Publications

An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data.

The design of an effective physical protection system (PPS) includes the determination of the PPS objectives, the initial design of a PPS, the evaluation of the design, and probably, the redesign or refinement of the system. To develop the objectives, the designer must begin by gathering information about facility operation and conditions, such as a comprehensive description of the facility, operating conditions, and the physical protection requirements. The designer then needs to define the threat. This involves considering factors about potential adversaries: class of adversary, adversary`s capabilities, and range of adversary`s tactics. Next, the designer should identify targets. Determination of whether or not the materials being protected are attractive targets is based mainly on the ease or difficulty of acquisition and desirability of the material. The designer now knows the objectives of the PPS, that is, ``what to protect against whom.`` The next step is to design the system by determining how best to combine such elements as fences, vaults, sensors and assessment devices, entry control devices, communication devices, procedures, and protective force personnel to meet the objectives of the system. Once a PPS is designed, it must be analyzed and evaluated to ensure it meets the PPS objectives. Evaluation must allow for features working together to ensure protection rather than regarding each feature separately. Due to the complexity of the protection systems, an evaluation usually requires modeling techniques. If any vulnerabilities are found, the initial system must be redesigned to correct the vulnerabilities and a reevaluation conducted. After the system is installed, the threat and system parameters may change with time. If they do, the analysis must be performed periodically to ensure the system objectives are still being met.

The design of an effective physical protection system includes the determination of physical protection system objectives, initial design of a physical protection system, design evaluation, and probably a redesign or refinement. To develop the objectives, the designer must begin by gathering information about facility operation and conditions, such as a comprehensive description of the facility, operating conditions, and the physical protection requirements. The designer then needs to define the threat. This involves considering factors about potential adversaries: class of adversary, adversary`s capabilities, and range of adversary`s tactics. Next, the designer should identify targets. Determination of whether or not the materials being protected are attractive targets is based mainly on the ease or difficulty of acquisition and desirability of the material. The designer now knows the objectives of the physical protection system, that is, {open_quotes}what to protect against whom.{close_quotes} The next step is to design the system by determining how best to combine such elements as fences, vaults, sensors and assessment devices, entry control elements, procedures, communication devices, and protective forces personnel to meet the objectives of the system. Once a physical protection system is designed, it must be analyzed and evaluated to ensure it meets the physical protection objectives. Evaluation must allow for features working together to ensure protection rather than regarding each feature separately. Due to the complexity of the protection systems, an evaluation usually requires modeling techniques. If any vulnerabilities are found, the initial system must be redesigned to correct the vulnerabilities and a reevaluation conducted. This paper reviews the physical protection system design and methodology mentioned above. Examples of the steps required and a brief introduction to some of the technologies used in modem physical protections system are given.

US DOE national laboratories and Russian institutes are becoming increasingly cooperative in support of nonproliferation of nuclear materials. This paper describes completed projects, current work, and areas of possible future cooperation between US laboratories and a Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) entity, Special Scientific and Production State Enterprise (SNPO). The Kurchatov Institute, SNPO, and the US national laboratories jointly completed a physical protection system (PPS) for a facility housing two reactors at Kurchatov Institute within a very short time frame in 1994. Spin- off projects from this work resulted in a US-witnessed acceptance test of the new system adhering to a procedure adopted in Russia, and visits by DOE laboratories` personnel to SNPO`s sensor development and test facilities at Dubna and Penza. SNPO was one of the MINATOM sites at which Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a vulnerability assessment training course. Current cooperative projects include additional physical protection upgrades at Kurchatov where SNPO is involved as an installer and supplier of sensors, alarm display, video, and fiber optic equipment. Two additional contracts between SNL and SNPO result in information on Russian sensor performance and cost and an exchange of US and Russian sensors. Russian sensors will be tested in the United States,a nd US sensors will be tested in Russia. Pacific Northwest Laboratory administers a contract to document the process of certifying physical protection equipment for use at MINATOM facilities. Recent interest in transportation security has opened a new area of cooperation between the national laboratories and SNPO. Future projects are expected to include SNPO participation in physical protection upgrades at other locations in Russia, pedestrian and vehicle portal development, positive personnel identifier testing, and the exchange and testing of additional equipment.

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This paper presents an overview of physical protection cooperation activities between Sandia (SNL) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) regarding Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) responsibilities. Begun four years ago as part of the Safe, Secure Dismantlement Program, this project is intended to stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Purpose of the program is to accelerate progress toward a goal shared by both Russia and the United States: to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, including such threats as theft, diversion, and unauthorized possession of nuclear materials. This will be accomplished by strengthening the MPC&A systems in both, countries. This new program (US Department of Energy Laboratory-to-Laboratory MPC&A program) is designed to complement Government-to-Government programs sponsored by US Senators Nunn and Lugar. US and Russian representatives exchange visits and discuss physical protection philosophies. Russian representatives have received formal training in the US process of system design and analysis to include the design of an effective physical protection system, determination of physical protection system objectives, initial design of a physical protection system, evaluation of the design, and often redesign or refinement of the existing system. Some Russian organizations have philosophies similar to those of the United States, but when they differ, the US and Russian representatives must negotiate. Other Russian organizations, because of heavy reliance on guard forces, have not developed a systematic design process. Cooperative work between US national laboratories and Russian counterparts has resulted in major physical protection enhancements at a Russian demonstration site and other advancements for Laboratory-to-Laboratory projects.

Formal interactions with Kurchatov Institute (KI) began summer 1994 on material protection, control and accountability (MPC&A). Contracts were placed by LANL and Sandia with KI to implement a nuclear material accounting system and a physical security system at a KI demonstration facility which contain two critical assemblies with special nuclear material. LLNL implemented May 1995 a task to measure by gamma-ray spectroscopy the uranium enrichment of fuel in the facility. This laboratory-to-laboratory effort is part of the cooperative program between US and Russian institutes in nuclear material nonproliferation. In 1994-5, KI personnel demonstrated the physical security system. The next facility for work in MPC&A at KI is the Central Storage Facility, which is important for the computerized material accounting system for KI.

This paper presents a survey of technologies useful in providing early warning in physical security systems. Early warning is important in virtually all types of security systems whether they are used for temporary (tactical, portable, or semi-permanent) applications, border warning, fixed-site detection, or standoff surveillance detection. With the exception of the standoff surveillance detection systems, all systems discussed in this paper usually involve a moving target. The fact that a person(s) to be detected in a standoff surveillance scenario is not moving presents challenging problems and requires different applications of technology. The technologies commonly used to detect moving targets and some suggestions for detection of stationary targets are addressed in this paper.

Perimeter intrusion detection systems are an integral part of most physical security systems. Sandia National Laboratories, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security; the U.S. Military Services; and many other U.S. Government Agencies, has over the last 20 years conducted surveys of available perimeter intrusion detection sensors and has tested many of the sensors manufactured in the United States and other countries. An overview of the newer and more advanced technologies employed in these sensors is provided.

Today`s highly competitive global economy is being driven by increasingly rapid technological development. This paper explores the problems of math and science illiteracy in the United States and the potential impact on our economic survival in this environment during the next century. Established educational methods that reward task performance, emphasize passive lecture, and fail to demonstrate relevance to real life are partly to blame. Social norms, stereotypes, and race and gender bias also have an impact. To address this crisis, we need to question the philosophy of an educational system that values task over concept. Many schools have already initiated programs at all grade levels to make math and science learning more relevant, stimulating, and fun. Teaching methods that integrate math and science learning with teamwork, social context, and other academic subjects promote the development of higher-order thinking skills and help students see math and science as necessary skills.

An entry control system (ECS) allows the movement of authorized personnel and material through normal routes while detecting and delaying movement of unauthorized personnel and contraband. This paper presents an overview of several unique design and operating principles used in the implementation of a positive identity entry control system utilizing proximity cards. The system design incorporates distributed processing to support geographically separated entry points and redundancy such that no single point failure will shut down operations. The functionality and integration of the photo identification system, the visitor authorization system, and the access control and contraband detection systems will be discussed. Systems unique features such as temporary badge issue for lost or forgotten badges at entry points using video lookup, visitor processing, and ergonomic and environmental considerations for the design of the proximity card based entry lane will be covered. 6 figs.