The thorium fuel cycle is emerging as an attractive alternative to conventional nuclear fuel cycles, as it does not require the enrichment of uranium for long-term sustainability. The operating principle of this fuel cycle is the irradiation of 232Th to produce 233U, which is fissile and sustains the fission chain reaction. 233U poses unique challenges for nuclear safeguards, as it is associated with a uniquely extreme γ-ray environment from 232U contamination, which limits the feasibility of the γ-ray-based assay, as well as more conservative accountability requirements than for 235U set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Consequently, instrumentation used for safeguarding 235U in traditional fuel cycles may be inapplicable. It is essential that the nondestructive signatures of 233U be characterized so that nuclear safeguards can be applied to thorium fuel-cycle facilities as they come online. In this work, a set of 233U3O8 plates, containing 984 g233U, was measured at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center. A high-pressure 4He gaseous scintillation detector, which is insensitive to γ-rays, was used to perform a passive fast neutron spectral signature measurement of 233U3O8, and was used in conjunction with a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator to demonstrate the differential die-away signature of this material. Furthermore, an array of 3He detectors was used in conjunction with the same neutron generator to measure the delayed neutron time profile of 233U, which is unique to this nuclide. These measurements provide a benchmark for future nondestructive assay instrumentation development, and demonstrate a set of key neutron signatures to be leveraged for nuclear safeguards in the thorium fuel cycle.
On May 26, 2021, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) convened a diverse group of experts spanning private industry, academia, the United States military and federal government, and the national laboratories, and hosted a series of panels to gain their insight on critical emergent research and capability development needs to support national cyber strategy objectives. Two panelists of experts presented their prepared remarks, followed by open discussion from over 250 audience members.
On December 9, 2020, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) convened a diverse set of voices from across the federal government, the United States (U.S.) military, the private sector, and national laboratories to understand current and future trends affecting our national cyber strategy, and to illuminate the role of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) in contributing to national cyber strategy objectives.
Further to our previous safeguards approach for Accelerator Driven Systems, which focused on estimates of fissile material production using relevant proton accelerator systems and corresponding safeguards needs for fuel storage, the subcritical reactor, and spent fuel storage material balances areas, this report is more expansive and considers utilization of ADS for either burning of transuranics or breeding of fissile materials. We find that the recycled fuels likely intended for ADS will be thermally and radioactively hot to such a degree that it is likely reprocessing and fuel fabrication will have to be co - located with the ADS reactor facility to avoid impractical hot fuel transportation issues. As such, we consider in detail the full ADS system to include material balance areas for spent fuel receiving, reprocessing, storage & cooling, fuel fabrication, subcritical reactor area, and waste storage & handling. Furthermore, aqueous - based separation methods like PUREX cannot tolerate the intense heat of the ADS fuels, so pyroprocessing will likely be required. With these considerations, we developed an Enhanced Safeguards Approach for ADS beyond the work done in our first report, and conclude that significant diagnostic development is needed , a nd provide safeguards recommendations. We have also included an appendix regarding some country programs, in particular the Chinese ADANES burner/breeder program a nd the Indian thorium - based breeder program.
This paper was written by the Cyber Deterrence and Resilience Strategic Initiative in partnership with the Resilience Energy Systems Strategic Initiative. Resilience and deterrence are both part of a comprehensive cyber strategy where tactics may overlap across defense, resilience, deterrence, and other strategic spaces. This paper explores how building resiliency in cyberspace can not only serve to strengthen the defender's posture and capabilities in a general sense but also deter adversaries from attacking.
Since even before its establishment as an independent national security laboratory in 1949, Sandia has been devoted to an overarching mission of developing advanced technologies for global peace. These technologies have taken a variety of forms, and they exist in and must address an ever-changing global security environment. An understanding of that global security environment and its possible or likely evolution is therefore critical to ensuring that Sandia can maintain its focus on strategic technology investments that will benefit the nation in the next 20- 30 years. Sandia sustains multiple Systems Analysis organizations whose responsibility includes maintaining an understanding of the global security environment as it applies across multiple mission domains. The topics below include two from Sandia's emerging threats and biodefense mission, three with relevance to Sandia's cyber defense mission, and four of particular but not exclusive relevance to Sandia's nuclear deterrence mission. All are intended to spur independent academic thought that could assist Sandia as well as the broader national security community in anticipating and adapting to a continually changing world. Sandia anticipates periodic interactions between Sandia Systems Analysis staff and SciPol Scholars Program faculty and students who choose to expand upon these topics in order to provide opportunities for feedback and communication throughout 2020-2021.
Through cyberattacks on information technology and digital communications systems, antagonists have increasingly been able to alter the strategic balance in their favor without provoking serious consequences. Conflict within and through the cyber domain is inherently different from conflict in other domains that house our critical systems. These differences result in new challenges for defending and creating resilient systems, and for deterring those who would wish to disrupt or destroy them. The purpose of this paper is to further examine the question of whether or not deterrence can be an effective strategy in cyber conflict, given our broad and varied interests in cyberspace. We define deterrence broadly as the creation of conditions that dissuade antagonists from taking unwanted actions because they believe that they will incur unacceptably high costs and/or receive insufficient benefits from taking that action. Deterrence may or may not be the most credible or effective strategy for achieving our desired end states in cybersecurity. Regardless of the answer here, however, it is important to consider why deterrence strategies might succeed under certain conditions, and to understand why deterrence is not effective within the myriad contexts that it appears fail. Deterrence remains a key component of U.S. cyber strategy, but there is little detail on how to operationalize or implement this policy, how to bring a whole-of-government and whole-of- private-sector approach to cyber deterrence, which types of antagonists can or should be deterred, and in which contexts. Moreover, discussion about how nations can and should respond to significant cyber incidents largely centers around whether or not the incident constitutes a "use of force," which would justify certain types of responses according to international law. However, we believe the "use of force" threshold is inadequate to describe the myriad interests and objectives of actors in cyberspace, both attackers and defenders. In this paper, we propose an approach to further examine if deterrence is an effective strategy and under which conditions. Our approach includes systematic analysis of cyber incident scenarios using a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of various activities in influencing antagonist behavior. While we only examine a single scenario for this paper, we propose that additional work is needed to more fully understand how various alternative thresholds constrain or unleash options for actors to influence one another's behavior in the cyber domain.
In 2018 Sandia National Laboratories launched the Civilian Cyber Strategic Initiative, an ongoing multi-year effort to characterize future threats to civilian cyber infrastructures, to inform research and development efforts to detect, attribute, counter, and recover from cyber attacks, and to inform program and capability investment decisions across the Energy and Homeland Security portfolio at Sandia. One of the primary objectives of the Civilian Cyber Strategic initiative is to leverage Sandia's systems analysis capabilities to characterize future threats and to support a new theory of deterrence. Towards the goal of supporting a new theory of deterrence in cyberspace, the purpose of this study was to understand how new and existing deterrence paradigms can be applied to cyberspace, to identify unique challenges and pitfalls associated with deterring adversaries in cyberspace, and to develop preliminary ideas for how our ability to deter cyber adversaries might be improved. Our approach combined literature reviews of relevant policy documents and the academic literature with interviews of experts both at Sandia and beyond.