Sandia National Laboratories performed tests to address the potential vulnerability concerns of a coupled High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) inducing secondary coupling onto critical instrumentation and control cables in a nuclear power plant, with specific focus on early-time HEMP. Three types of receiving cables in nine configurations were tested to determine transfer functions between two electrically separated cables referenced to the common mode input current on the transmitting cable. One type of transfer function related the input short circuit current and resulting open circuit voltage on the receiving cable. The other transfer function related the input short circuit current and the resulting short circuit current on the receiving cable. A 500 A standard HEMP waveform was input into the transfer functions to calculate peak coupling values on the receiving cables. The highest level of coupling using the standard waveform occurred when cables were in direct contact, with a peak short circuit current of 85 A and open circuit voltage of 9.8 kV, while configurations with separated cables predicted coupling levels of less than 5 A or 500 V.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is performing a test campaign for the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) to address high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) vulnerability of critical components of generation stations, with focus on early-time (E1) HEMP. The campaign seeks to establish response and damage thresholds for these critical elements in response to reasonable HEMP threat levels as a means for determining where vulnerabilities may exist or where mitigations may be needed. This report provides component vulnerability test results that will help to inform site vulnerability assessments and HEMP mitigation planning.
This document summarizes the findings of a review of published literature regarding the potential impacts of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) phenomena on oil and gas pipeline systems. The impacts of telluric currents on pipelines and their associated cathodic protection systems has been well studied. The existing literature describes implications for corrosion protection system design and monitoring to mitigate these impacts. Effects of an EMP on pipelines is not a thoroughly explored subject. Most directly related articles only present theoretical models and approaches rather than specific analyses and in-field testing. Literature on SCADA components and EMP is similarly sparse and the existing articles show a variety of impacts to control system components that range from upset and damage to no effect. The limited research and the range of observed impacts for the research that has been published suggests the need for additional work on GMD and EMP and natural gas SCADA components.
The electric power grid is one of the most critical national infrastructures, and determining the susceptibility of power grid elements to external factors is of significant importance for ensuring grid resilience. Reliable energy is vital to the safety and security of society. One potential threat to the power grid comes in the form of strong electromagnetic field transients arising from high-altitude nuclear weapon detonation. The radiated EM fields from these can affect the operation of electronic components via direct field exposure or from the conducted transients that arise from coupling onto long cables. Vulnerability to these pulses for many electrical components on the grid is unknown. This research focuses on conducted pulse testing of digital protective relays in a power substation and their associated high-voltage circuit breaker circuit and instrumentation transformer circuits. The relays, yard cables, power supplies, and components representing yard equipment were assembled in a manner consistent with installation in a substation to represent the pulse's propagation in the components and wiring. Equipment was tested using pulsed injection into the yard cable. The results showed no equipment damage or undesired operations for insult levels below 180 kV peak open circuit voltage, which is significantly higher than the anticipated coupling to substation yard cables.
Severe, wide-area power system emergencies are rare but highly impactful. Such emergencies are likely to move the system well outside normal operating conditions. Appropriate remedial operation plans are unlikely to exist, and visibility into system stability is limited. Inspired by the literature on Transient Stability Constrained Optimal Power Flow and Emergency Control, we propose a stability-incentivized dynamic control optimization formulation. The formulation is designed to safely bring the system to an operating state with better operational and stability margins, reduced transmission line overlimits, and better power quality. Our use case demonstrates proof of concept that coordinated wide-area control has the potential to significantly improve power system state following a severe emergency.
This report presents a framework to evaluate the impact of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) event on a bulk electric power grid. This report limits itself to modeling the impact of EMP E1 and E3 components. The co-simulation of E1 and E3 is presented in detail, and the focus of the paper is on the framework rather than actual results. This approach is highly conservative as E1 and E3 are not maximized with the same event characteristics and may only slightly overlap. The actual results shown in this report are based on a synthetic grid with synthetic data and a limited exemplary EMP model. The framework presented can be leveraged and used to analyze the impact of other threat scenarios, both manmade and natural disasters. This report d escribes a Monte-Carlo based methodology to probabilistically quantify the transient response of the power grid to a HEMP event. The approach uses multiple fundamental steps to characterize the system response to HEMP events, focused on the E1 and E3 components of the event. 1) Obtain component failure data related to HEMP events testing of components and creating component failure models. Use the component failure model to create component failure conditional probability density function (PDF) that is a function of the HEMP induced terminal voltage. 2) Model HEMP scenarios and calculate the E1 coupled voltage profiles seen by all system components. Model the same HEMP scenarios and calculate the transformer reactive power consumption profiles due to E3. 3) Sample each component failure PDF to determine which grid components will fail, due to the E1 voltage spike, for each scenario. 4) Perform dynamic simulations that incorporate the predicted component failures from E1 and reactive power consumption at each transformer affected by E3. These simulations allow for secondary transients to affect the relays/protection remaining in service which can lead to cascading outages. 5) Identify the locations and amount of load lost for each scenario through grid dynamic simulation. This can be an indication of the immediate grid impacts from a HEMP event. In addition, perform more detailed analysis to determine critical nodes and system trends. 6) To help realize the longer-term impacts, a security constrained alternating current optimal power flow (ACOPF) is run to maximize critical load served. This report describes a modeling framework to assess the systemic grid impacts due to a HEMP event. This stochastic simulation framework generates a large amount of data for each Monte Carlo replication, including HEMP location and characteristics, relay and component failures, E3 GIC profiles, cascading dynamics including voltage and frequency over time, and final system state. This data can then be analyzed to identify trends, e.g., unique system behavior modes or critical components whose failure is more likely to cause serious systemic effects. The proposed analysis process is demonstrated on a representative system. In order to draw realistic conclusions of the impact of a HEMP event on the grid, a significant amount of work remains with respect to modeling the impact on various grid components.
Wide-area time-synchronized measurements have recently revealed troublesome forced oscillations (FOs) within modern synchronized power grids. In some cases, these FOs represent a dangerous hazard to the system. Recent research has focused on locating the source of FOs to provide operators with knowledge for mitigating their impact locally. This paper presents a complementary mitigation strategy, which is to purposely induce a second oscillation into the grid which cancels the impact of the FO. Such a strategy is complementary in that it may provide valuable time to operators attempting to locate the FOs source and to determine how to rectify it. This paper presents a suppression control strategy which modulates controllable devices to automatically cancel the impact of the FO without the need for locating the source of the original FO. The strategy is based upon tuned feedback control. The approach is demonstrated on a simulation system via modulation of inverter-based generation.
A High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is a potential threat to the power grid. HEMP can couple to transmission lines and cables, causing significant overvoltages which can be harmful to line connected equipment. The effects of overvoltages on various types of power systems components need to be understood. HEMP effects on trip coils were tested and presented in this report. A high voltage pulser was built to replicate the induced voltage waveform from a HEMP. The pulser was used to test breaker trip coils with increasing pulse magnitudes ranging from 20 kV to 80 kV. The State-of-Health of each trip coils was measured via mechanical operation and impedance measurements before and after each insult to identify any damage or degradation to the trip coils. Dielectric breakdown was observed at the conductor leads during testing, causing the HEMP insult to be diverted to the grounded casing. However, the dielectric breakdown did not cause interference with regular device operation.
Determining the effectiveness of surge and pulse protection devices in the United States power grid against effects of a High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is crucial in determining the present state of grid resilience. Transient Voltage Surge Suppressors (TVSS) are used to protect loads in substations from transient overvoltages. Designed to mitigate the effects of lightning, their response to a HEMP event is unknown and was determined. TVSSs were tested in two unique configurations using a pulser that generates pulses in the tens of nanoseconds scale to determine their protective capability as well as to determine their self-resilience against HEMP pulses. Testing concluded that TVSS devices adequately protect against microsecond scale pulses like lightning but do not protect against pulses resembling HEMP events. It suggests that TVSS devices should not be relied upon to mitigate the effects of HEMP pulses.
Sandia National Laboratories sponsored a three-year internally funded Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) effort to investigate the vulnerabilities and mitigations of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) on the electric power grid. The research was focused on understanding the vulnerabilities and potential mitigations for components and systems at the high voltage transmission level. Results from the research included a broad array of subtopics, covered in twenty-three reports and papers, and which are highlighted in this executive summary report. These subtopics include high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) characterization, HEMP coupling analysis, system-wide effects, and mitigating technologies.
Understanding the effect of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) on the equipment in the United States electrical power grid is important to national security. A present challenge to this understanding is evaluating the vulnerability of transformers to a HEMP. Evaluating vulnerability by direct testing is cost-prohibitive, due to the wide variation in transformers, their high cost, and the large number of tests required to establish vulnerability with confidence. Alternatively, material and component testing can be performed to quantify a model for transformer failure, and the model can be used to assess vulnerability of a wide variety of transformers. This project develops a model of the probability of equipment failure due to effects of a HEMP. Potential failure modes are cataloged, and a model structure is presented which can be quantified by the results of small-scale coupon tests.
Impacts of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) on the power grid are a growing concern due to the increased reliance on the power grid. A critical area of research is quantifying power system equipment response to HEMP since this is not known in general. Substation site surveys were performed at seven high voltage substations across the United States to gather substation layout and construction details pertinent to HEMP coupling calculations and component vulnerability assessments. The primary objective for the survey was to gather information on cable layouts and cable construction within substations. Additional information was also gathered on equipment present within the substations and control house layouts. This report provides information gathered from the substation surveys.
The Energy Surety Design Methodology (ESDM) provides a systematic approach for engineers and researchers to create a preliminary electric grid design, thus establishing a means to preserve and quickly restore customer-specified critical loads. Over a decade ago, Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) defined Energy Surety for applications with energy systems to include elements of reliability, security, safety, cost, and environmental impact. Since then, Sandia has employed design concepts of energy surety for over 20 military installations and their interaction with utility systems, including the Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security (SPIDERS) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) project. In recent years, resilience has also been added as a key element of energy surety. This methodology document includes both process recommendations and technical guidance, with references to useful tools and analytic approaches at each step of the process.