Publications

The Canada-US Blended Cyber-Physical Exercise was a successful, first of its kind, multiorganization and multi-laboratory exercise that culminated years of complex system development and planning. The project aimed to answer three driving research questions, (1) How do cyberattacks support malicious acts leading to theft or sabotage [at a nuclear site]? (2) What are aspects of an effective combined cyber-physical response? (3) How to evaluate effectiveness of that response? Which derived the following primary objectives, 1. The May 2023 Cyber-Physical Exercise shall present a cyber-attack scenario that supports malicious acts leading to theft or sabotage. 2. The May 2023 Cyber-Physical Exercise shall define aspects of an effective combined cyber-physical response. 3. Analysis of the May 2023 Cyber-Physical Exercise shall evaluate the effectiveness of the incident response against pre-established exercise evaluation criteria. 4. Analysis of the May 2023 Cyber-Physical Exercise shall assess the effectiveness of the evaluation criteria itself. 5. Exercises shall be performed in a real-life environment. The team believes these objectives were met, and the evidence will be presented in this report. Due to the novelty of the exercise, there were several lessons learned that will be presented in this report.

The purpose of this document is to briefly frame the challenges of detecting low, slow, and small (LSS) unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The conclusion drawn from internal discussions and external reports is the following; detection of LSS UAS is a challenging problem that can- not be achieved with a single detection modality for all potential targets. Classification of LSS UAS, especially classification in the presence of background clutter (e.g., urban environment) or other non-threating targets (e.g., birds), is under-explored. Though information of avail- able technologies is sparse, many of the existing options for UAS detection appear to be in their infancy (when compared to more established ground-based air defense systems for larger and/or faster threats). Companies currently providing or developing technologies to combat the UAS safety and security problem are certainly worth investigating, however, no company has provided the statistical evidence necessary to support robust detection, identification, and/or neutralization of LSS UAS targets. The results of a market survey are included that highlights potential commercial entities that could contribute some technology that assists in the detection, classification, and neutral- ization of a LSS UAS. This survey found no clear and obvious commercial solution, though recommendations are given for further investigation of several potential systems.

Sandia and Semprius have partnered to evaluate the operational performance of a 3.5 kW (nominal) R&D system using 40 Semprius modules. Eight months of operational data has been collected and evaluated. Analysis includes determination of Pmp, Imp and Vmp at CSTC conditions, Pmp as a function of DNI, effect of wind speed on module temperature and seasonal variations in performance. As expected, on-sun Pmp and Imp of the installed system were found to be ~10% lower than the values determined from flash testing at CSTC, while Vmp was found to be nearly identical to the results of flash testing. The differences in the flash test and outdoor data are attributed to string mismatch, soiling, seasonal variation in solar spectrum, discrepancy in the cell temperature model, and uncertainty in the power and current reported by the inverter. An apparent limitation to the degree of module cooling that can be expected from wind speed was observed. The system was observed to display seasonal variation in performance, likely due to seasonal variation in spectrum.