Publications

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Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has hosted the International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities since 1978. This course is the flagship training course of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On behalf of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), SNL manages, develops, and coordinates all course materials, and works closely with the IAEA to arrange all logistical details for the course. ITC-28 incorporated several new approaches based on feedback and experience with ITC-27 and earlier versions of the course. For ITC-28, an addition to the Integrated Security Facility (ISF) at SNL was a mock reactor hall with a mock reactor pool. Other facilities at the ISF include a mock processing facility, material receiving area, and central alarm station. The physical protection system at the ISF—an area that formerly housed Category I nuclear material—provides many opportunities for hands-on, real world training in the design and evaluation of a physical protection system (PPS). This document provides a brief description of ITC-28, including a summary of lessons learned and key recommendations for future development efforts.

The course content consisted of 32 modules that included topics necessary to understand how to conduct PPS design and evaluation. An important aspect of ITC-27's training methodology was to ensure that each topic was presented via lecture (hear), and also included demonstrations (see) and hands-on field activities (do), whenever applicable. A final exercise provided participants with the opportunity to apply the design and evaluation knowledge gained during the course. Guest lecturers—both domestic and international—supplemented information from related agency perspectives. A new topic—Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)—offered participants a high-level awareness of the types, uses, and capabilities of these systems and how they might be used in both an adversarial and protective capacity.

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This hypothetical order provides the requirements and instructions for the Springfield Processing Plant (SPP) Vehicle Gate and Entry Control Point (ECP) in the perimeter access building. The purpose of this post is to prevent the theft, sabotage or diversion of nuclear material (NM), control access and exit at the protected area, and to respond to emergencies according the SPP Guard Force (GF) Contingency Plan and as directed by a Guard Force Supervisor.

A variety of performance tests are described relating to: Material Transfers; Emergency Evacuation; Alarm Response Assessment; and an Enhanced Limited Scope Performance Test (ELSPT). Procedures are given for: nuclear material physical inventory and discrepancy; material transfers; and emergency evacuation.

The current wave of small modular reactor (SMR) designs all have the goal of reducing the cost of management and operations. By optimizing the system, the goal is to make these power plants safer, cheaper to operate and maintain, and more secure. In particular, the reduction in plant staffing can result in significant cost savings. The introduction of advanced reactor designs and increased use of advanced automation technologies in existing nuclear power plants will likely change the roles, responsibilities, composition, and size of the crews required to control plant operations. Similarly, certain security staffing requirements for traditional operational nuclear power plants may not be appropriate or necessary for SMRs due to the simpler, safer and more automated design characteristics of SMRs. As a first step in a process to identify where regulatory requirements may be met with reduced staffing and therefore lower cost, this report identifies the regulatory requirements and associated guidance utilized in the licensing of existing reactors. The potential applicability of these regulations to advanced SMR designs is identified taking into account the unique features of these types of reactors.

This report gives an overview of expected design characteristics, concepts, and procedures for small modular reactors. The purpose of this report is to provide those who are interested in reducing the cost and improving the safety of advanced nuclear power plants with a generic design that possesses enough detail in a non-sensitive manner to give merit to their conclusions. The report is focused on light water reactor technology, but does add details on what could be different in a more advanced design (see Appendix). Numerous reactor and facility concepts were used for inspiration (documented in the bibliography). The final design described here is conceptual and does not reflect any proposed concept or sub-systems, thus any details given here are only relevant within this report. This report does not include any design or engineering calculations.

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