A significant amount of uncertainty exists regarding potential human exposure to laboratory biomaterials and organisms in Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) research laboratories. Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling is proposed as a way to better understand potential impacts of different combinations of biomaterials, laboratory manipulations, and exposure routes on risks to laboratory workers. Here, in this study, we use CFD models to simulate airborne concentrations of contaminants in an actual BSL-2 laboratory under different configurations. Results show that ventilation configuration, sampling location, and contaminant source location can significantly impact airborne concentrations and exposures. Depending on the source location and airflow patterns, the transient and time-integrated concentrations varied by several orders of magnitude. Contaminant plumes from sources located near a return vent (or exhaust like a fume hood or ventilated biosafety cabinet) are likely to be more contained than sources that are further from the exhaust. Having a direct flow between the source and the exhaust (through-flow condition) may reduce potential exposures to individuals outside the air flow path. Designing a BSL-2 room with ventilation and airflow patterns that maximize through-flow conditions to the return/exhaust vents and minimize dispersion and mixing throughout the room is, therefore, recommended. CFD simulations can also be used to assist in characterizing the impacts of supply and return vent locations, room layout, and source locations on spatial and temporal contaminant concentrations. In addition, proper placement of particle sensors can also be informed by CFD simulations to provide additional characterization and monitoring of potential exposures in BSL-2 facilities.
On behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Global Chemical and Biological Security (GCBS) group visited the Jordan Royal Medical Society (RMS) from 8 to 11 April 2019. The goal of this visit was to provide subject matter expertise and advisory support to DTRA/BTRP and RMS regarding RMS' desire to establish a self-sufficient biorisk management (BRIV1) training capability housed in a training centre programmed to provide biorisk management training to the Jordan military services and beyond. This report provides SNL/GCBS' assessment of the status of RMS' current and desired capability as a BRM Training Centre across four critical components: 1) Curriculum, 2) Trainers, 3) Oversight and Administration, and 4) Facility.
The following document represents the joint SNL/IBCTR and HDR Team's Training Centre needs assessment for the Jordan Royal Medical Service (RMS) at the King Hussein Medical Centre (KHMC) and should be used as follows: 1) To present options for future facility improvements. 2) In support of obtaining additional funding for the facility and finalization of a plan for equipment, human resource development, and technical assistance. 3) as a platform to guide future considerations to provide training centre facilities in support of the Biorisk Management (BRM) training and other training to compliment RMS capabilities.
Sandia National Laboratories and Gryphon Scientific, as supported and directed by the CDC Center for Preparedness and Response (CPR), studied the process of risk assessment and risk-based decision-making in facilities expected to continue possessing poliovirus strains. The first phase of the study was conducted in anticipation of developing a tool to support decision-making processes for poliovirus containment to minimize the risk of facility-associated re-introduction of poliovirus. The study results supported the starting assumption that risk management of poliovirus will be aided by more rigorous and consistent risk assessment and that experience-based risk assessment is, by itself, inadequate to understand risk in a post-eradication world. These results were derived from review of polio virus literature, oversight documents, current and expected practices, and from discussions with affected facilities. Based on these results and on additional discussions with facilities, the study team recommends development of a quantitative risk assessment tool as well as improving access to and the quality of data for informing risk-based decision-making.
Sandia National Laboratories' International Biological and Chemical Threat Reduction (SNL/IBCTR) conducted, on behalf of the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP), a review of risk assessment in modern select agent laboratories. This review and analysis consisted of literature review, interviews of FSAP staff, entities regulated by FSAP, and deliberations of an expert panel. Additionally, SNL/IBCTR reviewed oversight mechanisms used by industries, US agencies, and other countries for high-consequence risks (e.g, nuclear, chemical, or biological materials, aviation, off-shore drilling, etc.) to determine if alternate oversight mechanisms existed that might be applicable to FSAP oversight of biological select agents and toxins. This report contains five findings, based on these reviews and analyses, with recommendations and suggested actions for FSAP to consider.