PAT-1 Plutonium Air Transportable Package
Abstract not provided.
Publications
Containment Evaluation / Leak Testing KRMC Discussion
Abstract not provided.
PAT-1 Subpart H Quality Assurance Program 10 CFR 71
Abstract not provided.
PAT-1 safety analysis report addendum
The Plutonium Air Transportable Package, Model PAT-1, is certified under Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per Certificate of Compliance (CoC) USA/0361B(U)F-96 (currently Revision 9). The purpose of this SAR Addendum is to incorporate plutonium (Pu) metal as a new payload for the PAT-1 package. The Pu metal is packed in an inner container (designated the T-Ampoule) that replaces the PC-1 inner container. The documentation and results from analysis contained in this addendum demonstrate that the replacement of the PC-1 and associated packaging material with the T-Ampoule and associated packaging with the addition of the plutonium metal content are not significant with respect to the design, operating characteristics, or safe performance of the containment system and prevention of criticality when the package is subjected to the tests specified in 10 CFR 71.71, 71.73 and 71.74.
PAT-1 safety analysis report addendum author responses to request for additional information
A Stress-State Modified Strain Based on FAilure Criterion for Evaluating the Structural Integrity of an Inner Eutectic Barrier
Abstract not provided.
A stress-state modified strain based failure criterion for evaluating the structural integrity of an inner eutectic barrier
A slight modification of a package to transport solid metal contents requires inclusion of a thin titanium liner to protect against possible eutectic formation in 10 CFR 71.74 regulatory fire accident conditions. Under severe transport regulatory impact conditions, the package contents could impart high localized loading of the liner, momentarily pinching it between the contents and the thick containment vessel, and inducing some plasticity near the contact point. Actuator and drop table testing of simulated contents impacts against liner/containment vessel structures nearly bounded the potential plastic strain and stress triaxiality conditions, without any ductile tearing of the eutectic barrier. Additional bounding was necessary in some cases beyond the capability of the actuator and drop table tests, and in these cases a stress-modified evolution integral over the plastic strain history was successfully used as a failure criterion to demonstrate that structural integrity was maintained. The Heaviside brackets only allow the evolution integral to accumulate value when the maximum principal stress is positive, since failure is never observed under pure hydrostatic pressure, where the maximum principal stress is negative. Detailed finite element analyses of myriad possible impact orientations and locations between package contents and the thin eutectic barrier under regulatory impact conditions have shown that not even the initiation of a ductile tear occurs. Although localized plasticity does occur in the eutectic barrier, it is not the primary containment boundary and is thus not subject to ASME stress allowables from NRC Regulatory Guide 7.6. These analyses were used to successfully demonstrate that structural integrity of the eutectic barrier was maintained in all 10 CFR 71.73 and 71.74 regulatory accident conditions. The NRC is currently reviewing the Safety Analysis Report.
PAT-1 SAR addendum overview : EM packaging certification program technical review
Abstract not provided.
Air transport of plutonium metal : content expansion initiative for the Plutonium Air Transportable (PAT-1) packaging
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has submitted an application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the air shipment of plutonium metal within the Plutonium Air Transportable (PAT-1) packaging. The PAT-1 packaging is currently authorized for the air transport of plutonium oxide in solid form only. The INMM presentation will provide a limited overview of the scope of the plutonium metal initiative and provide a status of the NNSA application to the NRC.
PAT-1 SAR Addendum Overview
Abstract not provided.
Early Thermal Testing of Type B Radioactive Material Packages in the US to Environments Beyond the Regulatory Package Thermal Test Standards
Abstract not provided.
A Risk Based Approach to Security Arrangement
Abstract not provided.
Mitigation of Nuclear Transport Sabotage
Abstract not provided.
Parametric Study of the Release of Spent Fuel Aerosol Resulting from HEDD Attack
Abstract not provided.
PAT-1 NRC Amendment Meeting
Abstract not provided.
Review of Waste Management Symposium 2007, Tucson, AZ, USA
Packaging, Transport, Storage and Security of Radioactive Material
The Waste Management Symposium 2007 is the most recent in a long series that has been held at Tucson, Arizona. The meeting has become extremely popular as a venue for technical exchange, marketing, and networking involving upward of 1800 persons involved with various aspects of radioactive waste management. However, in a break with tradition, the symposium organizers reported that next year’s Waste Management Symposium would be held at the Phoenix, AZ convention center. Additionally, most of the WM07 sessions dealt with the technical and institutional issues relating to the resolution of waste disposal and processing challenges, including a number of sessions dealing with related transport activities.
Overview of Transportation & Facility Safety and Security Work Performed for the NRC
Abstract not provided.
Surrogate/spent fuel sabotage aerosol ratio testing:phase 1 summary and results
This multinational test program is quantifying the aerosol particulates produced when a high energy density device (HEDD) impacts surrogate material and actual spent fuel test rodlets. The experimental work, performed in four consecutive test phases, has been in progress for several years. The overall program provides needed data that are relevant to some sabotage scenarios in relation to spent fuel transport and storage casks, and associated risk assessments. This program also provides significant political benefits in international cooperation for nuclear security related evaluations. The spent fuel sabotage--aerosol test program is coordinated with the international Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of Transport and Storage Casks (WGSTSC), and supported by both the U.S. Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This report summarizes the preliminary, Phase 1 work performed in 2001 and 2002 at Sandia National Laboratories and the Fraunhofer Institute, Germany, and documents the experimental results obtained, observations, and preliminary interpretations. Phase 1 testing included: performance quantifications of the HEDD devices; characterization of the HEDD or conical shaped charge (CSC) jet properties with multiple tests; refinement of the aerosol particle collection apparatus being used; and, CSC jet-aerosol tests using leaded glass plates and glass pellets, serving as representative brittle materials. Phase 1 testing was quite important for the design and performance of the following Phase 2 test program and test apparatus.
Estimating risks of terrorist attacks on RAM transport packages
Abstract not provided.
Smart cask monitoring system
Abstract not provided.
Spent fuel/surrogate aerosol ratio test program and preliminary results
Abstract not provided.
Spent fuel response in high energy environments : initial results, international program
Abstract not provided.
Perspectives on Spent Fuel Cask Sabotage
Abstract not provided.
23 Results