Publications

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The 30 cm drop is the remaining NRC normal conditions of transport (NCT) regulatory requirement (10 CFR 71.71) for which there are no data on the actual surrogate fuel. While obtaining data on the actual fuel is not a direct requirement, it provides definitive information which aids in quantifying the risk of fuel breakage resulting from a cask drop from a height of 30 cm or less. The 30 cm drop test with the full-scale surrogate assembly conducted in May 2020 was the last step needed for quantifying the strains on the surrogate assembly rods under NCT. The full-scale surrogate assembly used in the 2020 30 cm drop test was built using a new 17x17 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Westinghouse skeleton filled with the copper rods and 3 zircaloy rods from the full-scale surrogate assembly used in the Multi-Modal Transportation Test (MMTT). Felt pads were attached to the surrogate assembly bottom prior to the 30 cm drop to adequately represent the effects of the impact limiters and the cask. Note that felt "programming material" has been used extensively in past drop tests and is known to be a good material for programming a desired shock pulse. The felt pad configuration was determined during a previous series of tests reported in. The acceleration pulses observed on the surrogate assembly during the test were in good agreement with the expected pulses. This confirmed that during the 30 cm drop the surrogate assembly experienced the same conditions as it would if it was dropped in the cask with the impact limiters.

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This report is a condensed version of previous reports identifying technical gaps that, if addressed, could be used to ensure the continued safe storage of SNF for extended periods and support licensing activities. This report includes updated gap priority assessments because the previous gap priorities were based on R&D performed through 2017. Much important work has been done since 2017 that requires a change in a few of the priority rankings to better focus the near-term R&D program. Background material, regulatory positions, operational and inventory status, and prioritization schemes are discussed in detail in Hanson et al. (2012) and Hanson and Alsaed (2019) and are not repeated in this report. One exception is an overview of the prioritization criteria for reference. This is meant to give the reader an appreciation of the framework for prioritization of the identified gaps. A complete discussion of the prioritization scheme is provided in Hanson and Alsaed (2019).

The data from the multi-modal transportation test conducted in 2017 demonstrated that the inputs from the shock events during all transport modes (truck, rail, and ship) were amplified from the cask to the spent commercial nuclear fuel surrogate assemblies. These data do not support common assumption that the cask content experiences the same accelerations as the cask itself. This was one of the motivations for conducting 30 cm drop tests. The goal of the 30 cm drop test is to measure accelerations and strains on the surrogate spent nuclear fuel assembly and to determine whether the fuel rods can maintain their integrity inside a transportation cask when dropped from a height of 30 cm. The 30 cm drop is the remaining NRC normal conditions of transportation regulatory requirement (10 CFR 71.71) for which there are no data on the actual surrogate fuel. Because the full-scale cask and impact limiters were not available (and their cost was prohibitive), it was proposed to achieve this goal by conducting three separate tests. This report describes the first two tests — the 30 cm drop test of the 1/3 scale cask (conducted in December 2018) and the 30 cm drop of the full-scale dummy assembly (conducted in June 2019). The dummy assembly represents the mass of a real spent nuclear fuel assembly. The third test (to be conducted in the spring of 2020) will be the 30 cm drop of the full-scale surrogate assembly. The surrogate assembly represents a real full-scale assembly in physical, material, and mechanical characteristics, as well as in mass.

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The Department of Energy(DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program is performing research and development in the area of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) long term storage and transportation. This program is being conducted under the provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 and its amendments that require the DOE to take title to and manage SNF after storage at the utility reactor site. This report is a condensed version of previous gap reports (Hanson 2012 and Hanson 2019) with up-dated gap priority assessments. The gap priorities have been updated from Hanson 2019 because 2019 is based on R&D performed through 2017. Much important work has been done since 2017 that requires a change in a few of the priority rankings to better focus the near-term R&D program. Background material, regulatory positions, operational and inventory status, and prioritization schemes are discussed in detail in Hanson 2012/2019, and are not repeated in this report. One exception is an overview of the prioritization criteria for reference. This is meant to give the reader an appreciation of the framework for prioritization of the identified gaps. A complete discussion of the prioritization scheme is provided in Hanson 2019.

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This project addresses the important issue of validating the integrity of spent nuclear fuel storage for extended periods of time, followed by transportation. While it is believed that this fuel is safe in its current condition for long periods of time, confirmatory data and analyses need to be obtained to validate our understanding of used fuel degradation mechanisms that may impinge on the integrity of the fuel to withstand long term storage and transportation conditions. This is especially true for high burnup fuel (> 45 GWD/MTU) that is currently being discharged. The international community recognizes the importance of these issues. Moreover, several European countries now envisage to subject mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to extended storage and direct disposal. The institutes collaborating on this proposal all have active programs focused on resolving these very issues. Collaborating together provides a leverage of programs and funding that will benefit each program individually as well as the commercial nuclear industry, as a whole.

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