Publications

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The power grid, traditionally perceived as an independent physical network has undergone a significant transformation in recent years due to its integration with cyber communication networks and modern digital components. Cyber situations, including cyber-attacks and network anomalies, can directly affect the physical operation of the grid; therefore, studying this intricate relationship between the physical and cyber systems is pivotal for enhancing the resilience and security of modern power systems. In this digest, a novel Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)-based Autoencoder (AE) model for cyber-physical data fusion and threat detection is proposed. The scenario under consideration includes the effective detection of a physical disturbance and a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, which obstructs control commands during the physical disturbance in the power grid. Detailed analysis and quantitative results regarding the LSTM-based AE model's training and evaluation phases is provided, which highlight its key operation features and benefits for guaranteeing security and resilience in the power grid.

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Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 1.6 is widely used in the electric vehicle (EV) charging industry to communicate between Charging System Management Services (CSMSs) and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). Unlike OCPP 2.0.1, OCPP 1.6 uses unencrypted websocket communications to exchange information between EVSE devices and an on-premise or cloud-based CSMS. In this work, we demonstrate two machine-in-the-middle attacks on OCPP sessions to terminate charging sessions and gain root access to the EVSE equipment via remote code execution. Second, we demonstrate a malicious firmware update with a code injection payload to compromise an EVSE. Lastly, we demonstrate two methods to prevent availability of the EVSE or CSMS. One of these, originally reported by SaiFlow, prevents traffic to legitimate EVSE equipment using a DoS-like attack on CSMSs by repeatedly connecting and authenticating several CPs with the same identities as the legitimate CP. These vulnerabilities were demonstrated with proof-of-concept exploits in a virtualized Cyber Range at Wright State University and/or with a 350 kW Direct Current Fast Charger at Idaho National Laboratory. The team found that OCPP 1.6 could be protected from these attacks by adding secure shell tunnels to the protocol, if upgrading to OCPP 2.0.1 was not an option.