Sandia National Laboratories and Idaho National Laboratory deployed state-of-the-art cybersecurity technologies within a virtualized, cyber-physical wind energy site to demonstrate their impact on security and resilience. This work was designed to better quantify cost-benefit tradeoffs and risk reductions when layering different security technologies on wind energy operational technology networks. Standardized step-by-step attack scenarios were drafted for adversaries with remote and local access to the wind network. Then, the team investigated the impact of encryption, access control, intrusion detection, security information and event management, and security, orchestration, automation, and response (SOAR) tools on multiple metrics, including physical impacts to the power system and termination of the adversary kill chain. We found, once programmed, the intrusion detection systems could detect attacks and the SOAR system was able to effectively and autonomously quarantine the adversary, prior to power system impacts. Cyber and physical metrics indicated network and endpoint visibility were essential to provide human defenders situational awareness to maintain system resilience. Certain hardening technologies, like encryption, reduced adversary access, but recognition and response were also critical to maintain wind site operations. Lastly, a cost-benefit analysis was performed to estimate payback periods for deploying cybersecurity technologies based on projected breach costs.
Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 1.6 is widely used in the electric vehicle (EV) charging industry to communicate between Charging System Management Services (CSMSs) and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). Unlike OCPP 2.0.1, OCPP 1.6 uses unencrypted websocket communications to exchange information between EVSE devices and an on-premise or cloud-based CSMS. In this work, we demonstrate two machine-in-the-middle attacks on OCPP sessions to terminate charging sessions and gain root access to the EVSE equipment via remote code execution. Second, we demonstrate a malicious firmware update with a code injection payload to compromise an EVSE. Lastly, we demonstrate two methods to prevent availability of the EVSE or CSMS. One of these, originally reported by SaiFlow, prevents traffic to legitimate EVSE equipment using a DoS-like attack on CSMSs by repeatedly connecting and authenticating several CPs with the same identities as the legitimate CP. These vulnerabilities were demonstrated with proof-of-concept exploits in a virtualized Cyber Range at Wright State University and/or with a 350 kW Direct Current Fast Charger at Idaho National Laboratory. The team found that OCPP 1.6 could be protected from these attacks by adding secure shell tunnels to the protocol, if upgrading to OCPP 2.0.1 was not an option.
Sangoleye, Fisayo; Johnson, Jay; Chavez, Adrian R.; Tsiropoulou, Eirini E.; Marton, Nicholas L.; Hentz, Charles R.; Yannarelli, Albert
Microgrids require reliable communication systems for equipment control, power delivery optimization, and operational visibility. To maintain secure communications, Microgrid Operational Technology (OT) networks must be defensible and cyber-resilient. The communication network must be carefully architected with appropriate cyber-hardening technologies to provide security defenders the data, analytics, and response capabilities to quickly mitigate malicious and accidental cyberattacks. In this work, we outline several best practices and technologies that can support microgrid operations (e.g., intrusion detection and monitoring systems, response tools, etc.). Then we apply these recommendations to the New Jersey TRANSITGRID use case to demonstrate how they would be deployed in practice.
The goal of the project was to protect US critical infrastructure and improve energy security through technical analysis of the risk landscape presented by the anticipated massive deployment of interoperable EV chargers.
Fragkos, Georgios; Johnson, Jay; Tsiropoulou, Eirini E.
A global transition to power grids with high penetrations of renewable energy generation is being driven in part by rapid installations of distributed energy resources (DER). New DER equipment includes standardized IEEE 1547-2018 communication interfaces and proprietary communications capabilities. Interoperable DER provides new monitoring and control capabilities. The existence of multiple entities with different roles and responsibilities within the DER ecosystem makes the Access Control (AC) mechanism necessary. In this paper, we introduce and compare two novel architectures, which provide a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) service to the DER ecosystem’s entities. Selecting an appropriate RBAC technology is important for the RBAC administrator and users who request DER access authorization. The first architecture is centralized, based on the OpenLDAP, an open source implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). The second approach is decentralized, based on a private Ethereum blockchain test network, where the RBAC model is stored and efficiently retrieved via the utilization of a single Smart Contract. We have implemented two end-to-end Proofs-of-Concept (PoC), respectively, to offer the RBAC service to the DER entities as web applications. Finally, an evaluation of the two approaches is presented, highlighting the key speed, cost, usability, and security features.
Role-based access control (RBAC) is adopted in the information and communication technology domain for authentication purposes. However, due to a very large number of entities within organizational access control (AC) systems, static RBAC management can be inefficient, costly, and can lead to cybersecurity threats. In this article, a novel hybrid RBAC model is proposed, based on the principles of offline deep reinforcement learning (RL) and Bayesian belief networks. The considered framework utilizes a fully offline RL agent, which models the behavioral history of users as a Bayesian belief-based trust indicator. Thus, the initial static RBAC policy is improved in a dynamic manner through off-policy learning while guaranteeing compliance of the internal users with the security rules of the system. By deploying our implementation within the smart grid domain and specifically within a Distributed Energy Resources (DER) ecosystem, we provide an end-To-end proof of concept of our model. Finally, detailed analysis and evaluation regarding the offline training phase of the RL agent are provided, while the online deployment of the hybrid RL-based RBAC model into the DER ecosystem highlights its key operation features and salient benefits over traditional RBAC models.
As the U.S. electrifies the transportation sector, cyberattacks targeting vehicle charging could impact several critical infrastructure sectors including power systems, manufacturing, medical services, and agriculture. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery capabilities and must communicate to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid operator communication systems could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks — or public perception of such — would ripple across the industry and produce lasting effects. Unfortunately, there is currently no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured inter faces. Comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project provided the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team created a cybersecurity threat model and performed a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets across multiple manufacturers and vendors, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders could better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.
In the near future, grid operators are expected to regularly use advanced distributed energy resource (DER) functions, defined in IEEE 1547-2018, to perform a range of grid-support operations. Many of these functions adjust the active and reactive power of the device through commanded or autonomous operating modes which induce new stresses on the power electronics components. In this work, an experimental and theoretical framework is introduced which couples laboratory-measured component stress with advanced inverter functionality and derives a reduction in useful lifetime based on an applicable reliability model. Multiple DER devices were instrumented to calculate the additional component stress under multiple reactive power setpoints to estimate associated DER lifetime reductions. A clear increase in switch loss was demonstrated as a function of irradiance level and power factor. This is replicated in the system-level efficiency measurements, although magnitudes were different—suggesting other loss mechanisms exist. Using an approximate Arrhenius thermal model for the switches, the experimental data indicate a lifetime reduction of 1.5% when operating the inverter at 0.85 PF—compared to unity PF—assuming the DER failure mechanism thermally driven within the H-bridge. If other failure mechanisms are discovered for a set of power electronics devices, this testing and calculation framework can easily be tailored to those failure mechanisms.
Worldwide growth in electric vehicle use is prompting new installations of private and public electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE). EVSE devices support the electrification of the transportation industry but also represent a linchpin for power systems and transportation infras-tructures. Cybersecurity researchers have recently identified several vulnerabilities that exist in EVSE devices, communications to electric vehicles (EVs), and upstream services, such as EVSE vendor cloud services, third party systems, and grid operators. The potential impact of attacks on these systems stretches from localized, relatively minor effects to long-term national disruptions. Fortunately, there is a strong and expanding collection of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) cybersecurity best practices that may be applied to the EVSE environment to secure this equipment. In this paper, we survey publicly disclosed EVSE vulnerabilities, the impact of EV charger cyberattacks, and proposed security protections for EV charging technologies.
Inverters convert DC power to AC power that can be injected into the grid. Many inverters offer multiple, independent maximum power point trackers (MPPTs) to accommodate photovoltaic arrays with different orientations or capacities. No validated model for overall DC-to-AC power conversion efficiency is available for such inverters. Herein, we propose a mathematical model that describes the efficiency of a multi-MPPT inverter and present validation using a commercial inverter with six MPPT inputs.
Currently, the solar industry is operating with little application-specific guidance on how to protect and defend their systems from cyberattacks. This 3-year Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office-funded project helped advance the distributed energy resource (DER) cybersecurity state-of-the-art by (a) bolstering industry awareness of cybersecurity concepts, risks, and solutions through a webinar series and (b) developing recommendations for DER cybersecurity standards to improve the security performance of DER products and networks. Drafting DER standards is a lengthy, consensus-based process requiring effective leadership and stakeholder participation. This project was designed to reduce standard and guide writing times by creating well-researched recommendations that could act as a starting place for national and international standards development organizations. Working within the SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup, the team produced guidance for DER cybersecurity certification, communication protocol standards, network architecture s, access control, and patching. The team also led subgroups within the IEEE P 1547.3 Guide for Cybersecurity of Distributed Energy Resources Interconnected with Electric Power Systems committee and pushed a draft to ballot in October 2021.
In the near future, grid operators are expected to regularly use advanced distributed energy resource (DER) functions, defined in IEEE 1547-2018, to perform a range of grid-support operations. Many of these functions adjust the active and reactive power of the device through commanded or autonomous modes, which will produce new stresses on the grid-interfacing power electronics components, such as DC/AC inverters. In previous work, multiple DER devices were instrumented to evaluate additional component stress under multiple reactive power setpoints. We utilize quasi-static time-series simulations to determine voltage-reactive power mode (volt-var) mission profile of inverters in an active power system. Mission profiles and loss estimates are then combined to estimate the reduction of the useful life of inverters from different reactive power profiles. It was found that the average lifetime reduction was approximately 0.15% for an inverter between standard unity power factor operation and the IEEE 1547 default volt-var curve based on thermal damage due to switching in the power transistors. For an inverter with an expected 20-year lifetime, the 1547 volt-var curve would reduce the expected life of the device by 12 days. This framework for determining an inverter's useful life from experimental and modeling data can be applied to any failure mechanism and advanced inverter operation.
In the near future, grid operators are expected to regularly use advanced distributed energy resource (DER) functions, defined in IEEE 1547-2018, to perform a range of grid-support operations. Many of these functions adjust the active and reactive power of the device through commanded or autonomous modes, which will produce new stresses on the grid-interfacing power electronics components, such as DC/AC inverters. In previous work, multiple DER devices were instrumented to evaluate additional component stress under multiple reactive power setpoints. We utilize quasi-static time-series simulations to determine voltage-reactive power mode (volt-var) mission profile of inverters in an active power system. Mission profiles and loss estimates are then combined to estimate the reduction of the useful life of inverters from different reactive power profiles. It was found that the average lifetime reduction was approximately 0.15% for an inverter between standard unity power factor operation and the IEEE 1547 default volt-var curve based on thermal damage due to switching in the power transistors. For an inverter with an expected 20-year lifetime, the 1547 volt-var curve would reduce the expected life of the device by 12 days. This framework for determining an inverter's useful life from experimental and modeling data can be applied to any failure mechanism and advanced inverter operation.
Ninad, Nayeem; Apablaza-Arancibia, Estefan; Bui, Michel; Johnson, Jay
As more countries seek solutions to their de-carbonization targets using renewable energy (RE) technologies, interconnection standards and national grid codes for distributed energy resources (DER) are being updated to support higher penetrations of RE and improve grid stability. Common grid-code revisions mandate DER devices, such as solar inverters and energy storage systems, ride-through (RT) voltage and frequency disturbances. This is necessary because as the percentage of generation from DER increases, there is a greater risk power system faults will cause many or all DER to trip, triggering a substantial load-generation imbalance and possible cascading blackout. This paper demonstrates for the first time a methodology to verify commercial DER devices are compliant to new voltage, frequency, and rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) RT requirements established in IEEE Std. 1547-2018. The methodology incorporates a software automation tool, called the SunSpec System Validation Platform (SVP), in combination with a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) system to execute the IEEE Std. 1547.1-2020 RT test protocols. In this paper, the approach is validated with two commercial photovoltaic inverters, the test results are analyzed for compliance, and improvements to the test procedure are suggested.
While computer systems, software applications, and operational technology (OT)/Industrial Control System (ICS) devices are regularly updated through automated and manual processes, there are several unique challenges associated with distributed energy resource (DER) patching. Millions of DER devices from dozens of vendors have been deployed in home, corporate, and utility network environments that may or may not be internet-connected. These devices make up a growing portion of the electric power critical infrastructure system and are expected to operate for decades. During that operational period, it is anticipated that critical and noncritical firmware patches will be regularly created to improve DER functional capabilities or repair security deficiencies in the equipment. The SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup created a Patching Subgroup to investigate appropriate recommendations for the DER patching, holding fortnightly meetings for more than nine months. The group focused on DER equipment, but the observations and recommendations contained in this report also apply to DERMS tools and other OT equipment used in the end-to-end DER communication environment. The group found there were many standards and guides that discuss firmware lifecycles, patch and asset management, and code-signing implementations, but did not singularly cover the needs of the DER industry. This report collates best practices from these standards organizations and establishes a set of best practices that may be used as a basis for future national or international patching guides or standards.
There are now over 2.5 million Distributed Energy Resource (DER) installations connected to the U.S. power system. These installations represent a major portion of American electricity critical infrastructure and a cyberattack on these assets in aggregate would significantly affect grid operations. Virtualized Operational Technology (OT) equipment has been shown to provide practitioners with situational awareness and better understanding of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Deploying synthetic DER devices as honeypots and canaries would open new avenues of operational defense, threat intelligence gathering, and empower DER owners and operators with new cyber-defense mechanisms against the growing intensity and sophistication of cyberattacks on OT systems. Well-designed DER canary field deployments would deceive adversaries and provide early-warning notifications of adversary presence and malicious activities on OT networks. In this report, we present progress to design a high-fidelity DER honeypot/canary prototype in a late-start Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project.