Publications

Abstract not provided.

A technical review is presented of experiment activities and state of knowledge on air-borne, radiation source terms resulting from explosive sabotage attacks on spent reactor fuel subassemblies in shielded casks. Current assumptions about the behavior of irradiated fuel are largely based on a limited number of experimental results involving unirradiated, depleted uranium dioxide ''surrogate'' fuel. The behavior of irradiated nuclear fuel subjected to explosive conditions could be different from the behavior of the surrogate fuel, depending on the assumptions made by the evaluator. Available data indicate that these potential differences could result in errors, and possible orders-of-magnitude overestimates of aerosol dispersion and potential health effects from sabotage attacks. Furthermore, it is suggested that the current assumptions used in arriving at existing regulations for the transportation and storage of spent fuel in the U.S. are overly conservative. This, in turn, has led to potentially higher-than-needed operating expenses for those activities. A confirmatory experimental program is needed to develop a realistic correlation between source terms of irradiated fuel and unirradiated fuel. The motivations for performing the confirmatory experimental program are also presented.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.

This paper describes a method for criticality control at fissile material storage facilities. The method involves the use criticiality indices for storage canisters. The logic, methodology, and results for selected canisters are presented. A concept for an interactive computer program using the method is also introduced. The computer program can be used in real time (using precalulated data) to select a Criticality Index (CI) for a container when it is delivered to or packaged at a site. Criticality safety is assured by controlling the sum of the CIs at each storage location below a defined Emit value when containers are moved.

Several potential incident scenarios involving the accidental release of radioactive material at five reference, nonreactor nuclear material licensees are analyzed in this report. The economic risk ($/licensee/yr) of decontamination is evaluated for each reference licensee. Although most releases and cleanup costs are minor, some less frequent incidents may result in very high cleanup costs that dominate the economic risk of decontamination of a particular licensee. The economic risk for the 5 plants ranged from a low of $14,000 per licensee per year to a high of $104,000 per licensee per year. This report is the second of two reports by Sandia National Laboratories on the economic risk of nonreactor nuclear material licensee operations. 40 refs., 21 figs., 31 tabs.