Helium-4-based scintillation detector technology is emerging as a strong alternative to pulse-shape discrimination-capable organic scintillators for fast neutron detection and spectroscopy, particularly in extreme gamma-ray environments. The 4He detector is intrinsically insensitive to gamma radiation, as it has a relatively low cross-section for gamma-ray interactions, and the stopping power of electrons in the 4He medium is low compared to that of 4He recoil nuclei. Consequently, gamma rays can be discriminated by simple energy deposition thresholding instead of the more complex pulse shape analysis. The energy resolution of 4He scintillation detectors has not yet been well-characterized over a broad range of energy depositions, which limits the ability to deconvolve the source spectra. In this work, an experiment was performed to characterize the response of an Arktis S670 4He detector to nuclear recoils up to 9 MeV. The 4He detector was positioned in the center of a semicircular array of organic scintillation detectors operated in coincidence. Deuterium–deuterium and deuterium–tritium neutron generators provided monoenergetic neutrons, yielding geometrically constrained nuclear recoils ranging from 0.0925 to 8.87 MeV. The detector response provides evidence for scintillation linearity beyond the previously reported energy range. The measured response was used to develop an energy resolution function applicable to this energy range for use in high-fidelity detector simulations needed by future applications.
The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.
Helium-4-based scintillation detector technology is emerging as a strong alternative to pulse-shape discrimination-capable organic scintillators for fast neutron detection and spectroscopy, particularly in extreme gamma-ray environments. The 4He detector is intrinsically insensitive to gamma radiation, as it has a relatively low cross-section for gamma-ray interactions, and the stopping power of electrons in the 4He medium is low compared to that of 4He recoil nuclei. Consequently, gamma rays can be discriminated by simple energy deposition thresholding instead of the more complex pulse shape analysis. The energy resolution of 4He scintillation detectors has not yet been well-characterized over a broad range of energy depositions, which limits the ability to deconvolve the source spectra. In this work, an experiment was performed to characterize the response of an Arktis S670 4He detector to nuclear recoils up to 9 MeV. The 4He detector was positioned in the center of a semicircular array of organic scintillation detectors operated in coincidence. Deuterium–deuterium and deuterium–tritium neutron generators provided monoenergetic neutrons, yielding geometrically constrained nuclear recoils ranging from 0.0925 to 8.87 MeV. The detector response provides evidence for scintillation linearity beyond the previously reported energy range. The measured response was used to develop an energy resolution function applicable to this energy range for use in high-fidelity detector simulations needed by future applications.
Helium-4-based scintillation detector technology is emerging as a strong alternative to pulse-shape discrimination-capable organic scintillators for fast neutron detection and spectroscopy, particularly in extreme gamma-ray environments. The 4He detector is intrinsically insensitive to gamma radiation, as it has a relatively low cross-section for gamma-ray interactions, and the stopping power of electrons in the 4He medium is low compared to that of 4He recoil nuclei. Consequently, gamma rays can be discriminated by simple energy deposition thresholding instead of the more complex pulse shape analysis. The energy resolution of 4He scintillation detectors has not yet been well-characterized over a broad range of energy depositions, which limits the ability to deconvolve the source spectra. In this work, an experiment was performed to characterize the response of an Arktis S670 4He detector to nuclear recoils up to 9 MeV. The 4He detector was positioned in the center of a semicircular array of organic scintillation detectors operated in coincidence. Deuterium–deuterium and deuterium–tritium neutron generators provided monoenergetic neutrons, yielding geometrically constrained nuclear recoils ranging from 0.0925 to 8.87 MeV. The detector response provides evidence for scintillation linearity beyond the previously reported energy range. Finally, the measured response was used to develop an energy resolution function applicable to this energy range for use in high-fidelity detector simulations needed by future applications.
Radiation source localization is important for nuclear nonproliferation and can be obtained using time-encoded imaging systems with unsegmented detectors. A scintillation crystal can be used with a moving coded-aperture mask to vary the detected count rate produced from radiation sources in the far field. The modulation of observed counts over time can be used to reconstruct an image with the known coded-aperture mask pattern. Current time-encoded imaging systems incorporate cylindrical coded-aperture masks and have limits to their fully coded imaging field-of-view. This work focuses on expanding the field-of-view to 4π by using a novel spherical coded-aperture mask. A regular icosahedron is used to approximate a spherical mask. This icosahedron consists of 20 equilateral triangles; the faces of which are each subdivided into four equilateral triangle-shaped voxels which are then projected onto a spherical surface, creating an 80-voxel coded-aperture mask. These polygonal voxels can be made from high-Z materials for gamma-ray modulation and/or low-Z materials for neutron modulation. In this work, we present Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) simulations and simple models programmed in Mathematica to explore image reconstruction capabilities of this 80-voxel coded-aperture mask.
We characterize the performance of two pixelated neutron detectors: a PMT-based array that utilizes Anger logic for pixel identification and a SiPM-based array that employs individual pixel readout. The SiPM-based array offers improved performance over the previously developed PMT-based detector both in terms of uniformity and neutron detection efficiency. Each detector array uses PSD-capable plastic scintillator as a detection medium. We describe the calibration and neutron efficiency measurement of both detectors using a 137Cs source for energy calibration and a 252Cf source for calibration of the neutron response. We find that the intrinsic neutron detection efficiency of the SiPM-based array is (30.2 ± 0.9)%, which is almost twice that of the PMT-based array, which we measure to be (16.9 ± 0.1)%.
The thorium fuel cycle is emerging as an attractive alternative to conventional nuclear fuel cycles, as it does not require the enrichment of uranium for long-term sustainability. The operating principle of this fuel cycle is the irradiation of 232Th to produce 233U, which is fissile and sustains the fission chain reaction. 233U poses unique challenges for nuclear safeguards, as it is associated with a uniquely extreme γ-ray environment from 232U contamination, which limits the feasibility of the γ-ray-based assay, as well as more conservative accountability requirements than for 235U set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Consequently, instrumentation used for safeguarding 235U in traditional fuel cycles may be inapplicable. It is essential that the nondestructive signatures of 233U be characterized so that nuclear safeguards can be applied to thorium fuel-cycle facilities as they come online. In this work, a set of 233U3O8 plates, containing 984 g233U, was measured at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center. A high-pressure 4He gaseous scintillation detector, which is insensitive to γ-rays, was used to perform a passive fast neutron spectral signature measurement of 233U3O8, and was used in conjunction with a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator to demonstrate the differential die-away signature of this material. Furthermore, an array of 3He detectors was used in conjunction with the same neutron generator to measure the delayed neutron time profile of 233U, which is unique to this nuclide. These measurements provide a benchmark for future nondestructive assay instrumentation development, and demonstrate a set of key neutron signatures to be leveraged for nuclear safeguards in the thorium fuel cycle.
Many highly pixelated organic scintillator detection systems would benefit from independent readout of each scintillator pixel. Recent advances in Silicon Photomultiplier (SiPM) technology makes this goal feasible, however the data acquisition from potentially hundreds or thousands of channels requires a low-cost and compact solution. For pixelated neutron detection with organic scintillators, the capability to distinguish between neutron and gamma interactions using Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) is required along with pulse charge and time of arrival. The TOFPET2 ASIC from PETsys Electronics is a 64-channel readout chip providing pulse time and charge integration measurements from SiPMs, and is specifically designed for time-of-flight positron-emission tomography. Using an 8 × 8 array of 6 mm × 6 mm J-series SiPMs from SensL/OnSemi (ArrayJ-60035-64P-PCB), we have studied the energy and PSD performance of the TOFPET2 ASIC using a 4 × 4 array of 6 mm × 6 mm × 30 mm trans-Stilbene crystals from Inrad Optics and a custom SiPM routing board from PETsys Electronics. Using a time-over-threshold method, we measure a maximum PSD figure-of-merit of approximately 1.2 at 478 keV (the Compton edge of 662 keV) for a J-series SiPM operating at an over-voltage of 3V.
