Publications

Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must build on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures.

Radiation detectors have been included in several remote monitoring field trial systems to date. The present study considers detectors at Embalse, Argentina, and Oarai, Japan. At Embalse four gamma detectors have been operating in the instrumentation tubes of spent fuel storage silos for up to three years. Except for minor fluctuations, three of the detectors have operated normally. One of the detectors appears never to have operated correctly. At Oarai two gamma detectors have been monitoring a spent-fuel transfer hatch for over 18 months. These detectors have operated normally throughout the period, although one shows occasional noise spikes.

Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the US Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these field trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology. Fortunately, modern technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime.

Under international partnerships and bilateral agreements with the U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, other national laboratories, and international partner organizations have emplaced remote monitoring systems in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world for the purpose of conducting field trials of remote monitoring. The purpose of the present report is to review the results from these field trials and draw general conclusions regarding the trials. Many thousands of hours of sensor and system operation have been logged, and data have been retrieved from many locations. In virtually all cases the system components have functioned as intended and data have been successfully collected and transmitted for review. Comparisons between front-end-triggered video and time-lapse video have shown that the triggered record has captured all relevant monitored operations at the various nuclear facilities included in the field trials. We believe the utility and functional reliability of remote monitoring for international safeguards has been shown. However, it should be kept in mind that openness and transparency, including some form of short-notice inspections, are likely to be prerequisites to the safeguards implementation of remote monitoring in any State.

The Joint ESARDA/INMM Workshop on Science and Modem Technology for Safeguards was held in Arona, Italy, October 28-31, 1996. It was attended by some 120 participants, consisting principally of scientists from various disciplines and safeguards experts from the inspectorates. The Workshop provided a full discussion on the near and far term scientific technologies that may be applied to safeguards. In addition, there were extended discussions on the social and political aspects surrounding the areas of Nonproliferation, International Safeguards, and Regional Safeguards. The general opinion was that the Workshop met and exceeded its goals, setting the stage for future workshops of this type. One of the outstanding characteristics of this Workshop was the ample amount of time allowed for full discussion of each presentation, both for technical issues and social/political issues. This procedure was substantially different from the usual ESARDA and INMM meetings. This paper will discuss the organization and conduct of the Workshop, as well as the results as reported by the four Working Group Chairs and the Workshop Co-chairs.

Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues.

As a part of the International Remote Monitoring Project, during March 1995, a Remote Monitoring System (RMS) was installed at the Embalse Nuclear Power Station in Embalse, Argentina. This system monitors the status of four typical Candu spent fuel dry storage silos. The monitoring equipment for each silo consists of analog sensors for temperature and gamma radiation measurement; digital sensors for motion detection; and electronic fiber-optic seals. The monitoring system for each silo is connected to a wireless Authenticate Item Monitoring System (AIMS). This paper describes the operation of the RMS during the first year of the trial and presents the results of the signals reported by the system compared with the on site inspections conducted by the regulatory bodies, ABACC, IAEA, ENREN. As an additional security feature, each sensor periodically transmits authenticated State-of-Health (SOH) messages. This feature provides assurance that all sensors are operational and have not been tampered with. The details of the transmitted information and the incidents of loss of SOH, referred to as Missing SOH Event, and the possible causes which produced the MSOHE are described. The RMS at the embalse facility uses gamma radiation detectors in a strong radiation field of spent fuel dry storage silos. The detectors are Geiger Muller tubes and Silicon solid state diodes. The study of the thermal drift of electronics in GM detectors and the possible radiation damage in silicon detectors is shown. Since the initial installation, the system has been successfully interrogated from Buenos Aires and Albuquerque. The experience gained, and the small changes made in the hardware in order to improve the performance of the system is presented.

Design improvements for the International Atomic Energy Agency`s Spent Fuel Attribute Tester, recommended on the basis of an optimization study, were incorporated into a new instrument fabricated under the Finnish Support Programme. The new instrument was tested at a spent fuel storage pool on September 8 and 9, 1993. The result of two of the measurements have been compared with calculations. In both cases the calculated and measured pulse height spectra in good agreement and the {sup 137}Cs gamma peak signature from the target spent fuel element is present.

Article VII, paragraphs 8 and 14, of the inspection protocol of the INF Treaty between the US and the USSR provides for the use of radiation detection devices as a verification tool. That is, the Treaty allows the parties to measure the radiation from the radioactive components of nuclear weapons in order to verify that the inspected party is complying with the Treaty. This is the only verification provision in the Treaty that addresses the nuclear components of the relevant weapon systems. Acceptance of and confidence in such measurements is a significant development and similar measurements may be needed for verification of future treaties.