Publications

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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies safeguards to nuclear facilities that are not operating, including those undergoing decommissioning, and the IAEA’s effort in this area is both considerable and increasing. Specifically, the IAEA Department of Safeguards’ Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP-003: Safeguards Approaches) identified an R&D need to “Develop safeguards implementation guidelines for facilities under decommissioning and safeguards concepts for post-accident facilities under decommissioning”. Nuclear facilities undergoing decommissioning are not exempt from safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Host State, and, accordingly, the requirement for verification of no diversion of nuclear material and detection of undeclared activities at decommissioned facilities remain even after facility shutdown. However, the effort required to meet safeguards objectives diminishes as nuclear material and essential equipment are removed during the decommissioning process which shifts the emphasis from verification of ever-diminishing fissile or source material inventories to verification of changes in facility design and equipment operability.

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.

This report documents a method for the quantitative identification of radionuclides of potential interest for accident consequence analysis involving advanced nuclear reactors. Based on previous qualitative assessments of radionuclide inventories for advanced reactors coupled with the review of a radiological inventory developed for a heat pipe reactor, a 1 Ci activity airborne release was calculated for 137 radionuclides using the MACCS 4.1 code suite. Several assumptions regarding release conditions were made and discussed herein. The potential release of a heat pipe reactor inventory was also modeled following the same assumptions. Results provide an estimation of the relative EARLY and CHRONC phase dose contribution from advanced reactor radionuclides and are normalized to doses from equivalent releases of I-131 and Cs-137, respectively. Ultimately, a list of 69 radionuclides with EARLY or CHRONC dose contributions at least 1/100th that of I-131 or Cs-137, respectively – 48 of which are currently considered for LWR consequence analyses – was identified of being of potential importance for analyses involving a heat pipe reactor.

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This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.

This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.

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Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors—increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aim of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives.

Applications of the severe accident analysis code MELCOR, developed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), have been supported by the graphical user-interface and post-processing suite Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package (SNAP), developed for the NRC by Applied Programming Technology (APT). With the release of MELCOR 2.2, new user functionality and models have been introduced and an update to the SNAP MELCOR plugin user interface is necessary to access these new features. This document relates all new features introduced into MELCOR to the development team at APT as well as the NRC.

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Following the conclusion of the first phase of the crosswalk analysis, one of the key unanswered questions was whether or not the deviations found would persist during a partially recovered accident scenario, similar to the one that occurred in TMI - 2. In particular this analysis aims to compare the impact of core degradation morphology on quenching models inherent within the two codes and the coolability of debris during partially recovered accidents. A primary motivation for this study is the development of insights into how uncertainties in core damage progression models impact the ability to assess the potential for recovery of a degraded core. These quench and core recovery models are of the most interest when there is a significant amount of core damage, but intact and degraded fuel still remain in the cor e region or the lower plenum. Accordingly this analysis presents a spectrum of partially recovered accident scenarios by varying both water injection timing and rate to highlight the impact of core degradation phenomena on recovered accident scenarios. This analysis uses the newly released MELCOR 2.2 rev. 966 5 and MAAP5, Version 5.04. These code versions, which incorporate a significant number of modifications that have been driven by analyses and forensic evidence obtained from the Fukushima - Daiichi reactor site.

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