Publications

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Today's need for rapid software development has generated a great interest in employing Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software products as a way of managing cost, developing time, and effort. With an abundance of COTS software packages to choose from, the problem now is how to systematically evaluate, rank, and select a COTS product that best meets the software project requirements and at the same time can leverage off the current corporate information technology architectural environment. This paper describes a systematic process for decision support in evaluating and ranking COTS software. Performed right after the requirement analysis phase, this process provides the evaluators with more concise, structural, and step-by-step activities for determining the best COTS software product with manageable risk. In addition, the process is presented in phases that are flexible to allow for customization or tailoring to meet various projects ' requirements. © 2007 IEEE.

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This document was prepared to support the Department of Energy's compliance with Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act. It provides an overview of the historic context in which Sandia National Laboratories/California was created and developed. Establishing such a context allows for a reasonable and reasoned historical assessment of Sandia National Laboratories/California properties. The Cold War arms race provides the primary historical context for the SNL/CA built environment.

This report documents the history of the major buildings in Sandia National Laboratories` Technical Area II. It was prepared in support of the Department of Energy`s compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. Technical Area II was designed and constructed in 1948 specifically for the final assembly of the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons, and was the primary site conducting such assembly until 1952. Both the architecture and location of the oldest buildings in the area reflect their original purpose. Assembly activities continued in Area II from 1952 to 1957, but the major responsibility for this work shifted to other sites in the Atomic Energy Commission`s integrated contractor complex. Gradually, additional buildings were constructed and the original buildings were modified. After 1960, the Area`s primary purpose was the research and testing of high-explosive components for nuclear weapons. In 1994, Sandia constructed new facilities for work on high-explosive components outside of the original Area II diamond-shaped parcel. Most of the buildings in the area are vacant and Sandia has no plans to use them. They are proposed for decontamination and demolition as funding becomes available.

The book that follows lays out the work of Sandia National Laboratories in its first fifty years and the events and decisions behind that work. But all of those decisions reside in the context of international events and shifting national priorities. As a result, within the broad chronological sweep of Sandia's half century are several turning points that caused the Labs to shift its emphasis and explore new areas. The result has been an ongoing evolution in the nature and focus of the projects Sandia has undertaken, all within the context of serving the national interest by preserving national security.

This paper discusses Sandia National Laboratories` development of new technologies for use in the Vietnam War - specifically the seismic sensors deployed to detect troop and vehicle movement - first along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and later in perimeter defense for American military encampments in South Vietnam. Although the sensor story is a small one, it is interesting because it dovetails nicely with our understanding of the war in Vietnam and its frustrations; of the creation of new technologies for war and American enthusiasm for that technology; and of a technological military and the organizational research and a m am development structure created to support it. Within the defense establishment, the sensors were proposed within the context of a larger concept - that of a barrier to prevent the infiltration of troops and supplies from North Vietnam to the South. All of the discussion of the best way to fight in Vietnam is couched in the perception that this was a different kind of war than America was used to fighting. The emphasis was on countering the problems posed by guerrilla/revolutionary warfare and eventually by the apparent constraints of being involved in a military action, not an outright war. The American response was to find the right technology to do the job - to control the war by applying a technological tincture to its wounds and to make the war familiar and fightable on American terms. And, when doubts were raised about the effectiveness of applying existing technologies (namely, the bombing of North Vietnam and Laos), the doubters turned to new technologies. The sensors that were developed for use in Vietnam were a direct product of this sort of thinking - on the part of the engineers at Sandia who created the sensors, the civilian scientific advisors who recommended them, and, ultimately, the soldiers in the field who had to use them.

A great deal has been written about the history of science in America since World War II. Much of that work has explored the government`s research and development establishment, focusing on the scientific community immediately after the war. It is generally argued that the apparent triumphs of the huge and expensive wartime research and development projects gave rise to a belief that scientific resources should be nurtured and kept on hand - ready to provide service in an emergency. The Cold War drive for more and better weapons further fed this belief, leading to a massive system of national laboratories, military laboratories, and defense industries. The science of this complex is built on extensive financial support, the central strategy of which is that by steadily, and occasionally even lavishly funding large research programs, you will have a constant stream of scientific ideas that can be applied to national security purposes. What is true of science, is also true, in slightly modified form, of postwar engineering. The story I want to tell you today is, I think, an example of the way Cold War engineering r&d for national security worked. This report describes aspects of the Sandia National Laboratories.