Publications

Researchers have the potential to be exposed to a wide variety of hazards inherent to the equipment they use and maintain. When equipment does not function as expected, researchers sometimes reach out to their vendors for assistance. Early diagnostic or troubleshooting interactions between researcher and vendor are often conducted over the telephone and can lead to researchers performing work outside of their area of expertise and exposure to unknown hazards. This type of interaction significantly contributed to an incident where during diagnostic activities a researcher accidentally contacted, and discharged, a capacitor in an X-ray diffraction instrument. While this incident did not produce a serious injury, if the capacitor discharge path had occurred hand-to-hand across the heart, a serious injury may have been possible.

On November 28, 2018 at approximately 4:17pm the arsenic monitor in the Acid Waste Neutralization (AWN) room located in 858N was registering a concentration above the permit level of 51ppb as stated in ABCWUA Permit 2069G Daily Composite Limit. 100ml samples had been drawn from the waste stream at - 6pm November 28, 2018. The samples were analyzed, results received on November 29, 2018 confirmed an arsenic concentration above the permit level.

From July 24th -27th, 2018, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was conducting a series of explosive tests (referred to as Block VIII Tests) at Thunder Range. Thunder Range is an explosive testing range located on Kirtland Air Force Base and operated by SNL. The testing occurred on Range 7, a fragmentation range that is authorized for activities up to a maximum of 2,000 pounds net explosive weight (NEW). The maximum NEW for the Block VIII tests was 114 lbs. The specific management concern is that although the Thunder Range team identified controls to provide protection for essential personnel, those controls were not adequately evaluated before testing occurred. There were several controls in place at Thunder Range when the block VW test was executed. Engineered controls including Fire Control Point (FCP) placement, FCP structure design, and administrative controls involving communications. These controls were in place but not thoroughly evaluated for adequacy in meeting requirements related to sound pressure and fragments before the test was executed. Compliance with the remaining requirements was achieved. The lack of evaluation did not result in harm to personnel, equipment, or structures but was deemed as an opportunity to further understand how compliance with DOE-STD-1212-2012 could be better achieved with defensible evidence. The information provided in the remainder of this report discusses these controls and the deficiencies that contributed to this management concern.

A Sandia National Laboratories Member of the Workforce (MOW) experienced contact with electrical energy while performing work on an oil filter pump electrical system in the al wind turbine nacelle at Sandia National Laboratories Scaled Wind Turbine Facility (SWiFT). The Department of Energy (DOE) Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Scaled Wind Farm Technology (SWiFT) facility does research and development (R&D) work in collaboration with Texas Tech University. The SWiFT facility includes three turbines for performing wind plant and turbine technology research in support of DOE's Wind Energy Technology Office. The current work ongoing at the site is primarily related to commissioning the three turbines to support ongoing DOE customer needs and requests. It was during the performance of commissioning tests of the hydraulic systems in the a1 turbine that a Sandia MOW experienced contact with electrical energy. There were multiple root and contributing causes that ultimately resulted in the electrical energy contact. These causes are summarized and aligned to their corrective actions in the corrective action plan table provided in Section 7(c). The purpose of this narrative section is to provide additional information and context

Two radar towers at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Contraves Towers 22-00 and 12-00, were torn down prior to completion of the required National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, (NTESS) submission of the NEPA checklist triggered a Sandia Field Office (SFO) review of the proposed work scope and was to include a required consultation between SFO and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) to assess any adverse effect(s) on historic properties or contributing element(s) to a historic district and, if so, determine a resolution. Following the consultation, SFO provides approval/denial of the proposed work detailed on the submitted NEPA checklist. Contraves Tower 22-00 is a historic structure, as formally determined by the SFO in consultation with the SHPO. The historical eligibility of Contraves Tower 12-00 is yet to be determined. On February 13, 2018, NTESS notified SFO that Contraves Tower 22-00 at TTR was torn down in May 2017 prior to completion of the required the NEPA process, including consultation with the SHPO. NTESS submitted two NEPA checklists to SFO in 2016 for the removal of several structures no longer required by NTESS. The first NEPA checklist listed three historic structures (one of which was Contraves Tower 22-00) and SFO determination on whether consultation with the SHPO is necessary as well as approval/denial of the NEPA checklist is pending. The second NEPA checklist listed five non-historic structures, one of which was Contraves Tower 12-00. SFO approved the NEPA checklist covering non historic structures except for the Contraves Tower 12-00, as the Contraves Tower 12-00 requires further consultation with the SHPO by SFO. Only after completion of the consultation would SFO determine approval/denial on the remaining property cited within the NEPA checklist. In late January 2018, NTESS personnel discovered that Contraves Tower 22-00 was no longer listed in the Facility Information Management System (FIMS). Upon further investigation, NTESS personnel verified that the Contraves Tower 22-00 had been removed in May 2017. During the initial extent of condition, it was discovered that Contraves Tower 12-00 had also been torn down in May 2017 as part of this same destruction and demolition (D&D) activity. Both Contraves Towers 22-00 and 12-00) had been torn down prior to completion of the NEPA process, including consultation with the SHPO.

Abstract not provided.

This quarterly summary report addresses measures and metrics as they pertain to risk, evaluation, and corrective action records in the Assurance Information System (AIS). This quarterly report is the product of a combined effort by the Risk, Assessments, and Take Action procedure subject matter experts (SMEs) to analyze the available data, primarily data from the AIS corporate application. The purpose of this report is to monitor implementation and identify improvement opportunities.

The Security and Emergency Management (S&EM) Center at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is responsible for ensuring overall security for people, information, and facilities at SNL. The center runs a broad Security and Emergency Management Program in close cooperation with other organizations throughout SNL. The mission of the Security program is to minimize current and future security threats so that Sandia can protect, sustain and enhance SNL’s ability to function as a multidisciplinary national security laboratory. The mission of the Emergency Management program is to provide SNL with dedicated professionals who deliver safe, prompt, courteous, efficient emergency planning and response to fire-related incidents, hazardous materials, confined space, emergency medical emergencies, and non-emergency events to protect the workers, the public and the environment. They embrace mission success in the National Interest, actively supporting all Divisions. The Emergency Management (EM) Program’s vision is to be recognized by SNL/NM and the entire DOE complex as the model for superior emergency management services. Emergency Management plans to accomplish this vision through a leadership philosophy that promotes respect and mutual trust among all members through open and honest communication.

Abstract not provided.

Niobium doped PZT 95/5 (lead zirconate-lead titanate) is the material used in voltage bars for all ferroelectric neutron generator power supplies. In June of 1999, the transfer and scale-up of the Sandia Process from Department 1846 to Department 14192 was initiated. The laboratory-scale process of 1.6 kg has been successfully scaled to a production batch quantity of 10 kg. This report documents efforts to characterize and optimize the production-scale process utilizing Design of Experiments methodology. Of the 34 factors identified in the powder preparation sub-process, 11 were initially selected for the screening design. Additional experiments and safety analysis subsequently reduced the screening design to six factors. Three of the six factors (Milling Time, Media Size, and Pyrolysis Air Flow) were identified as statistically significant for one or more responses and were further investigated through a full factorial interaction design. Analysis of the interaction design resulted in developing models for Powder Bulk Density, Powder Tap Density, and +20 Mesh Fraction. Subsequent batches validated the models. The initial baseline powder preparation conditions were modified, resulting in improved powder yield by significantly reducing the +20 mesh waste fraction. Response variation analysis indicated additional investigation of the powder preparation sub-process steps was necessary to identify and reduce the sources of variation to further optimize the process.

The Materials Chemistry Department 1846 has developed a lab-scale chem-prep process for the synthesis of PNZT 95/5, referred to as the ''SP'' process (Sandia Process). This process (TSP) has been successfully transferred to and scaled-up by Department 14192 (Ceramics and Glass Department), producing the larger quantities of PZT powder required to meet the future supply needs of Sandia for neutron generator production. The particle size distributions of TSP powders routinely have been found to contain a large particle size fraction that was absent in development (SP) powders. This SAND report documents experimental studies focused on characterizing these particles and assessing their potential impact on material performance. To characterize these larger particles, fractionation of several TSP powders was performed. The ''large particle size fractions'' obtained were characterized by particle size analysis, SEM, and ICP analysis and incorporated into compacts and sintered. Large particles were found to be very similar in structure and composition as the bulk of the powder. Studies showed that the large-size fractions of the powders behave similarly to the non-fractionated powder with respect to the types of microstructural features once sintered. Powders were also compared that were prepared using different post-synthesis processing (i.e. differences in precipitate drying). Results showed that these powders contained different amounts and sizes of porous inclusions when sintered. How this affects the functional performance of the PZT 95/5 material is the subject of future investigations.

Abstract not provided.

The Materials Chemistry Department 1846 has developed a lab-scale chem-prep process for the synthesis of PNZT 95/5, a ferroelectric material that is used in neutron generator power supplies. This process (Sandia Process, or SP) has been successfully transferred to and scaled by Department 14192 (Ceramics and Glass Department), (Transferred Sandia Process, or TSP), to meet the future supply needs of Sandia for its neutron generator production responsibilities. In going from the development-size SP batch (1.6 kg/batch) to the production-scale TSP powder batch size (10 kg/batch), it was important that it be determined if the scaling process caused any ''performance-critical'' changes in the PNZT 95/5 being produced. One area where a difference was found was in the particle size distributions of the calcined PNZT powders. Documented in this SAND report are the results of an experimental study to determine the origin of the differences in the particle size distribution of the SP and TSP powders.