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Abstract not provided.

The purpose of the program is to investigate the response of representative scale models of nuclear containment to pressure loading beyond the design basis accident and to compare analytical predictions to measured behavior. This objective is accomplished by conducting static, pneumatic overpressurization tests of scale models at ambient temperature. This research program consists of testing two scale models: a steel containment vessel (SCV) model (tested in 1996) and a prestressed concrete containment vessel (PCCV) model, which is the subject of this paper.

Three-dimensional finite element analyses were performed for the two gas-filled storage caverns at the Egan field, Jennings dome, Louisiana. The effects of cavern enlargement on surface subsidence, storage loss, and cavern stability were investigated. The finite element model simulated the leaching of caverns to 6 and 8 billion cubic feet (BCF) and examined their performance at various operating conditions. Operating pressures varied from 0.15 psi/ft to 0.9 psi/ft at the bottom of the lowest cemented casing. The analysis also examined the stability of the web or pillar of salt between the caverns under differential pressure loadings. The 50-year simulations were performed using JAC3D, a three dimensional finite element analysis code for nonlinear quasistatic solids. A damage criterion based on onset of dilatancy was used to evaluate cavern instability. Dilation results from the development of microfractures in salt and, hence, potential increases in permeability onset occurs well before large scale failure. The analyses predicted stable caverns throughout the 50-year period for the range of pressures investigated. Some localized salt damage was predicted near the bottom walls of the caverns if the caverns are operated at minimum pressure for long periods of time. Volumetric cavern closures over time due to creep were moderate to excessive depending on the salt creep properties and operating pressures. However, subsidence above the cavern field was small and should pose no problem, to surface facilities.

In SECY-90-016, the NTRC proposed a safety goal of a conditional containment failure probability (CCFP) of 0.1 and the alternative acceptance criteria allowed for steel containments, which specifies that the stresses should not exceed ASNE Level C allowables for severe accident pressures and temperatures. In this work, the need for an equivalent criterion for concrete containments was studied. Six surrogate containments were designed and analyzed in order to compare the margins between design pressure, pressure resulting in exceedance of Level C (or yield) stress limits, and ultimate pressure. For comparability, each containment has an identical internal volume and design pressure. Results from the analysis showed margins to yield are comparable and display a similar margin for both steel and concrete containments. In addition, the margin to failure, although slightly higher in the steel containments, were also comparable. Finally, a CCFP for code design was determined based on general membrane behavior and imposing an upper bound severe accident curve developed in the DCH studies. The resulting CCFP`s were less then 0.02 (or 2%) for all the surrogate containments studied, showing that these containment designs all achieved the NRC safety goal.

Test results sponsored by the USNRC have shown that reinforced shear wall (Seismic Category I) structures exhibit stiffnesses and natural frequencies which are smaller than those calculated in the design process. The USNRC has sponsored Sandia National Labs to perform an evaluation of the effects of the reduced frequencies on several existing seismic PRAs in order to determine the seismic risk implications inherent in these test results. This report presents the results for the re-evaluation of the seismic risk for three nuclear power plants: the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, the Zion Nuclear Power Plant, and Arkansas Nuclear One -- Unit 1 (ANO-1). Increases in core damage frequencies for seismic initiated events at Peach Bottom were 25 to 30 percent (depending on whether LLNL or EPRI hazard curves were used). At the ANO-1 site, the corresponding increases in plant risk were 10 percent (for each set of hazard curves). Finally, at Zion, there was essentially no change in the computed core damage frequency when the reduction in shear wall stiffness was included. In addition, an evaluation of deterministic ``design-like`` structural dynamic calculations with and without the shear stiffness reductions was made. Deterministic loads calculated for these two cases typically increased on the order of 10 to 20 percent for the affected structures.

This Fire Hazards Analysis is sponsored by Plant Engineering and is prepared to support the Safety Assessment for the CNSAC Facility. This is a preliminary fire hazards analysis of a yet to be constructed facility and is based upon the current building design and the current understanding of the potential occupancy hazards. The governing occupancy for this building is personnel offices. The CNSAC facility will be dedicated primarily to two activities: (1) arms control and verification technology and (2) intelligence. This report supplements the Safety Assessment for the CNSAC facility and follows the guidance of DOE Memorandum EH-31.3 and meets the objectives of paragraph 4 of DOE Order 5480.7A, ``Fire Protection.`` This analysis demonstrates that under ``worst case`` assumptions a fire in the CNSAC facility will result in consequences which are below DOE offsite guidelines for accident conditions. This report is based upon preliminary design information and any major changes to the building design may require additional analyses.