Publications

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Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) are an important component of the safety case for a Light Water Reactor (LWR). The number and types of SRVs in LWRs vary from plant to plant, but they generally operate to perform the same safety function. During accidents in which the coolant pressurizes beyond a predetermined set-point, the SRV will open, releasing coolant from the primary system and into the containment. Once enough coolant has been released to lower the coolant pressure, the SRV will reset. This cycle will continue until the SRV fails, in either a "Failed to Open (FTO)" or "Failed To Close (FTC)" mode. These failures can be caused either through cyclic loading or as a result of thermalinduced stresses from the coolant passing through the valve. SRV failures can be important, because an SRV that has FTC will cause a small "Loss of Cooling Accident", which depressurizes the primary system. Alternatively, SRVs that have FTO will allow system pressure to rise until it reaches the next SRV set-point. If the pressure is not reduced through the successful operation of other safety systems, either creep rupture elsewhere in the system, such as in the steam line, or high-pressure core damage may occur. While some SRV failure data is recorded in NUREG/CR-6928, the spread of the epistemic uncertainty distributions for FTO and FTC are wide. These large uncertainties may cause an analyst to be overconfident in the results of a severe accident simulation that uses only point-estimates calculations of FTO and FTC.

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This report proposes potential research priorities for the Department of Energy (DOE) with the intent of improving the licensability of the Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR). In support of this project, five panels were tasked with identifying potential safety-related gaps in available information, data, and models needed to support the licensing of a SFR. The areas examined were sodium technology, accident sequences and initiators, source term characterization, codes and methods, and fuels and materials. It is the intent of this report to utilize a structured and transparent process that incorporates feedback from all interested stakeholders to suggest future funding priorities for the SFR research and development. While numerous gaps were identified, two cross-cutting gaps related to knowledge preservation were agreed upon by all panels and should be addressed in the near future. The first gap is a need to re-evaluate the current procedures for removing the Applied Technology designation from old documents. The second cross-cutting gap is the need for a robust Knowledge Management and Preservation system in all SFR research areas. Closure of these and the other identified gaps will require both a reprioritization of funding within DOE as well as a re-evaluation of existing bureaucratic procedures within the DOE associated with Applied Technology and Knowledge Management.

Expert panels comprised of subject matter experts identified at the U.S. National Laboratories (SNL, ANL, INL, ORNL, LBL, and BNL), universities (University of Wisconsin and Ohio State University), international agencies (IRSN, CEA, JAEA, KAERI, and JRC-IE) and private consultation companies (Radiation Effects Consulting) were assembled to perform a gap analysis for sodium fast reactor licensing. Expert-opinion elicitation was performed to qualitatively assess the current state of sodium fast reactor technologies. Five independent gap analyses were performed resulting in the following topical reports: (1) Accident Initiators and Sequences (i.e., Initiators/Sequences Technology Gap Analysis), (2) Sodium Technology Phenomena (i.e., Advanced Burner Reactor Sodium Technology Gap Analysis), (3) Fuels and Materials (i.e., Sodium Fast Reactor Fuels and Materials: Research Needs), (4) Source Term Characterization (i.e., Advanced Sodium Fast Reactor Accident Source Terms: Research Needs), and (5) Computer Codes and Models (i.e., Sodium Fast Reactor Gaps Analysis of Computer Codes and Models for Accident Analysis and Reactor Safety). Volume II of the Sodium Research Plan consolidates the five gap analysis reports produced by each expert panel, wherein the importance of the identified phenomena and necessities of further experimental research and code development were addressed. The findings from these five reports comprised the basis for the analysis in Sodium Fast Reactor Research Plan Volume I.

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