Publications

Moussa, Jawad R.; Solodov, Alexander A.; Horowitz, Steven M.

Abstract not provided.

Moussa, Jawad R.; Solodov, Alexander A.; Horowitz, Steven M.

Abstract not provided.

Spence, Sondra E.; Baum, Gregory A.; Horowitz, Steven M.

Abstract not provided.

Bland, Jesse J.; Evans, Alan S.; Goolsby, Tommy D.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Monthan, Chad W.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Rivers, Joe R.; Rodgers, Thomas W.; White, Jake W.; Williams, Adam D.

The design and construction of a nuclear power plant must include robust structures and a security boundary that is difficult to penetrate. For security considerations, the reactors would ideally be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, which would be too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives. Additionally, all communications and power transfer lines would also be located underground and would be fortified against any possible design basis threats. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is a key aspect for determining response and staffing requirements. Considerations considered in a graded approach to physical protection are described.

Bland, Jesse J.; Evans, Alan S.; Goolsby, Tommy D.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Monthan, Chad W.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Rivers, Joe R.; Rodgers, Thomas W.; White, Jake W.; Williams, Adam D.

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.

Bland, Jesse J.; Evans, Alan S.; Goolsby, Tommy D.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Monthan, Chad W.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Rivers, Joe R.; Rodgers, Thomas W.; White, Jake W.; Williams, Adam D.

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for determining response and staffing requirements.

Farley, David R.; Uribe, Eva U.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Solodov, Alexander A.

Further to our previous safeguards approach for Accelerator Driven Systems, which focused on estimates of fissile material production using relevant proton accelerator systems and corresponding safeguards needs for fuel storage, the subcritical reactor, and spent fuel storage material balances areas, this report is more expansive and considers utilization of ADS for either burning of transuranics or breeding of fissile materials. We find that the recycled fuels likely intended for ADS will be thermally and radioactively hot to such a degree that it is likely reprocessing and fuel fabrication will have to be co - located with the ADS reactor facility to avoid impractical hot fuel transportation issues. As such, we consider in detail the full ADS system to include material balance areas for spent fuel receiving, reprocessing, storage & cooling, fuel fabrication, subcritical reactor area, and waste storage & handling. Furthermore, aqueous - based separation methods like PUREX cannot tolerate the intense heat of the ADS fuels, so pyroprocessing will likely be required. With these considerations, we developed an Enhanced Safeguards Approach for ADS beyond the work done in our first report, and conclude that significant diagnostic development is needed , a nd provide safeguards recommendations. We have also included an appendix regarding some country programs, in particular the Chinese ADANES burner/breeder program a nd the Indian thorium - based breeder program.

Williams, Adam D.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Bland, Jesse J.; Cohn, Brian C.; Faucett, Christopher F.; Gilbert, Luke J.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Rutkowski, Joshua E.

Abstract not provided.

Williams, Adam D.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Bland, Jesse J.; Cohn, Brian C.; Faucett, Christopher F.; Gilbert, Luke J.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Rutkowski, Joshua E.

Abstract not provided.

Solodov, Alexander A.; Potter, Charles A.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Gilbert, Christina L.; Lieberman, Jodi B.

Abstract not provided.

Solodov, Alexander A.; Potter, Charles A.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Gilbert, Luke J.; Lieberman, Jodi B.

Abstract not provided.

Small, Daniel E.; Solodov, Alexander A.; Novick, David K.; Horowitz, Steven M.

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Horowitz, Steven M.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Swanson, Meili C.

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Small, Daniel E.; Solodov, Alexander A.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Novick, David K.

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Horowitz, Steven M.

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Horowitz, Steven M.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Swanson, Meili C.

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Horowitz, Steven M.

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Williams, Adam D.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Bland, Jesse J.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Cohn, Brian C.; Faucett, Christopher F.; Gilbert, Luke J.; Haddal, Risa H.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Majedi, Mike M.; Snell, Mark K.

Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors-- increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aims of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives. This page left blank intentionally

Solodov, Alexander A.; Horowitz, Steven M.

Abstract not provided.

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Hinderstein, Corey H.; Crawford, Cary E.; Pickett, Chris P.; Disser, HJay D.; Swanson, Meili C.; Bachner, Katherine B.; Frazar, Sarah F.; Horak, Karl E.; Klein, Holli K.; Horowitz, Steven M.

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Solodov, Alexander A.; Horowitz, Steven M.

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Gastelum, Zoe N.; Hinderstein, Corey H.; Crawford, Cary E.; Pickett, Chris P.; Disser, HJay D.; Swanson, Meili C.; Bachner, Katherine B.; Frazar, Sarah F.; Horak, Karl E.; Klein, Holli K.; Horowitz, Steven M.

Abstract not provided.

Horowitz, Steven M.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Solodov, Alexander A.; Deland, Sharon M.; Wallace, Eric A.; Koskelo, Markku J.; Swanson, Meili C.; Hernandez, Tina H.

Abstract not provided.

Horowitz, Steven M.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Smartt, Heidi A.; Solodov, Alexander A.; Deland, Sharon M.; Wallace, Eric A.; Koskelo, Markku J.; Swanson, Meili C.; Hernandez, Tina H.

Abstract not provided.