Performance assessment for radioactive waste management at Sandia National Laboratories : a 30-year history
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Preliminary evaluation of deep borehole disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel indicates the potential for excellent long-term safety performance at costs competitive with mined repositories. Significant fluid flow through basement rock is prevented, in part, by low permeabilities, poorly connected transport pathways, and overburden self-sealing. Deep fluids also resist vertical movement because they are density stratified. Thermal hydrologic calculations estimate the thermal pulse from emplaced waste to be small (less than 20 C at 10 meters from the borehole, for less than a few hundred years), and to result in maximum total vertical fluid movement of {approx}100 m. Reducing conditions will sharply limit solubilities of most dose-critical radionuclides at depth, and high ionic strengths of deep fluids will prevent colloidal transport. For the bounding analysis of this report, waste is envisioned to be emplaced as fuel assemblies stacked inside drill casing that are lowered, and emplaced using off-the-shelf oilfield and geothermal drilling techniques, into the lower 1-2 km portion of a vertical borehole {approx}45 cm in diameter and 3-5 km deep, followed by borehole sealing. Deep borehole disposal of radioactive waste in the United States would require modifications to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and to applicable regulatory standards for long-term performance set by the US Environmental Protection Agency (40 CFR part 191) and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (10 CFR part 60). The performance analysis described here is based on the assumption that long-term standards for deep borehole disposal would be identical in the key regards to those prescribed for existing repositories (40 CFR part 197 and 10 CFR part 63).
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The proposed Yucca Mountain repository, located in southern Nevada, is to be the first facility for permanent disposal of spent reactor fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the United States. Total Systems Performance Assessment (TSPA) analysis has indicated that among the major radionuclides contributing to dose are technetium, iodine, and neptunium, all of which are highly mobile in the environment. Containment of these radionuclides within the repository is a priority for the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP). These proceedings review current research and technology efforts for sequestration of the radionuclides with a focus on technetium, iodine, and neptunium. This workshop also covered issues concerning the Yucca Mountain environment and getter characteristics required for potential placement into the repository.
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Scenario development has two primary purposes in the design and documentation of post-closure performance assessments in a regulatory setting. First, scenario development ensures a sufficiently comprehensive consideration of the possible future states of the system. Second, scenario development identifies the important scenarios that must be considered in quantitative analyses of the total system performance assessment (TSPA). Section 2.0 of this report describes the scenario development process. Steps in the process are described in Section 2.1, and terms introduced in this section are defined in Section 2.2. The electronic database used to document the process is described in Section 3, and Section 4 provides a summary of the current status of the YMP scenario development work. Section 5 contains acknowledgments, and Section 6 contains a list of the references cited.
Reliability Enginering and System Safety
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a mined repository constructed by the US Department of Energy for the permanent disposal of transuranic wastes generated since 1970 by activities related to national defense. The WIPP is located 42 km east of Carlsbad, New Mexico, in bedded salt (primarily halite) of the Late Permian (approximately 255 million years old) Salado Formation 655 m below the land surface. Characterization of the site began in the mid-1970s. Construction of the underground disposal facilities began in the early 1980s, and the facility received final certification from the US Environmental Protection Agency in May 1998. Disposal operations are planned to begin following receipt of a final permit from the State of New Mexico and resolution of legal issues. Like other proposed geologic repositories for radioactive waste, the WIPP relies on a combination of engineered and natural barriers to isolate the waste from the biosphere. Engineered barriers at the WIPP, including the seals that will be emplaced in the access shafts when the facility is decommissioned, are discussed in the context of facility design elsewhere in this volume. Physical properties of the natural barriers that contribute to the isolation of radionuclides are discussed here in the context of the physiographic, geologic, and hydrogeologic setting of the site.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety
Demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) requires an assessment of the long-term performance of the disposal system. Scenario development is one starting point of this assessment, and generates inquiry about the present state and future evolution of the disposal system. Scenario development consists of four tasks: (1) identifying and classifying features, events and processes (FEPs), (2) screening FEPs according to well-defined criteria, (3) forming scenarios (combinations of FEPs) in the context of regulatory performance criteria and (4) specifying of scenarios for consequence analysis. The development and screening of a comprehensive FEP list provides assurance that the identification of significant processes and events is complete, that potential interactions between FEPs are not overlooked, and that responses to possible questions are available and well documented. Two basic scenarios have been identified for the WIPP: undisturbed performance (UP) and disturbed performance (DP). The UP scenario is used to evaluate compliance with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Individual Dose (40 CFR Section 191-15) and Groundwater Protection (40 CFR Section 191-24) standards and accounts for all natural-, waste- and repository-induced FEPs that survive the screening process. The DP scenario is required for assessment calculations for the EPA's cumulative release standard (Containment Requirements, 40 CFR Section 191-13) and accounts for disruptive future human events, which have an uncertain probability of occurrence, in addition to the UP FEPs.
The US Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing to request the US Environmental Protection Agency to certify compliance with the radioactive waste disposal standards found in 40 CFR Part 191 for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE will also need to demonstrate compliance with a number of other State and Federal standards and, in particular, the Land Disposal Restrictions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 40 CFR Part 268. Demonstrating compliance with these regulations requires an assessment of the long-term performance of the WIPP disposal system. Re-evaluation and extension of past scenario development for the WIPP forms an integral part of the ongoing performance assessment (PA) process.