This report reviews regulations, codes, and standards to be considered for FCEB operations on airports governing vehicle safety, hydrogen infrastructure, and airport operations. Overall, the review found the existing regulatory framework largely suitable for FCEB operations on airports, with only minor gaps identified pertaining to heavy-duty vehicle fueling, operation and fire safety on airport aprons, and authorization for emergency power use.
The HyRAM+ software is an open-source toolkit that provides publicly available models and default input values to enable straightforward and consistent safety assessments for hydrogen and other alternative fuel systems, such as natural gas and propane. The HyRAM+ quantitative risk assessment calculation incorporates annual likelihood of leaks or failures for both compressed gaseous and liquefied flammable fuels, as well as probabilistic models for the effects of heat flux and overpressure. HyRAM
The Department of Energy Hydrogen Fuel Cell Technology Office and Wind Energy Technologies Office's Wind-H2-Green Steel/Ammonia project is an initiative to demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy of GW-scale integrated energy systems. The team designed reference facilities that utilize wind- and solar-produced hydrogen for industrial steel and ammonia production. This novel concept warranted review of safety codes and standards as they apply to the designs and the identification of codes and standards gaps. This report reviews hydrogen production and storage codes and standards using reference design specifications from a Minnesota steel plant. Requirements, recommendations, and exclusions for the system were identified. Observed gaps included non-specific salt cavern storage requirements, electrolyzer capacity beyond regulated ranges, and lack of requirements for iron reduction via hydrogen. This report will aide future project design efforts and may provide a basis for safety reviews in new designs for industrial facilities with hydrogen production integration.
Hydrogen fuel sources offer alternatives to conventional fuels in the rail transportation industry. Hydrogen powered locomotive designs utilizing either a fuel cell or an internal combustion engine can make migration to alternative fuels possible for rail transportation. Codes and standards are still in development for rail application of hydrogen and safety risks must be assessed for hydrogen locomotive applications. This report utilizes a failure mode & effects analysis framework to help qualitatively understand possible risks from a hydrogen locomotive system. Findings illustrate how a combination of three mitigations greatly reduces the risks from a hydrogen locomotive system.
Hydrogen-powered locomotives may present an alternative to diesel for achieving transportation-related decarbonization, energy security, and resilience goals. As an emerging technology, hydrogen locomotives may not have adequate representation in current safety codes and standards. NFPA 2 and other appropriate codes and standards were reviewed to identify technical gaps in the code for hydrogen rail defueling, refueling, maintenance, and storage. Several technical gaps pertaining to setback distances, allowable quantities, ventilation rates, and grounding have been identified. Fueling requirements can be informed by road vehicle standards but may need to be revised for larger quantity hydrogen locomotive systems. Since there are no hydrogen-specific locomotive design and safety standards, some aspects of diesel-based locomotive standards may apply. CGA G- 5.5 currently provides the most guidance on height, placement, orientation, and design of vent systems, while other standards emphasize the importance of shielding vent stacks and provide requirements for orientation of their discharge.
This report describes computational modeling in the HyRAM+ software for study of hydrogen behavior in two common scenarios. First, models of unignited plumes exiting a vent stack were considered. It was shown that entrainment and vent backpressure were major factors in plume physics. Second, HyRAM+ was extended to include wind effects on plumes by modifying the plume momentum balance and entrainment modeling. Use of the model showed that plume shape and length changed with wind speed and direction; in all cases, wind causes a shortening of the plume along the streamline. While the no-wind case in HyRAM+ has been validated and the newly developed wind model was fitted to very limited experimental data, more controlled experimental configurations would help validate the models and ensure accurate simulation of hydrogen plume behavior for vent stack releases or in wind.
The Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM+) software has seen various improvements and additional physics capabilities since validation against experimental data was last published for HyRAM v3.1. Notably, HyRAM+ now includes four models allowing for the calculation of overpressure resulting from vapor cloud explosions from unconfined jet releases. As with the previous HyRAM validation report, validation data was gathered from available published literature and tested against HyRAM+ capabilities. The validation comparisons include tank blowdown, unignited dispersion jet plume, ignited jet flame, and enclosed accumulation and overpressure. The unconfined overpressure calculations in HyRAM+ v5.1.1 generally show good agreement with many of the experimental data sets for all four unconfined overpressure models, though HyRAM+ overpredicts the experimental data for small and cryogenic hydrogen releases. The comparisons for the other HyRAM+ physics models are largely unchanged from the previously published validation report.
Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.
The Department of Energy Hydrogen Fuel Cell Technology Office and Wind Energy Technologies Office’s Wind-H2-Green Steel/Ammonia project is an initiative to demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy of GW-scale integrated energy systems. The team designed reference facilities that utilize wind- and solar-produced hydrogen for industrial steel and ammonia production. This novel concept warranted review of safety codes and standards as they apply to the designs and the identification of codes and standards as they apply to the designs and the identification of codes and standards gaps. This report reviews hydrogen production and storage codes and standards using reference design specifications from a Minnesota steel plant. Requirements, recommendations, and exclusions for the system were identified. Observed gaps included non-specific salt cavern storage requirements, electrolyzer capacity beyond regulated ranges, and lack of requirements for iron reduction via hydrogen. This report will aide future project design efforts and may provide a basis for safety reviews in new designs for industrial facilities with hydrogen production integration.
As hydrogen storage facilities increase in size and capacity, it may be necessary to evaluate codes and standards that regulate hydrogen, especially in relation to allowable aggregate quantities. Existing regulations for other substances with comparable hazards such as oxygen, natural gas, and petroleum were reviewed; most fuels do not have aggregate quantity limits despite sometimes having individual tank capacity restrictions or limits for certain non-industrial, indoor, or small-scale applications. This precedent suggests that specifying a hydrogen quantity limit may not be necessary. Several possible methods for identifying an appropriate limit are presented to illustrate different approaches for a limit basis. These methods are based on overall risk, or the specific consequences inflicted by a jet fire or an explosion on people and infrastructure. However, these example metrics tend to require assumptions about potential leak sizes, suggesting that a general aggregate quantity limit would be difficult to justify without more system-specific requirements.
Leaks in a hydrogen system can have destructive effects on other components within the system, leading to cascading leaks. The risk of cascading leaks is not currently quantified in many existing risk frameworks, but the prevalence of cascading failures in historical hydrogen facility accidents necessitates further study. A method for quantifying the probability, frequency, and risk of cascaded leaks is proposed. The method provides example scenarios of metrics that would set off cascading failures from each physical effect, including a jet fire melting the O-ring of another component, and an overpressure event from an initial explosion shearing off another component from the system. Cascading leak frequencies and individual risk are calculated for an example hypothetical system. While cascading leaks are quantitatively demonstrated to add to the overall risk, their contributions are small and may not add value to a risk assessment when analyzed in this rigorous quantitative framework.
Hydrogen powered locomotives are being explored to reduce emissions in rail applications. The risks of operations like refueling should be understood to ensure safe environments for workers and members of the public. Sensitivity analyses were conducted using HyRAM+ to identify major drivers of risk and compare effects of system parameters on individual risk. The consequences of jet fires from full-bore leaks dominated the risk, compared to explosions or smaller leaks. Pipe size, leak detection capability, and leak frequencies of system components greatly affected risk while overpressure modeling parameters and ambient conditions had little effect. The effects of personal protective equipment (PPE) materials on individual risk were quantified by reducing the individual’s exposure time or absorbed thermal dose. PPE only showed a risk reduction in low-risk cases. This study highlighted target areas for risk mitigation, including leak detection equipment and component maintenance, and indicated that the minimal effects of other parameters on risk may not justify prescriptive requirements for refueling operators.
Hydrogen energy storage can be used to achieve goals of national energy security, renewable energy integration, and grid resilience. Adapting underground natural gas storage facility (UNGSF) infrastructure for underground hydrogen storage (UHS) is one method of storing large quantities of hydrogen that has already largely been proven to work for natural gas. There are currently some underground salt caverns in the United States that are being used for hydrogen storage by commercial entities, but it is still a fairly new concept in that it has not been widely deployed nor has it been done with other geologic formations like depleted hydrocarbon reservoirs. Assessments of UHS systems can help identify and evaluate risks to people both working within the facility and residing nearby. This report provides example risk assessment methodologies and analyses for generic wellhead and processing facility configurations, specifically in the context of the risks of unintentional hydrogen releases into the air. Assessment of the hydrogen containment in the subsurface is also critically important for a safety assessment for a UHS facility, but those geomechanical assessments are not included in this report.
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is highly dependent on data, leading to more robust models as new and updated data is acquired. The Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment (HyRAM+) QRA capabilities include calculations of individual risk from leaks in a gaseous hydrogen facility due to the potential effects of jet fires and explosions. Leak frequencies are acquired through statistical analysis of published data from a variety of sources and industries. The filter leak frequencies in previous versions of the HyRAM+ software are substantially greater than the leak frequencies of other components, leading to QRA results for gaseous hydrogen in which filters consistently dominate the overall risk. Data that were previously used to derive the filter leak frequencies were reevaluated for applicability and additional data points were added to update the filter leak frequencies. The new frequencies are more comparable to leak frequencies for other components.
Hydrogen continues to show promise as a viable contributor to achieving energy storage goals such as energy security and decarbonization in the United States. However, many new and expanded hydrogen use applications will require identifying methods of larger-scale storage than the solutions that currently exist for smaller storage applications. One possibility is to store large quantities of gaseous hydrogen below ground level. Underground storage of other fuels such as natural gas is already currently utilized, so much of the infrastructure and basic technologies can be used as a basis for underground hydrogen storage (UHS). A few commercial UHS facilities currently exist in the United States, including salt caverns owned and operated by Air Liquide, Linde, and Conoco Philips, but UHS is still a relatively new concept that has not been widely deployed. It is necessary to understand the safety risks and hazards associated with UHS before its use can be expanded and accepted more broadly. Many of these risks are addressed through regulations, codes, and standards (RCS) issued by governing bodies and organizations with expertise in certain hazards. This report is a review of RCS documents relevant to UHS, with a particular lens on potential technical gaps in existing guidance. These gaps may be specific to the physical properties of hydrogen or due to the different technologies relevant for hydrogen vs. natural gas storage. This is meant to be a high-level review to identify relevant documents and potential gaps. Formally addressing the individual gaps identified here within the codes and standards themselves would involve a more intensive analysis and differ based on the code or standard revision processes of the various publishing organizations. Therefore, presenting specific recommendations for revising the verbiage of the documents for UHS applications is left for future work and other publications.
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is used in heating, cooking, and as a vehicle fuel (called autogas). A safety risk assessment may be needed to assess potential hazard scenarios and inform the regulations, codes, and standards that apply to LPG facilities, such as autogas refueling facilities. The frequency of unintended releases in an LPG system is an important aspect of a system quantitative risk assessment. This report documents estimation of leakage frequencies for individual components of LPG systems. These frequencies are described using uncertainty distributions obtained with Bayesian statistical methods, generic data, and LPG data which were publicly available. There was a lack of LPG data in the literature, so frequencies for most components were developed with generic data and should be used cautiously; without additional information about component leak frequencies in LPG systems, it is not known whether these generic frequencies may be conservative or non-conservative.
The previous separation distances in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Hydrogen Technologies Code (NFPA 2, 2020 Edition) for bulk liquid hydrogen systems lack a well-documented basis and can be onerous. This report describes the technical justifications for revisions of the bulk liquid hydrogen storage setback distances in NFPA 2, 2023 Edition. Distances are calculated based on a leak area that is 5% of the nominal pipe flow area. Models from the open source HyRAM+ toolkit are used to justify the leak size as well as calculate consequence-based separation distances from that leak size. Validation and verification of the numerical models is provided, as well as justification for the harm criteria used for the determination of the setback distances for each exposure type. This report also reviews mitigations that could result in setback distance reduction. The resulting updates to the liquid hydrogen separation distances are well-documented, retrievable, repeatable, revisable, independently verified, and use experimental results to verify the models.
