Publications

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To ensure reliable and predictable service in the electrical grid between distributed renewable distributed energy resources (DERs) it is important to gauge the level of trust present within critical components and DER aggregators (DERAs). Although trust throughout a smart grid is temporal and dynamically varies according to measured states, it is possible to accurately formulate communications and service level strategies based on such trust measurements. Utilizing an effective set of machine learning and statistical methods, it is shown that establishment of trust levels between DERAs using behavioral pattern analysis is possible. Further, it is also shown that the establishment of such trust can facilitate simple secure communications routing between DERAs. Providing secure routing between DERAs enables a grid operator to maintain service level agreements to its customers, reduce the attack surface and increase operational resiliency.

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions, which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. Here, the authors investigate the impact to the cyber-physical power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary. The findings show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The physical impact from cyber actions was analysed in cases of DER providing distribution system voltage regulation and transmission system support. Finally, recommendations are presented for minimising the risk using engineered parameter limits and segmenting the control network to minimise common-mode vulnerabilities.

Under its Grid Modernization Initiative, the U.S. Department of Energy(DOE),in collaboration with energy industry stakeholders developed a multi-year research plan to support modernizing the electric grid. One of the foundational projects for accelerating modernization efforts is information and communications technology interoperability. A key element of this project has been the development of a methodology for engaging ecosystems related to grid integration to create roadmaps that advance the ease of integration of related smart technology. This document is the product of activities undertaken in 2017 through 2019.It provides a Cybersecurity Plan describing the technology to be adopted in the project with details as per the GMLC Call document.

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An increasing number of public utility commissions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. The recently updated national standard, IEEE 1547-2018, requires all DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5, or IEEE 1815 communication interface in order to provide local and bulk power system services. Those communication protocols and associated information models will ensure system interoperability for PV and storage systems, but these new utility-to-DER communication networks must be deployed with sufficient cybersecurity to protect the U.S. power system and other critical infrastructure reliant on dependable power. Unlike bulk generators, DER are commonly connected to grid operators via public internet channels. These DER networks are exposed to a large attack surface that may leverage sophisticated techniques and infrastructure developed on IT systems, including remote exploits and distributed attacks. Although DER make up a growing portion of the national generation mix, they have limited processing capabilities and do not typically support modern security features such as encryption or authentication. In this work, Sandia National Laboratories constructed simulated DER communication net- works with a range of security features in order to study the security posture of different communication approaches. The experimental test environment was created in a Sandia-developed co-simulation platform, called SCEPTRE, which emulated Sun Spec-compliant DER equipment, the utility DER management system, communication network, and distribution power system. Adversary-based assessments were conducted and a quantitative scoring criteria was applied to evaluate the resilience of various architectures against cyber attacks and to measure the systemic impact during such attacks. The team found that network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defense improved the security of these networks and would be recommended for utility, aggregator, and local DER networks.

Recently developed Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interoperability standards include communication and cyber security requirements. In 2018, the US national interconnection standard, IEEE 1547, was revised to require DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5 (Smart Energy Profile, SEP 2.0), or IEEE 1815 (DNP3) communication interface but does not include any normative overarching cybersecurity requirements. IEEE 2030.5 and associated implementation requirements for California, known as the California Smart Inverter Profile (CSIP), prescribe the greatest security features - including encryption, authentication, and key management requirements. Sun Spec Modbus and IEEE 1815 security requirements are not as comprehensive, leading to implementation questions throughout the industry. Further, while the security features in IEEE 2030.5 are commonly used in computing platforms, there are still questions of how well the technologies will scale in highly-distributed, computationally-limited inverter environments. In this paper, (a) the elements of IEEE 2030.5 encryption, authentication, and key management guidelines are analyzed, (b) potential scalability gaps are identified, and (c) alternative technologies are explored for possible inclusion in DER interoperability or cyber security standards.

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An increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. These functions provide grid operators the nobs to support local and bulk power system operations with DER equipment, but the associated grid operator-to-DER communications networks must be deployed with appropriate cybersecurity features. In some situations, additional security features may prevent control system scalability or increase communication latencies and dropouts. These unintentional consequences of the security features would therefore hinder the ability of the grid operator to implement specific control algorithms. This project evaluated the tradeoffs between power system performance and cybersecurity metrics for several grid services.

An increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. These functions provide grid operators the nobs to support local and bulk power system operations with DER equipment, but the associated grid operator-to-DER communications networks must be deployed with appropriate cybersecurity features. In some situations, additional security features may prevent control system scalability or increase communication latencies and dropouts. These unintentional consequences of the security features would therefore hinder the ability of the grid operator to implement specific control algorithms. This project evaluated the tradeoffs between power system performance and cybersecurity metrics for several grid services. This was conducted in two parts.

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. This project was split into two phases. The first provided a survey and roadmap of the cybersecurity for the solar industry. The second investigated multiple PV cybersecurity research and development (R&D) concepts identified in the first phase. In the first year, the team created a roadmap for improving cybersecurity for distributed solar energy resources. This roadmap was intended to provide direction for the nation over the next five years and focused on the intersection of industry and government and recommends activities in four related areas: stakeholder engagement, cyber security research and development, standards development, and industry best practices. At the same time, the team produced a primer for DER vendors, aggregators, and grid operators to establish a common taxonomy and describe basic principles of cyber security, encryption, communication protocols, DER cyber security recommendations and requirements, and device-, aggregator-, and utility-level security best practices to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This material was motivated by the need to assist the broader PV industry with cybersecurity resilience and describe the state-of-the-art for securing DER communications. Lastly, an adversary-based assessment of multiple PV devices was completed at the Distributed Energy Technologies Laboratory at Sandia National Laboratories to determine the status of industry cybersecurity practices. The team found multiple deficiencies in the security features of the assessed devices. In the second year, a set of recommendations was created for DER communication protocols— especially with respect to the state-of-the-art requirements in IEEE 2030.5. Additionally, several cybersecurity R&D technologies related to communications-enabled photovoltaic systems were studied to harden DER communication networks. Specifically, the team investigated (a) using software defined networking to create a moving target defense system for DER communications, and (b) engineering controls that prevent misprogramming or adversary action on DER devices/networks by disallowing setpoints that will generate unstable power system operations.

This paper focuses on a transmission system with a high penetration of converter-interfaced generators participating in its primary frequency regulation. In particular, the effects on system stability of widespread misconfiguration of frequency regulation schemes are considered. Failures in three separate primary frequency control schemes are analyzed by means of time domain simulations where control action was inverted by, for example, negating controller gain. The results indicate that in all cases the frequency response of the system is greatly deteriorated and, in multiple scenarios, the system loses synchronism. It is also shown that including limits to the control action can mitigate the deleterious effects of inverted control configurations.

While the concept of aggregating and controlling renewable distributed energy resources (DERs) to provide grid services is not new, increasing policy support of DER market participation has driven research and development in algorithms to pool DERs for economically viable market participation. Sandia National Laboratories recently undertook a three-year research program to create the components of a real-world virtual power plant (VPP) that can simultaneously participate in multiple markets. Our research extends current state-of-the-art rolling horizon control through the application of stochastic programming with risk aversion at various time resolutions. Our rolling horizon control consists of (1) day-ahead optimization to produce an hourly aggregate schedule for the VPP operator and (2) sub-hourly optimization for real-time dispatch of each VPP subresource. Both optimization routines leverage a two-stage stochastic program (SP) with risk aversion, and integrate the most up-to-date forecasts to generate probabilistic scenarios in real operating time. Our results demonstrate the benefits to the VPP operator of constructing a stochastic solution regardless of the weather. In more extreme weather, applying risk optimization strategies can dramatically increase the financial viability of the VPP. As a result, the methodologies presented here can be further tailored for optimal control of any VPP asset fleet and its operational requirements.

Cybersecurity is essential for interoperable power systems and transportation infrastructure in the US. As the US transitions to transportation electrification, cyber attacks on vehicle charging could impact nearly all US critical infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as more charging stations communicate to a range of entities (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, etc.), as shown in Figure I.1.1.1. The research challenges are extensive and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) cybersecurity is a major risk to electric vehicle (EV) adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks—or public perception of such—ripples across the industry and has lasting and devastating effects. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. For this reason, there is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured interfaces. Thus, comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project is providing the automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, prioritizing technology gaps, and developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team is creating a cybersecurity threat model and performing a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders can better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

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Grid operators are increasingly turning to advanced grid-support functions in distributed energy resources (DER) to assist with distribution circuit voltage regulation, bulk system frequency control, and power system protection. The U.S. DER certification standard, Underwriters Laboratories (UL) 1741, was revised in September 2016 to add test procedures for multiple grid-support functions. Sandia National Laboratories, SunSpec Alliance, and growing community of collaborators have undertaken a multiyear effort to create an open-source system validation platform (SVP) that automates DER interconnection and interoperability test procedures by communicating with grid simulators, photovoltaic (PV) simulators, data acquisition systems, and interoperable equipment under test. However, the power hardware required for generating the test conditions may be untenable for many organizations. Herein, we discuss development of the SVP testing capabilities for UL 1741 tests utilizing a controller hardware-in-The-loop testbed that precludes the need for power hardware using a 34.5 kW Austrian Institute of Technology smart grid controller. Analysis of normal ramp rate, soft start ramp rate, specified power factor, volt-VAr, and frequency-watt advanced grid functions, and the effectiveness of the UL 1741 test protocols are included.

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Cyber-secure, resilient energy is paramount to the prosperity of the United States. As the experience and sophistication of cyber adversaries grow, so too must the US power system’s defenses, situational awareness, and response and recovery strategies. Traditionally, power systems were operated with dedicated communication channels to large generators and utility-owned assets but now there is greater reliance on photovoltaic (PV) systems to provide power generation. PV systems often communicate to utilities, aggregators, and other grid operators over the public internet so the power system attack surface has significantly expanded. At the same time, solar energy systems are equipped with a range of grid-support functions, that—if controlled or programmed improperly—present a risk of power system disturbances. This document is a five-year roadmap intended to chart a path for improving cyber security for communication-enabled PV systems with clear roles and responsibilities for government, standards development organizations, PV vendors, and grid operators.

This report provides an introduction to cyber security for distributed energy resources (DER) - such as photovoltaic (PV) inverters and energy storage systems (ESS). This material is motivated by the need to assist DER vendors, aggregators, grid operators, and broader PV industry with cyber security resilience and describe the state-of-the-art for securing DER communications. The report outlines basic principles of cyber security, encryption, communication protocols, DER cyber security recommendations and requirements, and device-, aggregator-, and utility-level security best practices to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Example cyber security attacks, including eavesdropping, masquerading, man-in-the-middle, replay attacks, and denial-of-service are also described. A survey of communication protocols and cyber security recommendations used by the DER and power system industry are included to elucidate the cyber security standards landscape. Lastly, a roadmap is presented to harden end-to-end communications for DER with research and industry engagement.