Publications

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High pressure Type 2 hoop-wrapped, thick-walled vessels are commonly used at hydrogen refueling stations. Vessels installed at stations circa 2010 are now reaching their design cycle limit and are being retired, which is the motivation for exploring life extension opportunities. The number of design cycles is based on a fatigue life calculation using a fracture mechanics assessment according to ASME Section VIII, Division 3, which assumes each cycle is the full pressure range identified in the User's Design Specification for a given pressure vessel design; however, assessment of service data reveals that the actual pressure cycles are more conservative than the design specification. A case study was performed in which in-service pressure cycles were used to re-calculate the design cycles. It was found that less than 1% of the allowable crack extension was consumed when crack growth was assessed using in-service design pressures compared to the original design fatigue life from 2010. Additionally, design cycles were assessed on the 2010 era vessels based on design curves from the recently approved ASME Code Case 2938, which were based on fatigue crack growth rate relationships over a broader range of K. Using the Code Case 2938 design curves yielded nearly 2.7 times greater design cycles compared to the 2010 vessel original design basis. The benefits of using inservice pressure cycles to assess the design life and the implications of using the design curves in Code Case 2938 are discussed in detail in this paper.

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are considering flexible plant operations to take advantage of excess thermal and electrical energy. One option for NPPs is to pursue hydrogen production through high temperature electrolysis as an alternate revenue stream to remain economically viable. The intent of this study is to investigate the risk of a high temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen production facility (HTEF) in close proximity to an NPP. This analysis evaluates a postulated HTEF located 1 km from an NPP, including the likelihood of an accident and the associated consequence to critical NPP targets. This analysis shows that although the likelihood of a leak in an HTEF is not negligible, the consequence to critical NPP targets is not expected to lead to a failure at a distance of 1 km. Furthermore, the minimum separation distance of the HTEF is calculated based on the target fragility criteria of 1 psi defined in Regulatory Guide 1.91.

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT) is conducting research and development (R&D) on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). Two high priorities for SFWST disposal R&D are design concept development and disposal system modeling. These priorities are directly addressed in the SFWST ''Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment'' (GDSA) control account, which is charged with developing a geologic repository system modeling and analysis capability, and the associated software, ''GDSA Framework'', for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. ''GDSA Framework'' is supported by SFWST Campaign and its predecessor the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) campaign. This report fulfills the GDSA Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods work package (SF-20SN01030403) level 3 milestone — ''Advances in Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in GDSA Framework'' (M3SF-20SN010304032). It presents high level objectives and strategy for development of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis tools, demonstrates uncertainty quantification (UQ) and sensitivity analysis (SA) tools in GDSA Framework in FY20, and describes additional UQ/SA tools whose future implementation would enhance the UQ/SA capability of ''GDSA Framework''. This work was closely coordinated with the other Sandia National Laboratory GDSA work packages: the GDSA Framework Development work package (SF- 2051\101030404), the GDSA Repository Systems Analysis work package (SF-2051\101030405), and the GDSA PFLOTRAN Development work package (SF-20SN01030406). This report builds on developments reported in previous ''GDSA Framework'' milestones, particularly M2SF- 19SNO1030403.

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are considering flexible plant operations to take advantage of excess thermal and electrical energy. One option for NPPs is to pursue hydrogen production through high temperature electrolysis as an alternate revenue stream to remain economically viable. The intent of this study is to investigate the risk of a high temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen production facility (HTEF) in close proximity to an NPP. This analysis evaluates a postulated HTEF located 1 km from an NPP, including the likelihood of an accident and the associated consequence to critical NPP targets. This analysis shows that although the likelihood of a leak in an HTEF is not negligible, the consequence to critical NPP targets is not expected to lead to a failure at a distance of 1 km. Furthermore, the minimum separation distance of the HTEF is calculated based on the target fragility criteria of 1 psi defined in Regulatory Guide 1.91.

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This paper describes the source term calculation documented in SAND2011-0128, ''Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants Using High-Burnup or MOX Fuel'' and describes one method for implementing the calculation in MATLAB.

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The need to understand the risks and implications of traffic incidents involving hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles in tunnels is increasing in importance with higher numbers of these vehicles being deployed. A risk analysis was performed to capture potential scenarios that could occur in the event of a crash and provide a quantitative calculation for the probability of each scenario occurring, with a qualitative categorization of possible consequences. The risk analysis was structured using an event sequence diagram with probability distributions on each event in the tree and random sampling was used to estimate resulting probability distributions for each end-state scenario. The most likely consequence of a crash is no additional hazard from the hydrogen fuel (98.1–99.9% probability) beyond the existing hazards in a vehicle crash, although some factors need additional data and study to validate. These scenarios include minor crashes with no release or ignition of hydrogen. When the hydrogen does ignite, it is most likely a jet flame from the pressure relief device release due to a hydrocarbon fire (0.03–1.8% probability). This work represents a detailed assessment of the state-of-knowledge of the likelihood associated with various vehicle crash scenarios. This is used in an event sequence framework with uncertainty propagation to estimate uncertainty around the probability of each scenario occurring.

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Representations for margins associated with loss of assured safety (LOAS) for weak link (WL)/strong link (SL) systems involving multiple time-dependent failure modes are developed. The following topics are described: (i) defining properties for WLs and SLs, (ii) background on cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for link failure time, link property value at link failure, and time at which LOAS occurs, (iii) CDFs for failure time margins defined by (time at which SL system fails) − (time at which WL system fails), (iv) CDFs for SL system property values at LOAS, (v) CDFs for WL/SL property value margins defined by (property value at which SL system fails) − (property value at which WL system fails), and (vi) CDFs for SL property value margins defined by (property value of failing SL at time of SL system failure) − (property value of this SL at time of WL system failure). Included in this presentation is a demonstration of a verification strategy based on defining and approximating the indicated margin results with (i) procedures based on formal integral representations and associated quadrature approximations and (ii) procedures based on algorithms for sampling-based approximations.

Representations are developed and illustrated for the distribution of link property values at the time of link failure in the presence of aleatory uncertainty in link properties. The following topics are considered: (i) defining properties for weak links and strong links, (ii) cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for link failure time, (iii) integral-based derivation of CDFs for link property at time of link failure, (iv) sampling-based approximation of CDFs for link property at time of link failure, (v) verification of integral-based and sampling-based determinations of CDFs for link property at time of link failure, (vi) distributions of link properties conditional on time of link failure, and (vii) equivalence of two different integral-based derivations of CDFs for link property at time of link failure.

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This report reviews and offers recommendations from Sandia National transportation of hazardous materials in the U.S. The risk criteria should be used with the results of a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) in risk acceptance decision-making. The QRA for transportation is fundamentally the same as a fixed facility. However, there are differences in calculations of both the probabilities of occurrence and location of hazards. Involuntary individual fatality risk is recommended to be acceptable for annual probabilities of less than 3 x 10^-7 for any population, including vulnerable populations, and may be considered acceptable at the regulators discretion for non-sensitive/non-vulnerable populations if less than 5 x 10^-5 and demonstrated to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Societal risk is recommended to be acceptable if the annual frequency of events that would result in N or more fatalities is less than 10^-5/N events per year and may be considered acceptable at the regulators discretion if less than 10^-3/N events per year and demonstrated to be ALARP. These criteria should be applied to the societal risk over the entire transportation route, not normalized per-distance. These values are adapted from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 59A, a U.S. and international standard for liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility siting.

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The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT) is conducting research and development (R&D) on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). Two high priorities for SFWST disposal R&D are design concept development and disposal system modeling. These priorities are directly addressed in the SFWST Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) control account, which is charged with developing a geologic repository system modeling and analysis capability, and the associated software, GDSA Framework, for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. GDSA Framework is supported by SFWST Campaign and its predecessor the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) campaign.

The following topics are considered in this presentation: (i) Overview of evidence theory, (ii) Representation of loss of assured safety (LOAS) with evidence theory for a 1 SL, 1 WL system, (iii) Description of 2 SLs and 1 WL used for illustration, (iv) Plausibility and belief for LOAS and associated sampling-based verification calculations for a 2 SL, 1 WL system, (iv) Plausibility and belief for margins associated with LOAS for a 2 SL, 1 WL system, (v) Plausibility and belief for LOAS for a 2 SL, 2 WL system, (vi) Incorporation of evidence spaces for link temperature curves into LOAS calculations, (vii) Plausibility and belief for LOAS for WL/SL systems with SL subsystems, and (viii) Sampling-based procedures for the estimation of plausibility and belief. 2

In the summer of 2020, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to launch a spacecraft as part of the Mars 2020 mission. The rover on the proposed spacecraft will use a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) to provide continuous electrical and thermal power for the mission. The MMRTG uses radioactive plutonium dioxide. NASA is preparing a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for the mission in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. This Nuclear Risk Assessment addresses the responses of the MMRTG option to potential accident and abort conditions during the launch opportunity for the Mars 2020 mission and the associated consequences. This information provides the technical basis for the radiological risks discussed in the SEIS.

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