Publications Details

Reliable software systems via chains of object models with provably correct behavior

Yakhnis, A.

This work addresses specification and design of reliable safety-critical systems, such as nuclear reactor control systems. Reliability concerns are addressed in complimentary fashion by different fields. Reliability engineers build software reliability models, etc. Safety engineers focus on prevention of potential harmful effects of systems on environment. Software/hardware correctness engineers focus on production of reliable systems on the basis of mathematical proofs. The authors think that correctness may be a crucial guiding issue in the development of reliable safety-critical systems. However, purely formal approaches are not adequate for the task, because they neglect the connection with the informal customer requirements. They alleviate that as follows. First, on the basis of the requirements, they build a model of the system interactions with the environment, where the system is viewed as a black box. They will provide foundations for automated tools which will (a) demonstrate to the customer that all of the scenarios of system behavior are presented in the model, (b) uncover scenarios not present in the requirements, and (c) uncover inconsistent scenarios. The developers will work with the customer until the black box model will not possess scenarios (b) and (c) above. Second, the authors will build a chain of several increasingly detailed models, where the first model is the black box model and the last model serves to automatically generated proved executable code. The behavior of each model will be proved to conform to the behavior of the previous one. They build each model as a cluster of interactive concurrent objects, thus they allow both top-down and bottom-up development.