Publications

Abstract not provided.

The restructuring of the U.S. power industry will surely lead to a greater dependence on computers and communications to allow appropriate information sharing for management and control of the power grid. This report describes the operating environment for system operations that control the bulk power system as it exists today including the role NERC plays in this process. Some high-level functional requirements for new approaches to control of the grid are listed followed by a description of the next research steps that are needed to identify specific information management functions.

Intelligent agents and multi-agent systems promise to take information management for real-time control of the power grid to a new level. This report presents our concept for intelligent agents to mediate and coordinate communications between Control Areas and Security Coordinators for real-time control of the power grid. An appendix describes the organizations and publications that deal with agent technologies.

In order to promote internatinal confidence that the US and Russia are disarming per their commitments under Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an international verification regime may be applied to US and Russian excess fissile materials. Initially, it is envisioned that this verification regime would be applied at storage facilities; however, it should be anticipated that the verificatino regime would continue throughout any material disposition activities, should such activities be pursued. once the materials are accepted into the verification regime, it is assumed that long term monitoring will be used to maintain continuity of knowledge. The requirements for long term storage monitoring include unattended operation for extended periods of time, minimal intrusiveness on the host nation`s safety and security activities, data collection incorporating data authentication, and monitoring redundancy to allow resolution of anomalies and to continue coverage in the event of equipment failures. Additional requirements include effective data review and analysis processes, operation during storage facility loading, procedure for removal of inventory items for safety-related surveillance, and low cost, reliable equipment. A monitoring system might include both continuous monitoring of storagecontainers and continuous area monitoring. These would be complemented with periodic on-site inspections. A fissile material storage facility is not a static operation. The initial studies have shown there are a number of volid reasions why a host nation may need them to remove material from the storage facility. A practical monitoring system must be able to accommodate necessary material movements.

This video cassette and its corresponding script describe efforts at Sandia Laboratories to develop surveillance equipment to include geophone sensors, point sensors, line sensors, and video surveillance cameras.