Publications

Abstract not provided.

The V31 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate (RCMD) as a third-generation EDS containment vessel. It is the fifth EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the 2019 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the code case, is 24 lb (11 kg) TNT-equivalent for up to 1092 detonations. This report documents the results of explosive tests that were performed on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico to qualify the vessel for field operations use. There were three design basis configurations for qualification testing. Qualification test (1) consisted of a simulated M55 rocket motor and warhead assembly of 24 lb (11 kg) of Composition C-4 (30 lb [14 kg] TNT equivalent). This test was considered the maximum load case, based on modeling and simulation methods performed by Sandia prior to the vessel design phase. Qualification test (2) consisted of a regular, right circular cylinder, unitary charge, located central to the vessel interior of 19.2 lb (8.72 kg) of Composition C-4 (24 lb [11 kg] TNT equivalent). Qualification test (3) consisted of a 12-pack of regular, right circular cylinders of 2 lb (908 g) each, distributed evenly inside the vessel (totaling 19.2 lb [8.72 kg] of C-4, or 24 lb [11 kg] TNT equivalent). All vessel acceptance criteria were met.

The V31 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate (RCMD) as a third - generation EDS containment vessel. It is the fifth EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the 2019 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the code case, is twenty-four (24) pounds TNT - equivalent for up to 1092 detonations. This report documents the results of explosive tests that were performed on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico to qualify the vessel for field operations use. There were three design basis configurations for qualification testing. Qualification test (1) consisted of a simulated M55 rocket motor and warhead assembly of 24lbs of Composition C-4 (30 lb TNT equivalent). This test was considered the maximum load case, based on modeling and simulation methods performed by Sandia prior to the vessel design phase. Qualification test (2) consisted of a regular, right circular cylinder, unitary charge, located central to the vessel interior of 19.2 lb of Composition C-4 (24 lb TNT equivalent). Qualification test (3) consisted of a 12-pack of regular, right circular cylinders of 2 lb each, distributed evenly inside the vessel (totaling 19.2 lb of C-4, or 24 lb TNT equivalent). All vessel acceptance criteria were met.

Abstract not provided.

The Explosive Destruction System (EDS), which was developed at Sandia National Laboratories, is a portable system used by the US Army to destroy recovered chemical munitions on site. The latest containment vessel is larger, much heavier and is expected to contain an explosive load over twice that of previous versions. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the BPVC, is 24 pounds TNT for up to 1,131 detonations. The EDS vessel consists of a stainless steel, thick wall cylindrical body with large flat doors on each end which contains the explosive detonation and the subsequent chemical treatment of the chemical agent. The vessel is sealed with a metal seal gasket located between each door and the cylinder. A three-part clamping system is used to secure each door to the cylinder at each end. One of the design challenges for the EDS vessel is to ensure that the doors do not leak when the shock loads from the potentially very significant explosive loads impact the door. Previous versions of EDS vessels have experienced measurable transient displacement between the door and the vessel flanges that challenged the metal seal gasket to maintain a seal. To address the opening of the gap between the flanges during blast loadings, the door clamping system has been modified for this latest design referred to as P3. Only minor changes to the design were required and none to the operating procedure. Computer modeling of the new design predicts a significant reduction in the separation of the flanges when compared to a previous EDS vessels of similar design.

A new liquid sample adapter design for the Explosive Destruction Systems has been developed. The design features a semi-transparent fluoropolymer tube coupled to the vessel high pressure sample valve with a closing quick connect fitting. The sample tubes are the pressure-limiting component. The tubes were hydrostatically tested to establish failure characteristics and pressure limits at ambient and operational temperatures. A group of tubes from two manufacturing lots were tested to determine the consistency of the commercial part. An upper pressure limit was determined for typical operations.

This report summarizes activities at Sandia National Laboratories as part of the Explosive Destruction System (EDS) Phase 3 (P3) System design. An exploration of chemical neutralization strategies of phosgene was conducted for safe disposal of recovered mortars and M79 1000 lb. bombs filled with carbonyl dichloride "phosgene" or "CG agent" (molecular formula = COCl₂). The incumbent strategy utilized aqueous sodium hydroxide was found to be the worst-case scenario, producing enough CO₂ gas that would cause an unacceptable pressure and temperature spike. Several chemical neutralization strategies were evaluated based on criteria set by the operating envelope of the P3 design. In the end, it was determined that a pure solution of N-methyl ethanolamine (MeEA) or 90% monoethanolamine (MEA)(aqueous) provided the best balance reaction profile, cost, and safety.

The V28 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate (RCMD) as a replacement vessel for use on the P2 Explosive Destruction Systems. It is the fourth EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT- equivalent for up to 637 detonations. This report documents the results of explosive tests that were done on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque New Mexico to qualify the vessel for explosive use. The primary qualification test consisted of six, 1.5 pounds charges of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 11.25 pounds TNT) distributed around the vessel in accordance with the User Design Specification. This test was repeated due to a lack of proper clamp settings. Two additional tests using less explosive were performed, one identical in configuration to a test performed in the V27 qualification series as a baseline for comparison, and one where the separation distance of the charges was increased to extend the V27 analysis of distributed load effects on the P2 vessel. All vessel acceptance criteria were met.

Abstract not provided.

The V26 containment vessel was procured by the Project Manager, Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel (PMNSCM) for use on the Phase-2 Explosive Destruction Systems. The vessel was fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT-equivalent for up to 637 detonations, limited only by fatigue crack growth calculations initiated from a minimum detectable crack depth. The vessel consists of a cylindrical cup, a flat cover or door, and clamps to secure the door. The vessel is sealed with a metal gasket. The body is a deep cylindrical cup machined from a 316 stainless steel forging. The door is also machined from a 316 stainless steel forging. The closure clamps are secured with four 17-4 PH steel threaded rods with 4140 alloy steel threadednuts on one end and hydraulic nuts on the other. A flange with four high-voltage electrical feedthroughs is bolted to the door and sealed with a small metal gasket. These feedthroughs conduct the firing signals for the high-voltage Exploding Bridge-wire detonators. Small blast plates on the inside of the door protect fluidic components and electrical feedthroughs. A large blast plate provides additional protection. Both vessel door and feedthrough flange employ O-ring seals outside the metal seals in order to provide a mechanism for helium leak checks of the volume just outside the metal seal surface before and after detonation. In previous papers (References 2 and 3), the authors describe results from testing of the vessel body and ends under qualification loads, determining the effective TNT equivalency of Composition C4 (EDS Containment Vessel TNT Equivalence Testing) and analyzing the effects of distributed explosive charges versus unitary charges (EDS Containment Vessel Explosive Test and Analysis). In addition to measurements made on the vessel body and ends as reported previously, bulk motion and deformation of the door and clamping system was made. Strain gauges were positioned at various locations on the inner and outer surface of the clamping system and on the vessel door surface. Digital Image Correlation was employed during both hydrostatic testing and dynamic testing under full-load explosive detonation to determine bulk and bending motion of the door relative to the vessel body and clamping system. Some limited hydrocode and finite element code analysis was performed on the clamping system for comparison. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the likelihood of a change in the static sealing efficacy of the metal clamping system and to evaluate the possibility of dynamic burping of vessel contents during detonation. Those results will be reported in this paper.

This report documents the results of explosive re-qualification tests of the EDS V26 Vessel that were conducted at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico in May 2015 following the retrofitting of the vessel with a three piece clamp for use on the P2A system. The V26 containment vessel is the second EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the code case, is nine (9) pounds TNT-equivalent for up to 637 detonations. The goals of the tests were to qualify the vessel, particularly the clamping system, for explosive use. The explosive tests consisted of a 9 pound bare charge of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 11.25 pounds TNT), followed by a 7.2 pound bare charge of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 9 pounds of TNT). Helium permeation measurements of the seal and strain measurements using a pi tape and strain gauges were made. All vessel acceptance criteria were met.

Abstract not provided.

The V27 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate ( RCMD ) as a replacement vessel for use on the P2 Explosive Destruction Systems. It is the third EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT - equivalent for up to 637 detonations . This report documents the results of explosive tests that were done on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque New Mexico to qualify the vessel for explosive use . The primary qualification test consisted of si x 1.5 pound charges of Composition C - 4 (equivalent to 11.25 pounds TNT) distributed around the vessel in accordance with the User Design Specification. Four subsequent tests using less explosive evaluated the effects of slight variations in orientation of the charges . All vessel acceptance criteria were met.

Abstract not provided.

The objective of the test was to qualify the vessel for its intended use by subjecting it to a 1.25 times overtest. The criteria for success are that the measured strains do not exceed the calculated strains from the vessel analysis, there is no significant additional plastic strain on subsequent tests at the rated design load (shakedown), and there is no significant damage to the vessel and attached hardware that affect form, fit, or function. Testing of the V25 Vessel in 2011 established a precedent for testing V26 [2]. As with V25, two tests were performed to satisfy this objective. The first test used 9 pounds of Composition C-4 (11.25 lbs. TNT-equivalent), which is 125 percent of the design basis load. The second test used 7.2 pounds of Composition C-4 (9 lbs. TNT-equivalent) which is 100 percent of the design basis load. The first test provided the required overtest while the second test served to demonstrate shakedown and the absence of additional plastic deformation. Unlike the V25 vessel, which was mounted in a shipping cradle during testing, the V26 vessel was mounted on the EDS P2U3 trailer prior to testing. Visual inspections of the EDS vessel, surroundings, and diagnostics were completed before and after each test event. This visual inspection included analyzing the seals, fittings, and interior surfaces of the EDS vessel and documenting any abnormalities or damages. Photographs were used to visually document vessel conditions and findings before and after each test event.

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High temperature flow sensors must be developed for use with molten salts systems at temperatures in excess of 600ÀC. A novel magneto-hydrodynamic sensing approach was investigated. A prototype sensor was developed and tested in an aqueous sodium chloride solution as a surrogate for molten salt. Despite that the electrical conductivity was a factor of three less than molten salts, it was found that the electrical conductivity of an electrolyte was too low to adequately resolve the signal amidst surrounding noise. This sensor concept is expected to work well with any liquid metal application, as the generated magnetic field scales proportionately with electrical conductivity.

Abstract not provided.

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As part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Detect-to-Protect program, a multilab [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)] effort is addressing the need for useable detect-to-warn bioaerosol sensors for public facility protection. Towards this end, the SNL team is employing rapid fluorogenic staining to infer the protein content of bioaerosols. This is being implemented in a flow cytometry platform wherein each particle detected generates coincident signals of forward scatter, side scatter, and fluorescence. Several thousand such coincident signal sets are typically collected to generate a probability distribution over the scattering and fluorescence values. A linear unmixing analysis is performed to differentiate components in the mixture. After forming a library of pure component distributions from measured pure material samples, the distribution of an unknown mixture of particles is treated as a linear combination of the pure component distributions. The scattering/fluorescence probability distribution data vector a is considered the product of two vectors, the fractional profile f and the scattering/ fluorescence distributions from pure components P. A least squares procedure minimizes the magnitude of the residual vector e in the expression a = fP T + e. The profile f designates a weighting fraction for each particle type included in the set of pure components, providing the composition of the unknown mixture. We discuss testing of this analysis approach and steps we have taken to evaluate the effect of interferents, both known and unknown.

As part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Detect-to-Protect (DTP) program, a multilab [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)] effort is addressing the need for useable detect-to-warn bioaerosol sensors for public facility protection. Towards this end, the SNL team is investigating the use of rapid fluorogenic staining to infer the protein content of bioaerosols. This is being implemented in a flow cytometer wherein each particle detected generates coincident signals of correlated forward scatter, side scatter, and fluorescence. Several thousand such coincident signal sets are typically collected to generate a distribution describing the probability of observing a particle with certain scattering and fluorescence values. These data are collected for sample particles in both a stained and unstained state. A linear unmixing analysis is performed to differentiate components in the mixture. In this paper, we discuss the implementation of the staining process and the cytometric measurement, the results of their application to the analysis of known and blind samples, and a potential instrumental implementations that would use staining.

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Abstract not provided.

For most orbital maneuvers, small satellites in the sub-10 kg range require thrusters capable of spanning the micro-Newton to milli-Newton force range. At this scale, electrokinetic (EK) pumping offers precise metering of monergolic or hypergolic liquid propellants under purely electrical control at pressures and flow rates well-suited to microthruster applications. We have demonstrated direct and indirect EK pumping for delivery of anhydrous hydrazine and hydrogen peroxide monopropellants, respectively, into capillary-based microthrusters with integrated in-line catalyst beds. Catalytic decomposition generates gases which accelerate through a plasma-formed converging-diverging nozzle, producing thrust. Specific impulses up to 190 s have been shown for hydrazine in non-optimized nozzles. ©2007 IEEE.