Hypothetical Facility Attack Plan For The Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant
Detailed outline for a hypothetical scenario is provided in this document.
Detailed outline for a hypothetical scenario is provided in this document.
The same basic steps occur when evaluating the physical protection of nuclear or radiological material in transport against theft or sabotage as are needed for protecting nuclear facilities and nuclear material in use or storage. There are some notable distinctions, however. There are limited layers of protection around material when in transport so that the analysis focuses more on scenario analysis than for fixed sites which may require formal path analysis if the facility has some complexity. In many respects, ground transportation security is more challenging than security at a fixed site. Operation in the public domain is frequently required and the same degree of access limitation is not possible as it is in a protected fixed site. Because of these differences, response force personnel in transit play a more dominant role in the security of a mobile system than they do for a fixed site. In all cases, however, the system time delay that is required to provide the response force the time to react must be provided primarily by transportation vehicle technology elements.
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This document is a draft SecuritybyDesign (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to %E2%80%9Cencourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.%E2%80%9D The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PASPP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessonslearned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the systemlevel incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A fourelement strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.
This report documents the results of Task 3 of Project Action Sheet PP05 between the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST) for Support with Review of an ROK Risk Evaluation Process. This task was to have Sandia National Laboratories collaborate with the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) on several activities concerning how to determine the Probability of Neutralization, PN, and the Probability of System Effectiveness, PE, to include: providing descriptions on how combat simulations are used to determine PN and PE; comparisons of the strengths and weaknesses of two neutralization models (the Neutralization.xls spreadsheet model versus the Brief Adversary Threat-Loss Estimator (BATLE) software); and demonstrating how computer simulations can be used to determine PN. Note that the computer simulation used for the demonstration was the Scenario Toolkit And Generation Environment (STAGE) simulation, which is a stand-alone synthetic tactical simulation sold by Presagis Canada Incorporated. The demonstration is provided in a separate Audio Video Interleave (.AVI) file.
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