Publications

Let me begin with some comments about transparency. We all have some perception or vision about the use of transparency for nuclear technology and nuclear non-proliferation. Although we probably have some common understanding of what it implies, there is no precise definition that is agreed upon. One of the most significant ideas in transparency is that it is considered to be a voluntary or unilateral action. The party, or organization, or nation that wants its activities to be transparent voluntarily provides information to other parties with the expectation of receiving some acceptance or good will in return. The organization giving the information determines what information to provide, how much, how often, and when. This is in contrast to official treaties and monitoring regimes, in which specific verification information and activities are prescribed. This should have the advantage for the transparent organization of being less intrusive and less costly than a treaty monitoring regime. Information related to sensitive nuclear technology, proprietary processes, and physical security is more easily protected. The difficultly for both parties, the transparent organization and the information recipients, is in determining what information is necessary for the desired confidence building. It must be recognized that this state of transparency or confidence will only be achieved over an extended period of time, when history confirms that the information was reliable in conveying the true picture.

This purpose of this NUREG is to present technical information that should be useful to NRC licensees for understanding and applying line supervision techniques to security communication links. A review of security communication links is followed by detailed discussions of link physical protection and DC/AC static supervision and dynamic supervision techniques. Material is also presented on security for atmospheric transmission and video line supervision. A glossary of security communication line supervision terms is appended. 16 figs.

Physical security specialists have been attracted to the concept of video motion detection for several years. Claimed potential advantages included additional benefit from existing video surveillance systems, automatic detection, improved performance compared to human observers, and cost effectiveness. In recent years significant advances in image processing dedicated hardware and image analysis algorithms and software have accelerated the successful application of video motion detection systems to a variety of physical security applications. Currently Sandia is developing several advanced systems that employ image processing techniques for a broader set of safeguards and security applications. TCATS (Target Cueing and Tracking System) uses a set of powerful, flexible, modular algorithms and software to alarm on purposeful target motion. Custom TCATS hardware optimized for perimeter security applications is currently being evaluated with video input. VISDTA (Video Imaging System for Detection, Tracking, and Assessment) uses some of the same TCATS algorithms and operates with a thermal imager input. In the scan mode, VISDTA detects changes in a scene from the previous image at a given scan point; in the stare mode, VISDTA detects purposeful motion similar to TCATS.

This paper demonstrates the use of the Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security. ASSESS is an integrated approach for evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by different types of adversaries: insiders, outsiders, and colluding insiders and outsiders. ASSESS consists of six modules: System Manager, Facility Descriptor, Insider Analysis, Outsider Analysis, Neutralization Analysis, and Collusion Analysis. This paper introduces the modules, describes their scope, and highlights the interactions among them. Separate papers will provide detailed discussion and demonstration of each of the modules. The ASSESS code runs on the IBM PC family of computers with 640K RAM, the DOS operating system, and Microsoft Windows. The Windows environment provides a very efficient and convenient graphics user interface as well as drivers for many types of output devices. ASSESS is being developed jointly by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories under the sponsorship of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security. The first version of the ASSESS code was delivered to DOE/OSS in March 1989. 7 refs., 4 figs.