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Evans, Alan S.
U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security into the design process can provide robust, cost-effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this report is to capture lessons learned by the Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program that may be beneficial for other advanced and small modular reactor (SMR) vendors to use when developing security systems and postures. This report will capture relevant information that can be used in the security-by-design (SeBD) process for SMR and microreactor vendors.
Evans, Alan S.
U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, economical, and effective physical protection systems (PPS). The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a molten salt reactor (MSR) and show how to effectively design a PPS with a reduced staffing headcount. Specifically, this work focuses on integrating PPS design features into a developed facility layout by making minor modifications to building structures. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D©, PathTrace©, and Blender©, were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic MSR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and responders were added into the model based on defending the hypothetical MSR facility against a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT). Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4–8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic MSRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for small modular reactors (SMRs). The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.
Horowitz, Steven M. ; Holt, Katherine; Williams, Adam D. ; Evans, Alan S.
Williams, Adam D. ; Evans, Alan S. ; Mohagheghi, Amir H. ; Lawrence, Kimberly G. ; Crabtree, Lauren M. ; De Oliviera, Cassiano; Lee, Hyung
Williams, Adam D. ; Clark, Andrew J. ; Evans, Alan S. ; Bland, Jesse J.
Williams, Adam D. ; Evans, Alan S.
Williams, Adam D. ; Evans, Alan S.
Williams, Adam D. ; Evans, Alan S. ; Lawrence, Kimberly G. ; Crabtree, Lauren M. ; Mohagheghi, Amir H. ; De Oliviera, Cassiano; Lee, Hyung
Williams, Adam D. ; Clark, Andrew J. ; Evans, Alan S. ; Bland, Jesse J.
Evans, Alan S.
Evans, Alan S.
U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost- effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and microreactors. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR and microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility and microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and onsite response forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs and microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can lead to efficient security systems that utilize an onsite response force. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.
Williams, Adam D. ; Cipiti, Benjamin B. ; Bland, Jesse J. ; Osborn, Douglas ; Evans, Alan S.
Evans, Alan S.
This document is aimed at providing guidance to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security’s (INS) country and regional teams for implementing effective physical protection systems (PPSs) for nuclear power plants (NPPs) to prevent the radiological consequences of sabotage. This recommendation document includes input from the Physical Protection Functional Team (PPFT), the Response Functional Team (RFT), and the Sabotage Functional Team (SFT) under INS. Specifically, this document provides insights into increasing and sustaining physical protection capabilities at INS partner countries’ NPP sites. Nuclear power plants should consider that the intent of this document is to provide a historical context as well as technologies and methodologies that may be applied to improve physical protection capabilities. It also refers to relevant guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Williams, Adam D. ; Cipiti, Benjamin B. ; Bland, Jesse J. ; Osborn, Douglas ; Evans, Alan S.
Williams, Adam D. ; Evans, Alan S. ; Holt, Katherine
Williams, Adam D. ; Evans, Alan S. ; Holt, Katherine
Evans, Alan S.
Evans, Alan S.
This recommendation document will provide international partners insight on physical protection systems (PPSs) for small modular reactors (SMRs). SMRs create many unique challenges for physical protection that must be addressed in design and implementation. This document will attempt to highlight possible challenges of SMRs and identify potential physical protection recommendations to mitigate these challenges. These recommendations are based on hypothetical SMR facilities and PPSs and their effectiveness against hypothetical adversaries.
Evans, Alan S.
U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a microreactor and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for microreactors. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all microreactor designs.
Evans, Alan S.
U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.
Williams, Adam D. ; Cipiti, Benjamin B. ; Evans, Alan S.
Evans, Alan S.
Evans, Alan S.
Evans, Alan S.
Evans, Alan S.
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