Publications

Uribe, Eva U.; Gilbert, Stephen M.; Evans, Louise G.; Luciano, Nicholas P.; Reed, Richard L.; McGirl, Natalie A.; Powers, Jeffrey J.

Abstract not provided.

Uribe, Eva U.; Gilbert, Stephen M.; Evans, Louise G.; Luciano, Nicholas P.; Reed, Richard L.; McGirl, Natalie A.; Powers, Jeffrey J.

Abstract not provided.

Boggs, Mathias D.; Minner, Michael F.; Uribe, Eva U.

On May 26, 2021, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) convened a diverse group of experts spanning private industry, academia, the United States military and federal government, and the national laboratories, and hosted a series of panels to gain their insight on critical emergent research and capability development needs to support national cyber strategy objectives. Two panelists of experts presented their prepared remarks, followed by open discussion from over 250 audience members.

Uribe, Eva U.; Hammer, Ann H.; Miller, Trisha H.

Abstract not provided.

Farley, David R.; Uribe, Eva U.; Horowitz, Steven M.; Solodov, Alexander A.

Further to our previous safeguards approach for Accelerator Driven Systems, which focused on estimates of fissile material production using relevant proton accelerator systems and corresponding safeguards needs for fuel storage, the subcritical reactor, and spent fuel storage material balances areas, this report is more expansive and considers utilization of ADS for either burning of transuranics or breeding of fissile materials. We find that the recycled fuels likely intended for ADS will be thermally and radioactively hot to such a degree that it is likely reprocessing and fuel fabrication will have to be co - located with the ADS reactor facility to avoid impractical hot fuel transportation issues. As such, we consider in detail the full ADS system to include material balance areas for spent fuel receiving, reprocessing, storage & cooling, fuel fabrication, subcritical reactor area, and waste storage & handling. Furthermore, aqueous - based separation methods like PUREX cannot tolerate the intense heat of the ADS fuels, so pyroprocessing will likely be required. With these considerations, we developed an Enhanced Safeguards Approach for ADS beyond the work done in our first report, and conclude that significant diagnostic development is needed , a nd provide safeguards recommendations. We have also included an appendix regarding some country programs, in particular the Chinese ADANES burner/breeder program a nd the Indian thorium - based breeder program.

Bonin, Benjamin J.; Uribe, Eva U.; Reinhardt, Jason C.; Hamel, Michael C.

Abstract not provided.

Reinhardt, Jason C.; Bonin, Benjamin J.; Hamel, Michael C.; Uribe, Eva U.

Abstract not provided.

Reinhardt, Jason C.; Bonin, Benjamin J.; Uribe, Eva U.; Hamel, Michael C.

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Bonin, Benjamin J.; Uribe, Eva U.; Reinhardt, Jason C.; Hamel, Michael C.

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Farley, David R.; Uribe, Eva U.; Herberg-Bowen, Julie H.

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Minner, Michael F.; Uribe, Eva U.

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Farley, David R.; Uribe, Eva U.; Herberg-Bowen, Julie H.

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Uribe, Eva U.; Bonin, Benjamin J.; Minner, Michael F.; Reinhardt, Jason C.; Hammer, Ann H.; Teclemariam, Nerayo P.; Miller, Trisha H.; Forrest, Robert F.; Apolis, Jeffrey J.; Yang, Lynn I.

Through cyberattacks on information technology and digital communications systems, antagonists have increasingly been able to alter the strategic balance in their favor without provoking serious consequences. Conflict within and through the cyber domain is inherently different from conflict in other domains that house our critical systems. These differences result in new challenges for defending and creating resilient systems, and for deterring those who would wish to disrupt or destroy them. The purpose of this paper is to further examine the question of whether or not deterrence can be an effective strategy in cyber conflict, given our broad and varied interests in cyberspace. We define deterrence broadly as the creation of conditions that dissuade antagonists from taking unwanted actions because they believe that they will incur unacceptably high costs and/or receive insufficient benefits from taking that action. Deterrence may or may not be the most credible or effective strategy for achieving our desired end states in cybersecurity. Regardless of the answer here, however, it is important to consider why deterrence strategies might succeed under certain conditions, and to understand why deterrence is not effective within the myriad contexts that it appears fail. Deterrence remains a key component of U.S. cyber strategy, but there is little detail on how to operationalize or implement this policy, how to bring a whole-of-government and whole-of- private-sector approach to cyber deterrence, which types of antagonists can or should be deterred, and in which contexts. Moreover, discussion about how nations can and should respond to significant cyber incidents largely centers around whether or not the incident constitutes a "use of force," which would justify certain types of responses according to international law. However, we believe the "use of force" threshold is inadequate to describe the myriad interests and objectives of actors in cyberspace, both attackers and defenders. In this paper, we propose an approach to further examine if deterrence is an effective strategy and under which conditions. Our approach includes systematic analysis of cyber incident scenarios using a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of various activities in influencing antagonist behavior. While we only examine a single scenario for this paper, we propose that additional work is needed to more fully understand how various alternative thresholds constrain or unleash options for actors to influence one another's behavior in the cyber domain.

Minner, Michael F.; Uribe, Eva U.

Abstract not provided.

Uribe, Eva U.

Abstract not provided.

Minner, Michael F.; Uribe, Eva U.; Teclemariam, Nerayo P.

Abstract not provided.

Jacobson, Ryan J.; Johnson, David J.; Uribe, Eva U.

Abstract not provided.

Uribe, Eva U.

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Uribe, Eva U.

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Uribe, Eva U.

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Uribe, Eva U.

Abstract not provided.