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These Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) identify the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories, in compliance with 10 CFR 830, 'Nuclear Safety Management.' The bases for the TSRs are established in the AHCF Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), which was issued in compliance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements.' The AHCF Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) apply only to the ventilation system, the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and the inventory. Surveillance Requirements (SRs) apply to the ventilation system, HEPA filters, and associated monitoring equipment; to certain passive design features; and to the inventory. No Safety Limits are necessary, because the AHCF is a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility.

The Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) is a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility used to characterize, treat, and repackage radioactive and mixed material for reuse, recycling, or ultimate disposal. Mixed waste may also be handled at the AHCF. A significant upgrade to a previous facility, the Temporary Hot Cell, was required to perform this mission. A checklist procedure was used to perform a human-factors evaluation of the AHCF modifications. This evaluation resulted in two recommendations, both of which have been implemented.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

The Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) will be a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility used to characterize, treat, and repackage radioactive and mixed material and waste for reuse, recycling, or ultimate disposal. A significant upgrade to a previous facility, the Temporary Hot Cell, will be implemented to perform this mission. The following major features will be added: a permanent shield wall; eight floor silos; new roof portals in the hot-cell roof; an upgraded ventilation system; and upgraded hot-cell jib crane; and video cameras to record operations and facilitate remote-handled operations. No safety-class systems, structures, and components will be present in the AHCF. There will be five safety-significant SSCs: hot cell structure, permanent shield wall, shield plugs, ventilation system, and HEPA filters. The type and quantity of radionuclides that could be located in the AHCF are defined primarily by SNL/NM's legacy materials, which include radioactive, transuranic, and mixed waste. The risk to the public or the environment presented by the AHCF is minor due to the inventory limitations of the Hazard Category 3 classification. Potential doses at the exclusion boundary are well below the evaluation guidelines of 25 rem. Potential for worker exposure is limited by the passive design features incorporated in the AHCF and by SNL's radiation protection program. There is no potential for exposure of the public to chemical hazards above the Emergency Response Protection Guidelines Level 2.

Where there is a significant actuarial basis for decision making (e.g., the occurrence of fires in single-family dwellings), there is little incentive for formal risk management. Formal risk assessments are most useful in those cases where the value of the structure is high, many people may be affected, the societal perception of risk is high, consequences of a mishap would be severe, and the actuarial uncertainty is large. For these cases, there is little opportunity to obtain the necessary experiential data to make informed decisions, and the consequences in terms of money, lives, and societal confidence are severe enough to warrant a formal risk assessment. Other important factors include the symbolic value of the structure and vulnerability to single point failures. It is unlikely that formal risk management and assessment practices will or should replace the proven institutions of building codes and engineering practices. Nevertheless, formal risk assessment can provide valuable insights into the hazards threatening high-value and high-risk (perceived or actual) buildings and structures, which can in turn be translated into improved public health, safety, and security. The key is to choose and apply the right assessment tool to match the structure in question. Design-for-reliability concepts can be applied to buildings, bridges, transportation sys- tems, dams, and other structures. The use of these concepts could have the dual benefits of lowering life-cycle costs by reducing the necessity for maintenance and repair and of enhancing the saiiety and security of the structure's users.

How to ensure the appropriate performance of our built environment in the face of normal conditions, natural hazards, and malevolent threats is an issue of emerging national and international importance. As the world population increases, new construction must be increasingly cost effective and at the same time increasingly secure, safe, and durable. As the existing infrastructure ages, materials and techniques for retrofitting must be developed in parallel with improvements in design, engineering, and building codes for new construction. Both new and renovated structures are more often being subjected to the scrutiny of risk analysis. An international conference, "Assuring the Performance of Buildings and Infrastructures," was held in May 1997 to address some of these issues. The conference was co-sponsored by the Architectural Engineering Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), the American Institute of Architects, and Sandia National Laboratories and convened in Albuquerque, NM. Many of the papers presented at the conference are found within this issue of Techno20~. This paper presents some of the major conference themes and summarizes discussions not found in the other papers.

On July 1--2, 1997, Sandia National Laboratories hosted the External Committee to Evaluate Sandia`s Risk Expertise. Under the auspices of SIISRS (Sandia`s International Institute for Systematic Risk Studies), Sandia assembled a blue-ribbon panel of experts in the field of risk management to assess their risk programs labs-wide. Panelists were chosen not only for their own expertise, but also for their ability to add balance to the panel as a whole. Presentations were made to the committee on the risk activities at Sandia. In addition, a tour of Sandia`s research and development programs in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission was arranged. The panel attended a poster session featuring eight presentations and demonstrations for selected projects. Overviews and viewgraphs from the presentations are included in Volume 1 of this report. Presentations are related to weapons, nuclear power plants, transportation systems, architectural surety, environmental programs, and information systems.

Work on thermionic nuclear power systems has been performed in Russia within the framework of the TOPAZ reactor program since the early 1960s. In the TOPAZ in-core thermionic convertor reactor design, the fuel element`s cladding is also the thermionic convertor`s emitter. Deformation of the emitter can lead to short-circuiting and is the primary cause of premature TRC failure. Such deformation can be the result of fuel swelling, thermocycling, or increased unilateral pressure on the emitter due to the release of gaseous fission products. Much of the work on TRCs has concentrated on preventing or mitigating emitter deformation by improving the following materials and structures: nuclear fuel; emitter materials; electrical insulators; moderator and reflector materials; and gas-exhaust device. In addition, considerable effort has been directed toward the development of experimental techniques that accurately mimic operational conditions and toward the creation of analytical and numerical models that allow operational conditions and behavior to be predicted without the expense and time demands of in-pile tests. New and modified materials and structures for the cores of thermionic NPSs and new fabrication processes for the materials have ensured the possibility of creating thermionic NPSs for a wide range of powers, from tens to several hundreds of kilowatts, with life spans of 5 to 10 years.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, is a research and development facility to demonstrate safe disposal of defense-generated transuranic waste. Performance assessment comprises scenario development and screening and probability assignment; consequence analysis; sensitivity and uncertainty analysis; and comparison with a standard. This report examines events and processes that might give rise to scenarios for the long-term release of waste from the WIPP and begins to screen and assign probabilities to them. The events and processes retained here will be used to develop scenarios during the WIPP performance assessment; the consequences of scenarios that survive screening will be calculated and compared with the standard. 84 refs., 4 figs., 3 tabs.