Publications

In a world plagued with improvised explosive devices, drugs and dangerous people, the desire to field technology to protect our police and military is providing a fertile market for the proliferation of protection technologies that range from the unproven to the disproven. The market place is currently being flooded with detection equipment making inflated and inaccurate marketing claims of high reliably, high detection probabilities, and ease of operation - all while offering detection capabilities at safe distances. The manufacturers of these devices have found a willing global marketplace, which includes some of the most dangerous places in the world. Despite a wealth of contradictory performance and testing data available on the Internet, sales of these devices remain brisk and profitable. Rather than enhancing the security of police and military personnel, the reliance on these unproven and disproven devices is creating a sense of false security that is actually lowering the safety of front-line forces in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper addresses the development and distribution history of some of these devices and describes the testing performed by Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, and other reputable testing agencies that illustrate the real danger in using this kind of unproven technology. ©2010 IEEE.

In a world plagued with improvised explosive devices, drugs and dangerous people, the desire to field technology to protect our police and military is providing a fertile market for the proliferation of protection technologies that range from the unproven to the disproven. The market place is currently being flooded with detection equipment making inflated and inaccurate marketing claims of high reliably, high detection probabilities, and ease of operation - all while offering detection capabilities at safe distances. The manufacturers of these devices have found a willing global marketplace, which includes some of the most dangerous places in the world. Despite a wealth of contradictory performance and testing data available on the Internet, sales of these devices remain brisk and profitable. Rather than enhancing the security of police and military personnel, the reliance on these unproven and disproven devices is creating a sense of false security that is actually lowering the safety of front-line forces in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper addresses the development and distribution history of some of these devices and describes the testing performed by Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, and other reputable testing agencies that illustrate the real danger in using this kind of unproven technology. ©2010 IEEE.

Abstract not provided.

On March 20, 1998, Sandia National Laboratories performed a double-blind test of the DKL LifeGuard human presence detector and tracker. The test was designed to allow the device to search for individuals well within the product`s published operational parameters. The Test Operator of the DKL LifeGuard was provided by the manufacturer and was a high-ranking member of DKL management. The test was developed and implemented to verify the performance of the device as specified by the manufacturer. The device failed to meet its published specifications and it performed no better than random chance.

By extracting and analyzing measurement (variables) data from portal metal detectors whenever possible instead of the more typical ``alarm``/``no-alarm`` (attributes or binomial) data, we can be more informed about metal detector health with fewer tests. This testing methodology discussed in this report is an alternative to the typical binomial testing and in many ways is far superior.

The tests described in this report were conducted to obtain information on the effects target characteristics have on portal type metal detector response. A second purpose of the tests was to determine the effect of detector type and settings on the detection of the targets. Although in some cases comparison performance of different types and makes of metal detectors is found herein, that is not the primary purpose of the report. Further, because of the many variables that affect metal detector performance, the information presented can be used only in a general way. The results of these tests can show general trends in metal detection, but do little for making accurate predictions as to metal detector response to a target with a complex shape such as a handgun. The shape of an object and its specific metal content (both type and treatment) can have a significant influence on detection. Thus it should not be surprising that levels of detection for a small 100g stainless steel handgun are considerably different than for detection of the 100g stainless steel right circular cylinder that was used in these tests. 7 figs., 1 tab.