Semantic Graphis for Safeguards Data Integration Pattern Matching and Event Classification
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To support more rigorous analysis on global security issues at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), there is a need to develop realistic data sets without using "real" data or identifying "real" vulnerabilities, hazards or geopolitically embarrassing shortcomings. In response, an interdisciplinary team led by subject matter experts in SNL's Center for Global Security and Cooperation (CGSC) developed a hypothetical case description. This hypothetical case description assigns various attributes related to international SNF transportation that are representative, illustrative and indicative of "real" characteristics of "real" countries. There is no intent to identify any particular country and any similarity with specific real-world events is purely coincidental. To support the goal of this report to provide a case description (and set of scenarios of concern) for international SNF transportation inclusive of as much "real-world" complexity as possible -- without crossing over into politically sensitive or classified information -- this SAND report provides a subject matter expert-validated (and detailed) description of both technical and political influences on the international transportation of spent nuclear fuel.
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In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities -- and the associated suite of risks -- around the world, this project evaluated systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multimodal and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrated interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards risks is inherent in NFC activities and can go unidentified when each "S" is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques -- dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) -- provide integrated "3S" analysis to address these interdependencies and the research results suggest a need -- and provide a way -- to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global nuclear risks. Lastly, this research identifies areas where Sandia National Laboratories can spearhead technical advances to reduce global nuclear dangers.
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ESARDA Bulletin
The Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS) is a means to securely branch information from an existing measurement system or data stream to a secondary observer. In an international nuclear safeguards context, the EDAS connects to operator instrumentation, and provides a cryptographically secure copy of the information for a safeguards inspectorate. This novel capability could be a complement to inspector-owned safeguards instrumentation, offering context that is valuable for anomaly resolution and contingency. Sandia National Laboratories gathered operator and inspector requirements, and designed, developed, and fabricated prototype EDAS software and hardware. In partnership with Euratom, we performed an extended EDAS field trial at the Westinghouse Springfields nuclear fuel manufacturing facility in the United Kingdom. We inserted EDAS prototypes in operator instrumentation lines for a barcode scanner and weight scale at a portal where UF6 cylinders enter and exit the facility. The goal of the field trial was to demonstrate the utility of secure branching of operator instrumentation for nuclear safeguards, identify any unforeseen implementation and application issues, and confirm whether the approach is compatible with operator concerns and constraints. During the field trial, the data streams were collected for nine months, and the EDASs branched 698 barcode and 663 weight scale events. Our analysis found that both EDAS units accurately branched 100% of the data that flowed through the instrumentation lines when we compared them to the recorded operator data. With multiple deployed EDASs we found that it is possible to correlate the branched data and create a more holistic narrative of facility activities. Euratom reported the field trial as a full success due to the continuous, correct, and secure branching of safeguards relevant data. At the same time, the operator is satisfied that EDAS did not interfere with plant operations in any way. The success of this field trial is an important step toward illustrating the potential and utility of EDAS as a safeguards tool.
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The goal of the field trial of EDAS was to demonstrate the utility of secure branching of operator instrumentation for nuclear safeguards, identify any unforeseen implementation and application issues with EDAS, and confirm whether the approach is compatible with operator concerns and constraints.
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