Publications

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Safety standards development for maintenance facilities of liquid and compressed natural gas fueled vehicles is required to ensure proper facility design and operating procedures. Standard development organizations are utilizing risk-informed concepts to develop natural gas vehicle (NGV) codes and standards so that maintenance facilities meet acceptable risk levels. The present report summarizes Phase II work for existing NGV repair facility code requirements and highlights inconsistencies that need quantitative analysis into their effectiveness. A Hazardous and Operability study was performed to identify key scenarios of interest using risk ranking. Detailed simulations and modeling were performed to estimate the location and behavior of natural gas releases based on these scenarios. Specific code conflicts were identified, and ineffective code requirements were highlighted and resolutions proposed. These include ventilation rate basis on area or volume, as well as a ceiling offset which seems ineffective at protecting against flammable gas concentrations. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors gratefully acknowledge Bill Houf (SNL -- Retired) for his assistance with the set-up and post-processing of the numerical simulations. The authors also acknowledge Doug Horne (retired) for his helpful discussions. We would also like to acknowledge the support from the Clean Cities program of DOE's Vehicle Technology Office.

The goal of the DOE OE ESS Safety Roadmap is to foster confidence in the safety and reliability of energy storage systems.

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Several jurisdictions with critical tunnel infrastructure have expressed the need to understand the risks and implications of traffic incidents in tunnels involving hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. A risk analysis was performed to estimate what scenarios were most likely to occur in the event of a crash. The results show that the most likely consequence is no additional hazard from the hydrogen, although some factors need additional data and study to validate. This includes minor crashes and scenarios with no release or ignition. When the hydrogen does ignite, it is most likely a jet flame from the pressure relief device release due to a hydrocarbon fire. This scenario was considered in detailed modeling of specific tunnel configurations, as well as discussion of consequence concerns from the Massachusetts Department of Transportation. Localized concrete spalling may result where the jet flame impinges the ceiling, but this is not expected to occur with ventilation. Structural epoxy remains well below the degradation temperature. The total stress on the steel structure was significantly lower than the yield stress of stainless steel at the maximum steel temperature even when the ventilation was not operational. As a result, the steel structure will not be compromised. It is important to note that the study took a conservative approach in several factors, so observed temperatures should be lower than predicted by the models.

This report presents the results of instrumentation cable tests sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The goal of the tests was to assess thermal and electrical response behavior under fire-exposure conditions for instrumentation cables and circuits. The test objective was to assess how severe radiant heating conditions surrounding an instrumentation cable affect current or voltage signals in an instrumentation circuit. A total of thirty-nine small-scale tests were conducted. Ten different instrumentation cables were tested, ranging from one conductor to eight-twisted pairs. Because the focus of the tests was thermoset (TS) cables, only two of the ten cables had thermoplastic (TP) insulation and jacket material and the remaining eight cables were one of three different TS insulation and jacket material. Two instrumentation cables from previous cable fire testing were included, one TS and one TP. Three test circuits were used to simulate instrumentation circuits present in nuclear power plants: a 4–20 mA current loop, a 10–50 mA current loop and a 1–5 VDC voltage loop. A regression analysis was conducted to determine key variables affecting signal leakage time.

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Foster confidence in the safety and reliability of energy storage systems.

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The goal of the DOE OE ESS Safety Roadmap is to foster confidence in the safety and reliability of energy storage systems.

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