Publications

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There is an increasing awareness that efficient and effective nuclear facility design is best achieved when requirements from the 3S disciplines Safety, Safeguards, and Security - are balanced and intrinsic to the facility design. This can be achieved when policy, processes, methods, and technologies are understood and applied in these areas during all phases of the design process. For the purposes of this paper, Security-by-design will be defined as the system level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new or retrofitted nuclear power plant (NPP) or nuclear facility (NF) resulting in intrinsic security. Security-by-design can also be viewed as a framework to achieve robust and durable security systems. This paper reports on work performed to date to create a Security-by-Design Handbook, under a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan, specifically, a review of physical protection principles and best practices, and a decommissioning to better understand where these principles and practices can be applied. This paper describes physical protection principles and best practices to achieve security-by- design that were gathered from International, Japanese, and U.S. sources. Principles are included for achieving security early in the design process where security requirements are typically less costly and easier to incorporate. The paper then describes a generic design process that covers the entire facility lifecycle from scoping and planning of the project to decommissioning and decontamination. Early design process phases, such as conceptual design, offer opportunities to add security features intrinsic to the facility design itself. Later phases, including design engineering and construction, are important for properly integrating security features into a coherent design and for planning for and assuring the proper performance of the security system during the operation and decommissioning of the facility. The paper also describes some future activities on this bilateral project to create a Security-by-Design Handbook. When completed, the Handbook is intended to assist countries with less experience in nuclear power programs to apply principles and best practices in an effective and efficient manner as early in the design as possible to achieve robust and durable security.

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Security system analytical performance analysis is generally based on the probability of system effectiveness. The probability of effectiveness is a function of the probabilities of interruption and neutralization. Interruption occurs if the response forces are notified in sufficient time to engage the adversary. Neutralization occurs if the adversary attack is defeated after the security forces have actively engaged the adversary. Both depend upon communications of data. This paper explores details of embedded communications functions that are often assumed to be inconsequential. It is the intent of the authors to bring focus to an issue in security system modeling that, if not well understood, has the potential to be a deciding factor in the overall system failure or effectiveness.

Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities are being encouraged to reduce costs but the accounting data typically in use by the financial organizations at these laboratories cannot easily be used to determine which security activities offer the best reduction in cost. For example, labor costs have historically been aggregated over various activities, making it difficult to determine the true costs of performing each activity. To illustrate how this problem can be solved, a study was performed applying activity-based costing (ABC) to a hypothetical DOE facility. ABC is a type of cost-accounting developed expressly to determine truer costs of company activities. The hypothetical facility was defined to have features similar to those found across the DOE nuclear complex. ABC traced costs for three major security functions - Protective Force Operations, Material Control and Accountability, and Technical Security - to various activities. Once these costs had been allocated, we compared the cost of three fictitious upgrades: (1) an improvement in training or weapons that allows the protective force to have better capabilities instead of adding more response forces; (2) a change in the frequency of inventories; and (3) a reduction in the annual frequencies of perimeter sensor tests.

The Outsider Analysis (Outsider) module is part of the Analytic System and Software for Evaluation of Safeguards and Security (ASSESS). Outsider and the ASSESS Facility Descriptor (Facility) module together supercede the Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion (SAVI) PC software package. Outsider calculates P(I), the probability that outsiders are interrupted during an attack on a facility by security forces at the facility, and P(W), the probability of security system win. SAVI exhaustively examines every possible path to find the ten most vulnerable paths. Exhaustive search is adequate if the number of paths to examine is small, but moderately complex facilities can have millions of paths, making exhaustive search too slow for practical purposes. Outsider has two new algorithms that generate paths in order of vulnerability, finishing in a fraction of the time required by SAVI. The new Outsider algorithms make containment analysis easier for analysts than ever before. We describe the new algorithms and show how much better they perform than the SAVI exhaustive search algorithm. 6 refs., 5 figs., 2 tabs.