UAS and TBS operations at Oliktok Point, Alaska, have laid the groundwork for extended and semiroutine operations of such vehicles by the DOE ARM program. This paper provided an overview of these activities, along with insights into obstacles overcome and initial science achieved. While measurements from these initial activities are just beginning to be analyzed, these observations demonstrate the value of the new perspectives offered by these platforms, including information on spatial variability and vertical structure, and over difficult-to-sample surfaces such as newly forming sea ice and partially frozen tundra. Over the next few years, the measurements obtained, and those to be collected in the near future, will continue to be analyzed and used for model and remote sensing retrieval development and for the production of scientific understanding. Some such studies are currently being prepared for publication, offering new insights into atmospheric thermodynamic structure, aerosol processes, cloud macro- and microphysics, and turbulent and radiative energy fluxes at high latitudes. Information gained on the efficient use of unmanned platforms in the Arctic will benefit future missions, while scientific insight from such activities will continue, providing a valuable complement to measurements obtained from ARM's surface-based sensors and those provided by crewed research aircraft and satellites.
The Sandia ACRR (a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Reactor Facility) was defueled in June 1997 to modify the reactor core and control system to produce medical radioisotopes for the Department of Energy (DOE) Isotope Production Program. The DOE determined that an Operational Readiness Review (ORR) was required to confirm readiness to begin operations within the revised safety basis. This paper addresses the ORR Process, lessons learned from the Sandia and DOE ORRS of the ACRR, and the use of the ORR to confirm authorization basis implementation.
Sandia has implemented a formal process to verify that new or modified facilities and operations are ready to safely operate. The readiness review process focuses on the status of management systems, personnel, and systems, structures, and components to do work safely. The scope and depth of the review are tailored to match the potential consequences and the likelihood that the consequences could occur. The precepts and methodology of the process are applicable to verifying the readiness of enterprise systems, and should comprise the final element in developing and implementing an enterprise system. This paper describes the readiness review process, the key elements for success, lessons learned from Sandia's readiness assessment process, and outlines how the process can be applied to enterprise systems. Specific topics addressed include selecting the criteria, approach, and lines of inquiry to be used for the review; selecting members for the review team; team leader responsibilities; reporting and closing deficiencies; and, responsibilities of the facility/project owner and management.
This paper presents a paradigm for integrating the many facets of ES&H management based on the necessary and sufficient control of hazards and the resulting risks through a systems approach. The paradigm answers the question ``What is the best approach to managing ES&H to increase value, reduce risk, and improve satisfaction?`` Hazard identification is the foundation of integrated ES&H management. Knowledge of risk is essential to the necessary and sufficient management of risk. A systems approach to identifying and managing risks is essential in achieving integrated ES&H management. Feedback is discussed. The objectives can be applied to the function of risk management using the ``Know, Understand, Manage and Document`` paradigm. The organizational structure is crucial to the success of integrated ES&H management.
Selecting a risk-based tool to aid in decision making is as much of a challenge as properly using the tool once it has been selected. Failure to consider customer and stakeholder requirements and the technical bases and differences in risk-based decision making tools will produce confounding and/or politically unacceptable results when the tool is used. Selecting a risk-based decisionmaking tool must therefore be undertaken with the same, if not greater, rigor than the use of the tool once it is selected. This paper presents a process for selecting a risk-based tool appropriate to a set of prioritization or resource allocation tasks, discusses the results of applying the process to four risk-based decision-making tools, and identifies the ``musts`` for successful selection and implementation of a risk-based tool to aid in decision making.