Publications

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Of the many facets of the criminal world, few have captured societys fascination as has that of high stakes robbery. The combination of meticulousness, cunning, and audacity required to execute a real-life Oceans Eleven may be uncommon among criminals, but fortunately it is common enough to extract a wealth of lessons for the protection of high-value assets. To assist in informing the analyses and decisions of security professionals, this paper surveys 23 sophisticated and high-value heists that have occurred or been attempted around the world, particularly over the past three decades. The results, compiled in a Heist Methods and Characteristics Database, have been analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively, with the goals of both identifying common characteristics and characterizing the range and diversity of criminal methods used. The analysis is focused in six areas: (1) Defeated Security Measures and Devices, (2) Deception Methods, (3) Timing, (4) Weapons, (5) Resources, and (6) Insiders.

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This paper presents Sandia National Laboratories' Out-door Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision Analysis Center (Out-DAC) and, through an example case study, derives lessons for its use. This tool, related to similar capabilities at Sandia, can be used to determine functional requirements for a detection system of aerosol-released threats outdoors. Essential components of OutDAC are a population database, a meteorological dataset, an atmospheric transport and dispersion model and an optimization toolkit. Detector placement is done through optimization against a library of hypothe-sized attack scenarios by minimizing either the mean or value-at-risk of undetected infections. These scenarios are the product of a Monte Carlo simulation intended to characterize the uncertainty associated with the threat. An example case study illustrates that Monte Carlo convergence is dependent on the statistic of interest. Furthermore, the quality of the detector placement optimization may be tied to the convergence level of the Monte Carlo simulation. © 2009 IEEE.

Effective defense against chemical and biological threats requires an "end-to-end" strategy that encompasses the entire problem space, from threat assessment and target hardening to response planning and recovery. A key element of the strategy is the definition of appropriate system requirements for surveillance and detection of threat agents. Our end-toend approach to venue chem/bio defense is captured in the Facilities Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision Analysis Capability (FacDAC), an integrated system-of-systems toolset that can be used to generate requirements across all stages of detector development. For example, in the early stage of detector development the approach can be used to develop performance targets (e.g., sensitivity, selectivity, false positive rate) to provide guidance on what technologies to pursue. In the development phase, after a detector technology has been selected, the approach can aid in determining performance trade-offs and down-selection of competing technologies. During the application stage, the approach can be employed to design optimal defensive architectures that make the best use of available technology to maximize system performance. This presentation will discuss the end-to-end approach to defining detector requirements and demonstrate the capabilities of the FacDAC toolset using examples from a number of studies for the Department of Homeland Security. © 2009 SPIE.

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