Publications

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This article discusses likely future contexts of, and options for, global threat-reduction activities to support nonproliferation goals over the next five to ten years. Threat-reduction activities span a continuum from unilateral actions that the United States might take with little cooperation and transparency at one end to cooperative actions associated with negotiated treaties and agreements at the other. This study focuses on cooperative approaches embodied in the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which has been the most visible program reducing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction for over two decades. Here, we argue that CTR’s evolution can be described in terms of the relationship between the desired US influence on outcomes, the ability to generate a common threat definition, and appetite for collaboration on threat reduction. To that end, this article provides an introduction and overview of CTR initiatives over its twenty-seven-year history and a review of relevant legislation and trends. After introducing and describing the CTR Possible Futures Framework, this article offers five possible options for—and discusses the implications of—CTR’s future evolution.

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Security at nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States is currently based on vital area identification (VAI)-a procedure to determine locations within a nuclear facility that need to be defended from adversaries in order to avoid damage to the facility and/or release of radionuclides to the environment. This procedure heavily leverages a Level 1 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) which identifies combinations of events that can lead to core damage. Current approaches to VAI for NPPs, however, are determined on a “snapshot-in-time,” and therefore unable to include the time-dependent effects of safety systems within a NPP A novel “leading simulator (LS) / trailing simulator (TS)” methodology is proposed to integrate the thermal hydraulic-based safety analysis of a NPP with a physical security analytical tool to model vital area boundaries and related potential consequences. The methodology will use dynamic event trees to systematically explore the uncertainties in an adversary attack scenario at a hypothetical NPP while incorporating the timing and repair effects that are not captured using the available modeling approaches to physical security practices. Ultimately, the LS/TS methodology will enable NPPs to incorporate the full complement of safety systems and procedures when performing security analyses.

Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors—increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aim of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives.

Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors-- increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aims of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives.

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Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are among the major growing technologies that have many beneficial applications, yet they can also pose a significant threat. Recently, several incidents occurred with UAVs violating privacy of the public and security of sensitive facilities, including several nuclear power plants in France. The threat of UAVs to the security of nuclear facilities is of great importance and is the focus of this work. This paper presents an overview of UAV technology and classification, as well as its applications and potential threats. We show several examples of recent security incidents involving UAVs in France, USA, and United Arab Emirates. Further, the potential threats to nuclear facilities and measures to prevent them are evaluated. The importance of measures for detection, delay, and response (neutralization) of UAVs at nuclear facilities are discussed. An overview of existing technologies along with their strength and weaknesses are shown. Finally, the results of a gap analysis in existing approaches and technologies is presented in the form of potential technological and procedural areas for research and development. Based on this analysis, directions for future work in the field can be devised and prioritized.