Publications

This report aims at answering what, how, and when spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or dual-purpose canister (DPC) characteristics could be impacted by disposal events and processes, including decay, corrosion, dissolution, and criticality, such that the potential for criticality initiation or continuation in disposed DPCs becomes permanently significantly diminished. This report uses the term "permanent termination of criticality to denote the significant diminishment of criticality potential, not absolute prevention. The occurrence of disposal processes and events is a direct function of disposal time. For fundamental processes (e.g., decay), time is absolute; however, for other processes (e.g., corrosion), time is relative because it is driven by a combination of DPC characteristics (e.g., fuel conditions, basket composition), geologic parameters (e.g., infiltration rate), engineered barrier design, and other processes and events that impact in-package chemistry.

There are currently (as of January, 2019) more than 2,700 dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) loaded with spent nuclear fuel (SNF) across the United States. DPCs continue to be loaded at a rate of more than 200 per year by mid-century there are likely to be more than 8,160 DPCs in service. Options for disposing of SNF loaded in DPCs include repackaging into specialized disposal canisters, directly disposing of the loaded DPCs (with or without modification), or some combination of the two. The main technical challenges for direct disposal of loaded DPCs are thermal management, handling and emplacement operations for the large, heavy packages, and postclosure criticality control. This report focuses on postclosure criticality control which is the most challenging. The challenge lies in determining how to modify DPCs so as to minimize the probability that a criticality event might occur in a repository, or if the DPCs are not modified, to understand the nature and consequences of postclosure criticality events. There are several approaches that could facilitate direct disposal of loaded DPCs with acceptable repository performance. This report describes these approaches and presents comparative analysis of the rough-order-of-magnitude (ROM) costs. Repackaging SNF in DPCs into specialized disposal canisters could be financially and operationally costly with additional radiological, operational safety, and management risks. A disposition approach that would not involve repackaging or modifications to DPCs (future or already loaded) is development of a new licensing strategy that addresses the risk (probability and consequence) from criticality events. A different approach would modify existing loaded DPCs (some or all of them), and change the loading or design of future DPCs, to decrease the probability of a criticality event in a repository below levels of concern. This report investigates the cost to modify existing loaded DPCs, and the cost to modify the loading or design of future DPCs to facilitate direct disposal. It establishes the ROM cost for repackaging SNF that has been loaded into DPCs, into specialized canisters for disposal. It also identifies technical and regulatory challenges associated with the potential design modifications and loading considerations. It is left to future analyses to compare radiological, operational safety, and management risks associated with the available approaches.

Commercial generation of energy via nuclear power plants in the United States (U.S.) has generated thousands of metric tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), the disposal of which is the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982). Any repository licensed to dispose of the SNF must meet requirements regarding the long-term performance of the repository. In evaluating the long-term performance of the repository, one of the events that may need to be considered is the SNF achieving a critical configuration. Of particular interest is the potential behavior of SNF in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), which are currently being used to store the SNF but were not designed for permanent disposal. As part of a multiyear plan that is currently being developed for the DOE, a two-phase study has been initiated to examine the potential consequences, with respect to long-term repository performance, of criticality events that might occur during the postclosure period in a hypothetical repository containing DPCs. Phase I, a scoping phase, consists of generating an approach intended to be a starting point for the development of the modeling tools and techniques that may eventually be required either to exclude criticality from or include criticality in a performance assessment (PA) as appropriate. The Phase I approach will be used to guide the analyses and simulations done in Phase II to further the development of these modeling tools and techniques as well as the overall knowledge base. The purpose of this report is to document the approach created during Phase I. The study discussed herein focuses on the consequences of criticality in a DPC; it does not address the probability of occurrence of a criticality event. This approach examines two types of criticality events for SNF disposed of in a single type of DPC: a steady-state criticality and a transient criticality. The steady-state critical event is characterized by a relatively low constant power output over 10,000 years, while the transient critical event is characterized by a power spike that lasts on the order of seconds. Possible effects of the criticality are an increase in the radionuclide inventory; an increase in temperature; and a change in the chemistry inside the waste package, along with a change in radionuclide solubilities, fuel degradation rates, and steel corrosion rates. Additionally, for transient criticality the possibility of mechanical damage to the engineered and natural barriers also exists.