Publications

Abstract not provided.

DOE, Aquila Technologies, LANL and SNL recently launched collaborative efforts to create a Non-Proliferation Network Systems Integration and Test (NN-Site, pronounced N-Site) facility. NN-Site will focus on wide area, local area, and local operating level network connectivity including Internet access. This facility will provide thorough and cost-effective integration, testing and development of information connectivity among diverse operating systems and network topologies prior to full-scale deployment. In concentrating on instrument interconnectivity, tamper indication, and data collection and review, NN-Site will facilitate efforts of equipment providers and system integrators in deploying systems that will meet nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards objectives. The following will discuss the objectives of ongoing remote monitoring efforts, as well as the prevalent policy concerns. An in-depth discussion of the Non-Proliferation Network Systems Integration and Test facility (NN-Site) will illuminate the role that this testbed facility can perform in meeting the objectives of remote monitoring efforts, and its potential contribution in promoting eventual acceptance of remote monitoring systems in facilities worldwide.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) under DOE sponsorship is engaged in nuclear nonproliferation activities with the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) of Japan. From 1995 to the present SNL and PNC have been participating in a cooperative project to implement and assess the use of remote monitoring to achieve nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Implementation of remote monitoring at the PNC Joyo facility took place during 1996 and continues to date. An International Fellowship began in the Fall of 1995 and has complemented the nonproliferation study. Plans are underway to extend the Fellowship and to upgrade the existing Remote Monitoring System to include another area at the Joyo facility. SNL and PNC are currently exploring the possibility of exchanging experts with the objective of promoting regional confidence building in Northeast Asia, possibly using some of the same remote monitoring technologies. This paper will provide an overview of these activities and report on the status of cooperative nonproliferation activities being conducted by PNC and SNL.

Sandia National Laboratories has developed a high security fiber optic seal that incorporates tamper resistance features that are not available in commercial fiber optic seals. The Python Seal is a passive fiber optic loop seal designed to give indication of unauthorized entry. The seal includes a fingerprint feature that provides seal identity information in addition to the unique fiber optic pattern created when the seal is installed. The fiber optic cable used for the seal loop is produced with tamper resistant features that increase the difficulty of attacking that component of a seal. A Seal Reader has been developed that will record the seal signature and the fingerprint feature of the seal. A Correlator software program then compares seal images to establish a match or mismatch. SNL is also developing a Polaroid reader to permit hard copies of the seal patterns to be obtained directly from the seal.

In a joint effort conducted by Sandia National Laboratories, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), an authentication system has been installed at the Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) facility in Tokai-mura, Japan. The purpose of this authentication system is to provide the IAEA with an independent means of authenticating the operator-provided Advanced Containment and Survellance (AC/S) system already in place at the facility. Authentication Controllers were installed at the AC/S Portal Monkor and Penetration Monitor to collect data and to randomly test sensor functions between IAEA inspections. During each inspection the authentication data is collected with an Inspector`s portable computer and printed for comparison to the data recorded by the AC/S system. Installation of the authentication equipment took place in November 1991 and a three-month field test began in December 1991. This paper will describe the authentication system, the operator interface, and the preliminary results of the field tests.