Publications

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This paper describes the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System, Version 2 (MACCS2) dose-truncation sensitivity of offsite consequences for the uncertainty analysis of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses unmitigated long-term station blackout severe accident scenario at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. Latent-cancer-fatality (LCF) risk results for this sensitivity study are presented for three dose-response models. LCF risks are reported for circular areas ranging from a 10-to a 50-mile radius centered on the plant. For the linear, no-threshold, sensitivity analysis, all regression methods consistently rank the MACCS2 dry deposition velocity and the MELCOR safety relief valve (SRV) stochastic failure probability, respectively, as the most important input parameters. For the alternative dose-truncation models (i.e., USBGR (0.62 rem/yr) and HPS (5 rem/yr with a lifetime limit of 10 rem)) sensitivity analyses, the regression methods consistently rank the MACCS2 inhalation protection factor for normal activity, the MACCS2 lung lifetime risk factor for cancer death, and the MELCOR SRV stochastic failure probability as the most important input variables. The important MELCOR input parameters are relatively independent of the dose-response model used in MACCS2. However, the MACCS2 input variables depend strongly on the dose-response model. The use of either the USBGR or the HPS dose-response model emphasizes MACCS2 input variables associated with doses received in the first year and deemphasizes MACCS2 input parameters associated with long-term phase doses beyond the first year.

This paper describes the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System, Version 2(MACCS2), parameters and probabilistic results of offsite consequences for the uncertainty analysis of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses unmitigated long-term station blackout accident scenario at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. Consequence results are presented as conditional risk (i.e., assuming the accident occurs) to individuals of the public as a result of the accident - latent-cancer-fatality (LCF) risk per event or prompt-fatality risk per event. For the mean, individual, LCF risk, all regression methods at each of the circular areas around the plant that are analyzed (10-mile to 50-mile radii are considered) consistently rank the MACCS2 dry deposition velocity, the MELCOR safety relief valve (SRV) stochastic failure probability, and the MACCS2 residual cancer risk factor, respectively, as the most important input parameters. For the mean, individual, prompt-fatality risk (which is zero in over 85% of the Monte Carlo realizations) within circular areas with less than a 2-mile radius, the non-rank regression methods consistently rank the MACCS2 wet deposition parameter, the MELCOR SRV stochastic failure probability, the MELCOR SRV open area fraction, the MACCS2 early health effects threshold for red bone marrow, and the MACCS2 crosswind dispersion coefficient, respectively, as the most important input parameters. For the mean, individual prompt-fatality risk within the circular areas with radii between 2.5-miles and 3.5-miles, the regression methods consistently rank the MACCS2 crosswind dispersion coefficient, the MACCS2 early health effects threshold for red bone marrow, the MELCOR SRV stochastic failure probability, and the MELCOR SRV open area fraction, respectively, as the most important input parameters.

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The radiological transportation risk & consequence program, RADTRAN, has recently added an updated loss of lead shielding (LOS) model to it most recent version, RADTRAN 6.0. The LOS model was used to determine dose estimates to first-responders during a spent nuclear fuel transportation accident. Results varied according to the following: type of accident scenario, percent of lead slump, distance to shipment, and time spent in the area. This document presents a method of creating dose estimates for first-responders using RADTRAN with potential accident scenarios. This may be of particular interest in the event of high speed accidents or fires involving cask punctures.

RADTRAN is an internationally accepted program and code for calculating the risks of transporting radioactive materials. The first versions of the program, RADTRAN I and II, were developed for NUREG-0170 (USNRC, 1977), the first environmental statement on transportation of radioactive materials. RADTRAN and its associated software have undergone a number of improvements and advances consistent with improvements in both available data and computer technology. The version of RADTRAN currently bundled with RadCat is RADTRAN 6.0. This document provides a detailed discussion and a guide for the use of the RadCat 3.0 Graphical User Interface input file generator for the RADTRAN code. RadCat 3.0 integrates the newest analysis capabilities of RADTRAN 6.0 which includes an economic model, updated loss-of-lead shielding model, and unit conversion. As of this writing, the RADTRAN version in use is RADTRAN 6.0.

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The RADTRAN Loss of Shielding (LOS) Model was benchmarked using MicroShield 6.20®. This analysis considers an intact spent fuel truck cask as well as a set of damaged truck casks. Ratios of dose rates are calculated for casks with a loss of lead shielding to those of intact casks, and are then compared to ratios generated by the LOS model. LOS Model results were considered verified if two main constraints were satisfied. First, the dose rate profiles for both the LOS and MicroShield 6.20® calculations must have the same general shape and behavior. Additionally, the largest factor difference between any two points of the dose rate profiles may not exceed an order of magnitude. Reasonable agreement is shown for large-fraction LOS scenarios; however the differences in results are not satisfactory for cases with small fractions of slump.

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This document describes the specimen and transportation containers currently available for use with hazardous and infectious materials. A detailed comparison of advantages, disadvantages, and costs of the different technologies is included. Short- and long-term recommendations are also provided.3 DraftDraftDraftExecutive SummaryThe Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit currently has hazardous material transport containers for shipping 1-quart paint cans and small amounts of contaminated forensic evidence, but the containers may not be able to maintain their integrity under accident conditions or for some types of hazardous materials. This report provides guidance and recommendations on the availability of packages for the safe and secure transport of evidence consisting of or contaminated with hazardous chemicals or infectious materials. Only non-bulk containers were considered because these are appropriate for transport on small aircraft. This report will addresses packaging and transportation concerns for Hazardous Classes 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 materials. If the evidence is known or suspected of belonging to one of these Hazardous Classes, it must be packaged in accordance with the provisions of 49 CFR Part 173. The anthrax scare of several years ago, and less well publicized incidents involving unknown and uncharacterized substances, has required that suspicious substances be sent to appropriate analytical laboratories for analysis and characterization. Transportation of potentially hazardous or infectious material to an appropriate analytical laboratory requires transport containers that maintain both the biological and chemical integrity of the substance in question. As a rule, only relatively small quantities will be available for analysis. Appropriate transportation packaging is needed that will maintain the integrity of the substance, will not allow biological alteration, will not react chemically with the substance being shipped, and will otherwise maintain it as nearly as possible in its original condition.The recommendations provided are short-term solutions to the problems of shipping evidence, and have considered only currently commercially available containers. These containers may not be appropriate for all cases. Design, testing, and certification of new transportation containers would be necessary to provide a container appropriate for all cases.Table 1 provides a summary of the recommendations for each class of hazardous material.Table 1: Summary of RecommendationsContainerCost1-quart paint can with ArmlockTM seal ringLabelMaster(r)%242.90 eachHazard Class 3, 4, 5, 8, or 9 Small ContainersTC Hazardous Material Transport ContainerCurrently in Use4 DraftDraftDraftTable 1: Summary of Recommendations (continued)ContainerCost55-gallon open or closed-head steel drumsAll-Pak, Inc.%2458.28 - %2473.62 eachHazard Class 3, 4, 5, 8, or 9 Large Containers95-gallon poly overpack LabelMaster(r)%24194.50 each1-liter glass container with plastic coatingLabelMaster(r)%243.35 - %243.70 eachHazard Class 6 Division 6.1 Poisonous by Inhalation (PIH) Small ContainersTC Hazardous Material Transport ContainerCurrently in Use20 to 55-gallon PIH overpacksLabelMaster(r)%24142.50 - %24170.50 eachHazard Class 6 Division 6.1 Poisonous by Inhalation (PIH) Large Containers65 to 95-gallon poly overpacksLabelMaster(r)%24163.30 - %24194.50 each1-liter transparent containerCurrently in UseHazard Class 6 Division 6.2 Infectious Material Small ContainersInfectious Substance ShipperSource Packaging of NE, Inc.%24336.00 eachNone Commercially AvailableN/AHazard Class 6 Division 6.2 Infectious Material Large ContainersNone Commercially Available N/A5

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This document provides a detailed discussion and a guide for the use of the RadCat 2.0 Graphical User Interface input file generator for the RADTRAN 5.5 code. The differences between RadCat 2.0 and RadCat 1.0 can be attributed to the differences between RADTRAN 5 and RADTRAN 5.5 as well as clarification for some of the input parameters. 3