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System Theoretic Frameworks for Mitigating Risk Complexity in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Williams, Adam D.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Jones, Katherine A.; Kalinina, Elena A.; Cohn, Brian C.; Mohagheghi, Amir H.; DeMenno, Mercy D.; Thomas, Maikael A.; Parks, Mancel J.; Parks, Ethan R.; Jeantete, Brian A.

In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities -- and the associated suite of risks -- around the world, this project evaluated systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multimodal and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrated interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards risks is inherent in NFC activities and can go unidentified when each "S" is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques -- dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) -- provide integrated "3S" analysis to address these interdependencies and the research results suggest a need -- and provide a way -- to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global nuclear risks. Lastly, this research identifies areas where Sandia National Laboratories can spearhead technical advances to reduce global nuclear dangers.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2017
OSTIDOIOSTI

Understanding Risks in the Global Civilian Nuclear Enterprise: Global Nuclear Assured Security Scenarios Workshop

Deland, Sharon M.; Keller, Elizabeth J.; Littlefield, Adriane L.; Osborn, Douglas M.

The purpose of the scenarios workshop held for the Civilian Nuclear component of the Global Nuclear Assured Security Mission Integration Initiative was to identify sources of risk in the global civilian nuclear enterprise. The risks identified are inadequately addressed through current technical measures, regulatory frameworks and institutions and should be considered for further research. The workshop participants also developed four high level scenarios describing different sequences of events that could result in radiological releases, widespread loss of electric power, and loss of public confidence in segments of the nuclear industry. The scenarios are intended for further analysis and as the basis for simulation exercises.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2017
DOIOSTI

Terry Turbopump Expanded Operating Band Full-Scale Component and Basic Science Detailed Test Plan-Revision 2

Osborn, Douglas M.; Solom, Matthew A.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Ross, Kyle R.

This document details the milestone approach to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) efforts. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2017
DOIOSTIDOIOSTI

Terry Turbopump Expanded Operating Band Full-Scale Component and Basic Science Detailed Test Plan - Final

Osborn, Douglas M.; Solom, Matthew A.

This document details the milestone approach to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) efforts. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2017
DOIOSTI

Example of integration of safety, security, and safeguard using dynamic probabilistic risk assessment under a system-theoretic framework

ANS IHLRWM 2017 - 16th International High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference: Creating a Safe and Secure Energy Future for Generations to Come - Driving Toward Long-Term Storage and Disposal

Kalinina, Elena A.; Cohn, Brian C.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Williams, Adam D.; Parks, Mancel J.; Jones, Katherine A.; Andrews, Nathan A.; Johnson, Emma S.; Parks, Ethan R.; Mohagheghi, Amir H.

Transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is expected to increase in the future, as the nuclear fuel infrastructure continues to expand and fuel takeback programs increase in popularity. Analysis of potential risks and threats to SNF shipments is currently performed separately for safety and security. However, as SNF transportation increases, the plausible threats beyond individual categories and the interactions between them become more apparent. A new approach is being developed to integrate safety, security, and safeguards (3S) under a system-theoretic framework and a probabilistic risk framework. At the first stage, a simplified scenario will be implemented using a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) method. This scenario considers a rail derailment followed by an attack. The consequences of derailment are calculated with RADTRAN, a transportation risk analysis code. The attack scenarios are analyzed with STAGE, a combat simulation model. The consequences of the attack are then calculated with RADTRAN. Note that both accident and attack result in SNF cask damage and a potential release of some fraction of the SNF inventory into the environment. The major purpose of this analysis was to develop the input data for DPRA. Generic PWR and BWR transportation casks were considered. These data were then used to demonstrate the consequences of hypothetical accidents in which the radioactive materials were released into the environment. The SNF inventory is one of the most important inputs into the analysis. Several pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel burnups and discharge times were considered for this proof-of-concept. The inventory was calculated using ORIGEN (point depletion and decay computer code, Oak Ridge National Laboratory) for 3 characteristic burnup values (40, 50, and 60 GWD/MTU) and 4 fuel ages (5, 10, 25 and 50 years after discharge). The major consequences unique to the transportation of SNF for both accident and attack are the results of the dispersion of radionuclides in the environment. The dynamic atmospheric dispersion model in RADTRAN was used to calculate these consequences. The examples of maximum exposed individual (MEI) dose, early mortality and soil contamination are discussed to demonstrate the importance of different factors. At the next stage, the RADTRAN outputs will be converted into a form compatible with the STAGE analysis. As a result, identification of additional risks related to the interaction between characteristics becomes a more straightforward task. In order to present the results of RADTRAN analysis in a framework compatible with the results of the STAGE analysis, the results will be grouped into three categories: • Immediate negative harms •Future benefits that cannot be realized •Additional increases in future risk By describing results within generically applicable categories, the results of safety analysis are able to be placed in context with the risk arising from security events.

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TYPE Conference Poster YEAR 2017
OSTIScopusOSTIScopus
Results 76–100 of 149
Results 76–100 of 149