The US Department of Energy has required radiological sabotage vulnerability assessments to be conducted for years. However, the exact methodology to be used in this type of analysis still remains somewhat elusive. Therefore, there is tremendous variation in the methodologies and assumptions used to determine release levels and doses potentially affecting the health and safety of the public. In some cases, there are three orders of magnitude difference in results for dispersal of similar materials under similar meteorological conditions. To address this issue, the authors have developed an approach to standardizing radiological sabotage target analysis that starts by addressing basic assumptions and then directs the user to some recommended computerized analytical tools. Results from different dispersal codes are also compared in this analysis.
The ASSESS Neutralization Analysis module (Neutralization) is part of Analytic System and Software for Evaluation of Safeguards and Security, ASSESS, a vulnerability assessment tool. Neutralization models a fire fight engagement between security inspectors (SIs) and adversaries. Since version 1.0 of Neutralization was released in 1989, experience has shown that several features of the user interface should be improved. This report describes the improvements that have been implemented, which simplify operation by consolidating all capabilities under a single mode of operation, remove many restrictions on editing, and concentrate more information into fewer types of printed reports. Every adversary and SI combatant is named and described individually. Time to communicate orders is specified for each SI combatant. Adversaries and SIs can be reinforced. SI posting as well deployment destination is labeled. Scenario details can be revised without losing all completed event information. New on-screen summaries spell out characteristics, minimizing abbreviations. Neutralization will read files created by the previous version and permit the user to enter the additional labels supported in the new version. As described here, Neutralization now has an interface that handles more information, but is easier and faster to use.
This paper describes a passive tamper-indicating secure container that has been designed to demonstrate concepts, features, and materials that can be used in passive container applications. (In a passive security system, physical phenomena provide visual indication of tampering.) The basic container {open_quotes}volume within a volume{close_quotes} assembly consists of a transparent plastic outer container and an aluminum inner container. Both containers incorporate passive, fingerprinted layers as part of the tamper-indicating container system. Many of the tamper-indicating features can be visually inspected without disassembling the container. The status of container development and potential applications for the container are addressed.
A radiological safety evaluation is performed to determine the impacts of Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) design changes on the preclosure public radiological safety for a potential nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Although the ESF design has undergone significant modification, incorporation of the modified design requires only modest changes to the conceptual repository configuration. To the extent feasible, the results of earlier safety evaluations presented in SAND84-2641, SAND88-7061, and SAND89-7024, which were based on the original ESF configuration, are compared with the results for the modified configuration. This comparison provides an estimate of the range of analysis uncertainty. This preliminary analysis indicates that there are no Q-scenarios, which are defined as those scenarios with a net occurrence probability of greater than 10{sup {minus}6}/yr and produce a radiological dose at the 5-km controlled area boundary of greater than 0.5 rem. The analysis yielded estimates for an underground accident of a probability of 3.8 {times} 10{sup {minus}15}/yr and a dose of 1.5 rem. For a surface-initiated accident, a probability of 1.5 {times} 10{sup {minus}12}/yr and a dose of 0.6 rem was estimated.
Tunnels buried deep within the earth constitute an important class geomechanics problems. Two numerical techniques used for the analysis of geomechanics problems, the finite element method and the boundary element method, have complementary characteristics for applications to problems of this type. The usefulness of combining these two methods for use as a geomechanics analysis tool has been recognized for some time, and a number of coupling techniques have been proposed. However, not all of them lend themselves to efficient computational implementations for large-scale problems. This report examines a coupling technique that can form the basis for an efficient analysis tool for large scale geomechanics problems through the use of an iterative equation solver.
Human Instrusion into the potential repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, was modeled in the Total-System Performance Assessment (``TSPA-91``) recently completed for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project Office of the DOE. The scenario model assumed that the repository would be penetrated at random locations by a number of boreholes drilled using twentieth-century rotary drilling techniques.
This report brings into focus the results of numerous studies that have addressed issues associated with the validity of assumptions which are used to justify reducing the dimensionality of numerical calculations of water flow through Yucca Mountain, NV. it is shown that, in many cases, one-dimensional modeling is more rigorous than previously assumed.
Sandia National Laboratories was requested to establish the FAA Aging Aircraft Nondestructive Inspection (NDI) Development and Demonstration Center. The Center is housed in a hangar at the Albuquerque International Airport and owns its own aged transport airplane. The Center`s work encompasses research and development in enhanced structural inspection. The goals of the Center are to: promote NDI technology development and maturation; help transfer new nondevelopment item technology to the hangar floor; validate NDI techniques; assess reliability or probability of detection of NDI processes. An important part of this project will be to make sure that the cost of implementation and operation of any technique is seriously considered and that techniques are usable in the field. Among the initial techniques to be evaluated are: enhanced visual, magneto-optic eddy current; coherent optics; ultrasonics; thermographics; eddy current scanners; experimental modal analysis. This project is a perfect example of how Development Testing draws on its own resources and teams up with others, as necessary, to get the job done. In this case, New Mexico State University and a private company, Science Applications International Corporation, are assisting.
This cautionary paper reminds users of quartz shock stress gauges that sensors that ignore the design rules of the ``Sandia quartz gauge`` may produce substantial and unrecognized deviations from normal sensitivity, waveform distortion, and anomalous conduction. Each deviant design must be extensively characterized. The consequence of non-standard gauge designs, like the ``shorted quartz gauge`` designs, are given for prompt response to pulsed radiation while stressed.
PVDF piezoelectric polymer shock stress sensors have been used to measure the shock and impulse generated by soft X-rays and by filter debris in the SATURN Plasma Radiation Source at Sandia National Laboratories, NM. SATURN was used to generate 30 to 40 kJ, 20-ns duration, line radiation at 2 to 3 keV. Fluence on samples was nominally 40, 200, and 400 kJ/m{sup 2} (1, 5, and 10 cal/cm{sup 2}). Measurements of X-ray induced material shock response exposing both aluminum and PMMA acrylic samples agree well with companion measurements made with single crystal X-cut quartz gauges. Time-of-flight, stress, and impulse produced by Kimfol (polycarbonate/aluminum) filter debris were also measured with the PVDF gauges.
PVDF shock stress sensors were subjected to X-ray deposition at nominal absorbed levels of 1, 1{1/2}, 3, and 5 cal/gm (SiO{sub 2} equiv.) and to neutron fluence above 10{sup 13} n/cm{sup 2} while stressed at a peak level of about 2 GPa. Moderate transitory electrical noise that occurred briefly during the radiation did not persist. PVDF shock sensors with aluminum electrodes appear satisfactory for measurement within these exposure limits. Reference quartz gauges were severely affected.
Sandia National Laboratories has the qualification evaluation responsibility for the design of certain components intended for use in nuclear weapons. Specific techniques in assurance and assessment have been developed to provide the quality evidence that the software has been properly qualified for use. Qualification Evaluation is a process for assessing the suitability of either a process used to develop or manufacture the product, or the product itself. The qualification process uses a team approach to evaluating a product or process, chaired by a Quality Assurance professional, with other members representing the design organization, the systems organization, and the production agency. Suitable for use implies that adequate and appropriate definition and documentation has been produced and formally released, adequate verification and validation activities have taken place to ensure proper operation, and the software product meets all requirements, explicitly or otherwise.
Upon achieving ignition and gain, the Laboratory Microfusion Facility (LMF) will be a major tool for Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research and defense applications. Our concept for delivering {approximately}10 MJ with a peak on-target light ion power of {approximately}700 TW involves a multi-modular approach using an extension of the compact inductively isolated cavity and Magnetically Insulated Transmission Line (MITL) Voltage Adder technology that is presently being used in several large accelerators at Sandia/New Mexico. The LMF driver design consists of twelve 8-TW and twelve 38-TW accelerating modules, each with a triaxial MITL/Adder that delivers power to a two stage ion extraction diode. The desired energy, power pulse shape, and deposition uniformity on an ICF target can be achieved by controlling the energy and firing sequence of the ``A`` and ``B`` accelerator modules, plus optimizing the beam transport and focusing. The multi-modular configuration reduces risk by not scaling significantly beyond existing machines and offers the flexibility of staged construction. It permits modular driver testing at the full operating level required by the LMF.
Reconsolidated salt is a fundamental component of the permanent seals for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. As regulations are currently understood and seal concepts envisioned, emplaced salt is the sole long-term seal component designed to prevent the shafts from becoming preferred pathways for rating gases or liquids. Studies under way in support of the sealing function of emplaced salt include laboratory testing of crushed salt small-scale in situ tests, constitutive modeling of crushed salt, calculations of the opening responses during operation and closure, and design practicalities including emplacement techniques. This paper briefly summarizes aspects of these efforts and key areas of future work.
In the verification technology arena, there is a pressing need for surveillance and monitoring equipment that produces authentic, verifiable records of observed activities. Such a record provides the inspecting party with confidence that observed activities occurred as recorded, without undetected tampering or spoofing having taken place. The secure authenticated video equipment (SAVE) system provides an authenticated series of video images of an observed activity. Being self-contained and portable, it can be installed as a stand-alone surveillance system or used in conjunction with existing monitoring equipment in a non-invasive manner. Security is provided by a tamper-proof camera enclosure containing a private, electronic authentication key. Video data is transferred communication link consisting of a coaxial cable, fiber-optic link or other similar media. A video review station, located remotely from the camera, receives, validates, displays and stores the incoming data. Video data is validated within the review station using a public key, a copy of which is held by authorized panics. This scheme allows the holder of the public key to verify the authenticity of the recorded video data but precludes undetectable modification of the data generated by the tamper-protected private authentication key.
A multiphase mixture model is presented to describe shock compression of highly porous, multi-component powders. Volume fractions are represented as independent kinematic variables and thermodynamically-admissible phase interaction constitutive models are formulated in the context of a three phase system. Numerical solutions of the multiphase flow equations simulated impact on a porous layer of mixed powders of Al and Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3}. The multiphase model predicts dispersive compaction waves which have features similar to observed time-resolved pressure measurements.
GENSHELL is a three-dimensional shell mesh generation program. The three-dimensional shell mesh is generated by mapping a two-dimensional quadrilateral mesh into three dimensions according to one of several types of transformations: translation, mapping onto a spherical, ellipsoidal, or cylindrical surface, and mapping onto a user-defined spline surface. The generated three-dimensional mesh can then be reoriented by offsetting, reflecting about an axis, revolving about an axis, and scaling the coordinates. GENSHELL can be used to mesh complex three-dimensional geometries composed of several sections when the sections can be defined in terms of transformations of two-dimensional geometries. The code GJOIN is then used to join the separate sections into a single body. GENSHELL updates the EXODUS quality assurance and information records to help track the codes and files used to generate the mesh. GENSHELL reads and writes two-dimensional and three-dimensional mesh databases in the GENESIS database format; therefore, it is compatible with the preprocessing, postprocessing, and analysis codes in the Sandia National Laboratories Engineering Analysis Code Access System (SEACAS).
1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act have created the need for instruments capable of monitoring volatile organic compounds (VOCS) in public air space in an unattended and low cost manner. The purpose of the study was to develop and demonstrate the capability to do long term automatic and unattended ambient air monitoring using an inexpensive portable analytic system at a commercial manufacturing plant site. A gas chromatograph system personal computer hardware, meteorology tower & instruments, and custom designed hardware and software were developed. Comparison with an EPA approved method was performed. The system was sited at an aircraft engines manufacturing site and operated in a completely unattended mode for 60 days. Two VOCs were monitored every 30 minutes during the 24hr day. Large variation in the concentration from 800ppb to the limits of detection of about 10ppb were observed. Work to increase the capabilities of the system is ongoing.
Interest in launching payloads through the atmosphere to ever higher velocity is robust. For hundreds of years, guns and rockets have been improved for this purpose until they are now considered to be near to their performance limits. While the potential of electromagnetic technology to increase launch velocity has been known since late in the nineteenth century, it was not until about 1980 that a sustained and large-scale effort was started to exploit it. Electromagnetic launcher technology is restricted here to mean only that technology which establishes both a current density, J, and a magnetic field, B, within a part of the launch package, called the armature, so that J {times} B integrated over the volume of the armature is the launching force. Research and development activity was triggered by the discovery that high velocity can be produced with a simple railgun which uses an arc for its armature. This so called ``plasma-armature railgun`` has been the launcher technology upon which nearly all of the work has focused. Still, a relatively small parallel effort has also been made to explore the potential of electromagnetic launchers which do not use sliding contacts on stationary rails to establish current in the armature. One electromagnetic launcher of this type is called an induction coilgun because armature current is established by electromagnetic induction. In this paper, we first establish terminology which we will use not only to specify requirements for successful endoatmospheric launch but also to compare different launcher types. Then, we summarize the statuses of the railgun and induction coilgun technologies and discuss the issues which must be resolved before either of these launchers can offer substantial advantage for endoatomospheric launch.
To analyze the vulnerability of nuclear materials to theft or sabotage, Department of Energy facilities have been using, since 1989, a computer program called ASSESS, Analytic System and Software for Evaluation of Safeguards and Security. During the past year Sandia National Laboratories has began using an additional program, SEES, Security Exercise Evaluation Simulation, enhancing the picture of vulnerability beyond what either program achieves alone. ASSESS analyzes all possible paths of attack on a target and, assuming that an attack occurs, ranks them by the probability that a response force of adequate size can interrupt the attack before theft or sabotage is accomplished. A Neutralization module pits, collectively, a security force against the interrupted adversary force in a fire fight and calculates the probability that the adversaries are defeated. SEES examines a single scenario and simulates in detail the interactions among all combatants. Its output includes shots fired between shooter and target, and the hits and kills. Whereas ASSESS gives breadth of analysis, expressed statistically and performed relatively quickly, SEES adds depth of detail, modeling tactical behavior. ASSESS finds scenarios that exploit the greatest weaknesses of a facility. SEES explores these scenarios to demonstrate in detail how various tactics to nullify the attack might work out. Without ASSESS to find the facility weaknesses, it is difficult to focus SEES objectively on scenarios worth analyzing. Without SEES to simulate the details of response vs. adversary interaction, it is not possible to test tactical assumptions and hypotheses. Using both programs together, vulnerability analyses achieve both breadth and depth.
To analyze the vulnerability of nuclear materials to theft or sabotage, Department of Energy facilities have been using, since 1989, a computer program called ASSESS, Analytic System and Software for Evaluation of Safeguards and Security. During the past year Sandia National Laboratories has begun using an additional program, SEES, Security Exercise Evaluation Simulation, enhancing the picture of vulnerability beyond what either program achieves alone. Assess analyzes all possible paths of attack on a target and, assuming that an attack occurs, ranks them by the probability that a response force of adequate size can interrupt the attack before theft or sabotage is accomplished. A Neutralization module pits, collectively, a security force against the interrupted adversary force in a fire fight and calculates the probability that the adversaries are defeated. SEES examines a single scenario and simulates in detail the interactions among all combatants. its output includes shots fired between shooter and target, and the hits and kills. Whereas ASSESS gives breadth of analysis, expressed statistically and performed relatively quickly, SEES adds depth of detail, modeling tactical behavior. ASSESS finds scenarios that exploit the greatest weakness of a facility. SEES explores these scenarios to demonstrate in detail how various tactics to nullify the attack might work out. Without ASSESS to find the facility weakness, it is difficult to focus SEES objectively on scenarios worth analyzing. Without SEES to simulate the details of response vs. adversary interaction, it is not possible to test tactical assumptions and hypotheses. Using both programs together, vulnerability analyses achieve both breadth and depth.
Anomalous features in Gulf Coast Salt domes exhibit deviations from normally pure salt and vary widely in form from one dome to the next, ranging considerably in length and width. They have affected both conventional and solution mining in several ways. Gas outbursts, insolubles, and potash (especially carnallite) have led to the breakage of tubing in a number of caverns, and caused irregular shapes of many caverns through preferential leaching. Such anomalous features essentially have limited the lateral extent of conventional mining at several salt mines, and led to accidents and even the closing of several other mines. Such anomalous features, are often aligned in anomalous zones, and appear to be related to diapiric processes of salt dome development. Evidence indicates that anomalous zones are found between salt spines, where the differential salt intrusion accumulates other materials: Anhydrite bands which are relatively strong, and other, weaker impurities. Shear zones and fault displacement detected at Big Hill and Weeks Island domes have not yet had any known adverse impacts on SPR oil storage, but new caverns at these sites conceivably may encounter some potentially adverse conditions. Seismic reflection profiles at Big Hill dome have shown numerous fractures and faults in the caprock, and verified the earlier recognition of a major shear zone transecting the entire salt stock and forming a graben in the overlying caprock. Casing that is placed in such zones can be at risk. Knowledge of these zones should create awareness of possible effects rather than preclude the future emplacement of caverns. To the extent possible, major anomalous zones and salt stock boundaries should be avoided. Shear zones along overhangs may be particularly hazardous, and otherwise unknown valleys in the top of salt may occur along shear zones. These zones often can be mapped geophysically, especially with high-resolution seismic techniques.
Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory have been designated as the technical lead for Security, Safeguards and Computer/Information Security systems for all the DOE Complex 21/Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) facilities. The physical protection systems in these facilities will be required to meet the most current DOE orders and incorporate the latest physical protection technologies, proven state-of-the-art systems and strategies. The planned approach requires that security assistance and information be provided to the designers (e.g. the Complex 21 Architect & Engineer and the Weapons Complex Lead Laboratories) as early as possible and throughout all design phases. The outcome should avoid the costly retrofits to existing facilities that have occurred in the past and result in effective and comprehensive protection against current and projected threats with minimal impact on operations, safety and costs. This paper discusses the physical protection considerations being promoted for the integrated design effort for the Complex 21/Reconfiguration facilities, such as the tritium, uranium/lithium, plutonium processing and storage, high explosive and assembly and disassembly facilities.
The purpose of this report is to summarize the status of computational analysis of hypervelocity impact lethality in relatively nontechnical terms from the perspective of the author. It is not intended to be a review of the technical literature on the problems of concern. The discussion is focused by concentrating on two phenomenology areas which are of particular concern in computational impact studies. First, the material`s equation of state, specifically the treatment of expanded states of metals undergoing shock vaporization, is discussed. Second, the process of dynamic fragmentation is addressed. In both cases, the context of the discussion deals with inaccuracies and difficulties associated with numerical hypervelocity impact simulations. Laboratory experimental capabilities in hypervelocity impact for impact velocities greater than 10.0 km/s are becoming increasingly viable. This paper also gives recommendations for experimental thrusts which utilize these capabilities that will help to resolve the uncertainties in the numerical lethality studies that are pointed out in the present report.
