Synapse Energy Economics has conducted structured interviews to better characterize the current landscape of resilience planning within and across jurisdictions. Synapse interviewed representatives of a diverse group of communities and their electric utilities. The resulting case studies span geographies and utility regulatory structures and represent a range of threats. They also vary in terms of population density and size. This report summarizes our approach and the findings gleaned from these conversations. All the communities and utilities we interviewed see increased interest in and commitment of resources for energy-related resilience. The risks and consequences these communities and utilities faced in the past, face now, and will face in the future drove them to improve engagement, advance processes, further decision-making, and in many cases invest in projects. While no process used by communities and utilities was the same, the different processes used by communities and utilities allowed each one to make progress in its own way. Several approaches are emerging that can provide good models for other communities and utilities with an interest in improving resilience.
Sandia National Laboratories' (Sandia) Resilient Energy Systems (RES) Strategic Initiative is establishing a strategic vision for U.S. energy systems' resilience through threat-informed research and development, enabling energy and interdependent infrastructure systems to successfully adapt in an environment of accelerating change. A key challenge in promoting energy systems resilience lies in developing rigorous resilience analysis methodologies to quantify system performance. Resilience analysis methodologies should enable evaluation of the consequences of various disruptions and the relative effectiveness of potential mitigations. To address this challenge, RES synthesized the common components of Sandia's resilience frameworks into an integrated methodology for energy and infrastructure resilience analysis. This report documents, demonstrates, and extends this methodology.
This document represents the results of deliverable D05.02 (Identify relevant efforts at SNL and other institutions) under the activity area Relevant Efforts Review. The goal of the Relevant Efforts Review activity is to identify relevant data integration efforts at SNL and possibly other institutions and compile lessons learned that are relevant to the development of a framework for data integration efforts in support of analysts and decision makers. The intent of this activity is to provide, by examples, context of how the requirements-gathering process has already been implemented in other instances and to guide the development of such a process for OCIA's needs. Information for this report was gathered through SNL staff interviews and the team members' knowledge and project experiences.
To support more rigorous analysis on global security issues at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), there is a need to develop realistic data sets without using "real" data or identifying "real" vulnerabilities, hazards or geopolitically embarrassing shortcomings. In response, an interdisciplinary team led by subject matter experts in SNL's Center for Global Security and Cooperation (CGSC) developed a hypothetical case description. This hypothetical case description assigns various attributes related to international SNF transportation that are representative, illustrative and indicative of "real" characteristics of "real" countries. There is no intent to identify any particular country and any similarity with specific real-world events is purely coincidental. To support the goal of this report to provide a case description (and set of scenarios of concern) for international SNF transportation inclusive of as much "real-world" complexity as possible -- without crossing over into politically sensitive or classified information -- this SAND report provides a subject matter expert-validated (and detailed) description of both technical and political influences on the international transportation of spent nuclear fuel.
This Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project focused on understanding the mathematical relationships that can be used in assessing the value of executing various EMP mitigation strategies on the grid. This is referred to as the EMP Resilient Grid Value Model. Because the range of mitigation strategies can contain widely differing characteristics (operational vs. technological), it is necessary to compute functions of many interrelated metrics at varying levels of fidelity that will be used to provide feedback as to the cost/benefit relationship of any proposed strategy. The value model is a hierarchical decomposition of a system of systems (SoS) model down to a grid circuit model. The model is intended to be suitable for use in subsequent decision support optimization for resilience to EMP events. The metric set goes beyond direct, technical impacts on the electrical grid to include ancillary impacts on dependent infrastructure and enterprise concerns (water, DoD, transportation, etc.).
In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities -- and the associated suite of risks -- around the world, this project evaluated systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multimodal and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrated interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards risks is inherent in NFC activities and can go unidentified when each "S" is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques -- dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) -- provide integrated "3S" analysis to address these interdependencies and the research results suggest a need -- and provide a way -- to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global nuclear risks. Lastly, this research identifies areas where Sandia National Laboratories can spearhead technical advances to reduce global nuclear dangers.
This document provides implementation guidance for implementing personnel group FTE costs by JCA Tier 1 or 2 categories in the Contingency Contractor Optimization Tool – Engineering Prototype (CCOT-P). CCOT-P currently only allows FTE costs by personnel group to differ by mission. Changes will need to be made to the user interface inputs pages and the database
Despite the known degrading impact of high nuisance and false alarm rates (NAR/FAR) on operator performance, analyses of security systems often ignores operator performance. We developed a model to analyze the impact of nuisance alarm rates on operator performance and on overall system performance. The model demonstrates that current methods that do not account for operator performance produce optimistic estimates of system performance. As shown in our model, even low NAR/FAR levels and the associated alarm queueing effect can increase operator detect and response time, which in turn reduces the amount of time the response force has to interrupt the intruder. An illustrative analysis shows that alarm processing times can be higher than the assessment time due to queue wait times and that systems with only one or two operators can become overwhelmed as NAR increases, decreasing system performance.
ANS IHLRWM 2017 - 16th International High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference: Creating a Safe and Secure Energy Future for Generations to Come - Driving Toward Long-Term Storage and Disposal
Transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is expected to increase in the future, as the nuclear fuel infrastructure continues to expand and fuel takeback programs increase in popularity. Analysis of potential risks and threats to SNF shipments is currently performed separately for safety and security. However, as SNF transportation increases, the plausible threats beyond individual categories and the interactions between them become more apparent. A new approach is being developed to integrate safety, security, and safeguards (3S) under a system-theoretic framework and a probabilistic risk framework. At the first stage, a simplified scenario will be implemented using a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) method. This scenario considers a rail derailment followed by an attack. The consequences of derailment are calculated with RADTRAN, a transportation risk analysis code. The attack scenarios are analyzed with STAGE, a combat simulation model. The consequences of the attack are then calculated with RADTRAN. Note that both accident and attack result in SNF cask damage and a potential release of some fraction of the SNF inventory into the environment. The major purpose of this analysis was to develop the input data for DPRA. Generic PWR and BWR transportation casks were considered. These data were then used to demonstrate the consequences of hypothetical accidents in which the radioactive materials were released into the environment. The SNF inventory is one of the most important inputs into the analysis. Several pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel burnups and discharge times were considered for this proof-of-concept. The inventory was calculated using ORIGEN (point depletion and decay computer code, Oak Ridge National Laboratory) for 3 characteristic burnup values (40, 50, and 60 GWD/MTU) and 4 fuel ages (5, 10, 25 and 50 years after discharge). The major consequences unique to the transportation of SNF for both accident and attack are the results of the dispersion of radionuclides in the environment. The dynamic atmospheric dispersion model in RADTRAN was used to calculate these consequences. The examples of maximum exposed individual (MEI) dose, early mortality and soil contamination are discussed to demonstrate the importance of different factors. At the next stage, the RADTRAN outputs will be converted into a form compatible with the STAGE analysis. As a result, identification of additional risks related to the interaction between characteristics becomes a more straightforward task. In order to present the results of RADTRAN analysis in a framework compatible with the results of the STAGE analysis, the results will be grouped into three categories: • Immediate negative harms •Future benefits that cannot be realized •Additional increases in future risk By describing results within generically applicable categories, the results of safety analysis are able to be placed in context with the risk arising from security events.
The performance of many of the technologies used in physical protection systems that guard high-value assets are heavily influenced by weather and visibility conditions as well as intruder capabilities. This complicates the already difficult problem of optimizing the design of multi-layered physical protection systems. This paper develops an optimization model for the automatic design of these systems with explicit consideration of the impact of weather and visibility conditions as well as intruder capabilities on system performance. An illustrative case study is provided.