Publications

Engineered Surety Using the Risk Equation (EnSURE) is a new approach being developed by Sandia National Laboratories for determining and mitigating risk. The EnSURE approach is based on the risk equation, which can be defined by the following equation: R = (Pa)(1-Pe)(C). Where R is risk, Pa is the likelihood of attack, Pe is the system effectiveness and C is the consequence. EnSURE considers each of the components of risk to help in assessing surety (e.g. security, safety, environmental) and providing for the most cost-effective ways to reduce risk. EnSURE is intended to help in evaluating and reducing the risk from either man-caused or natural events. It will help the decision-makers identify possible targets, evaluate the consequences of an event, assess the risk based on the threat and the existing conditions and then help in the application of mitigating measures. EnSURE is in the development stages. It builds on existing and ongoing development activities at Sandia, as well as the considerable work done in the fields of consequence analysis, risk analysis and intelligence. The components of EnSURE include consequences, constraints, threat, target/goal identification, facility/process characterization, evaluation and analysis, system improvement, and decision making. This paper provides a brief description of EnSURE.

In an effort to establish joint activities in the disposition of fissile materials from nuclear materials, the US and Russia agreed to conduct joint work to develop consistent comparisons of various alternatives for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Joint working groups were established for the analysis of alternatives for plutonium management for water reactors, fast reactors, storage, geological formations, immobilization and stabilization of solutions and other forms. In addition cross-cutting working groups were established for economic analysis and nonproliferation (NP). This paper reviews the activities of the NP working group in support of these studies. The NP working group provided integrated support in the area of nuclear NP to the other US/Russian Study teams. It involved both domestic safeguards and security and international safeguards. The analysis of NP involved consideration of the resistance to theft or diversion and resistance to retrieval, extraction or reuse.

A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered and include facilities which provide for long-ten-n and interim storage, convert and stabilize fissile materials for other disposition alternatives, immobilize fissile material in glass and/or ceramic material, fabricate fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and dispose of fissile material using a number of geologic alternatives. Particular attention will be given to the reactor alternatives which include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary LWRs and CANDU reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include processing which converts Pu to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility located in either the US or in Europe, US LWRs or the CANDU reactors and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository. This paper focuses on how the objectives of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction and nonproliferation will be accomplished and the possible impacts of meeting these objectives on facility operations and design. Some of the areas in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threat, and (4) potential proliferation risks, the impacts on the facilities, and safeguards and security issues unique to the presence of Category 1 or strategic special nuclear material.

The Department of Energy`s Office of Materials Disposition (MD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for fissile materials, preparing a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), preparing for a Record of Decision (ROD) regarding this material, and conducting other related activities. A primary objective of this program is to support U.S. nonproliferation policy by reducing major security risks. Particular areas of concern are the acquisition of this material by unauthorized persons and preventing the reintroduction of the material for use in weapons. This paper presents some of the issues, definitions, and assumptions addressed by the Safeguards and Security Project Team in support of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP). The discussion also includes some preliminary ideas regarding safeguards and security criteria that are applicable to the screening of disposition options.

The Department of Energy has defined a safeguards system to be an integrated system of physical protection, material accounting and material control subsystems designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession, use, or sabotage of SNM. In practice, safeguards involve the development and application of techniques and procedures dealing with the establishment and continued maintenance of a system of activities. The system must also include administrative controls and surveillance to assure that the procedures and techniques of the system are effective and are being carried out. The control of nuclear material is critical to the safeguarding of nuclear materials within the United States. The U.S. Department of Energy includes as part of material control four functional performance areas. They include access controls, material surveillance, material containment and detection/assessment. This paper will address not only these areas but also the relationship between material control and other safeguards and security functions.

As a result of a number of events the inventory of fissile materials no longer in nuclear weapons in the United States is increasing. This has led to a growing concern regarding the potential for theft and/or diversion and accountability of this material. Straight-Line is a project whose purpose is to demonstrate a site-independent system to monitor stored nuclear material (e.g. plutonium) and integrate the collection, processing and dissemination of information regarding this material. Safeguards and security (S&S) goals of this project include data transfer of information on nuclear material to appropriate users to enhance S&S, continuous on-line accountability, reduction of hands-on access to nuclear materials, incorporation of information security technologies, and early detection of tampering or unauthorized material movement. This paper addresses threat considerations, S&S requirements, S&S objectives, and issues for the Straight-Line project. S&S features and benefits of this project are discussed with respect to existing item monitoring systems and/or other material tracking systems being developed.

The Department of Energy`s Office of Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials, preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), preparing for a record of decision (ROD) regarding this material and conducting other activities. The primary security objectives of this program are to reduce major security risks and strengthen arms reduction and nonproliferation (NP). To help achieve these objectives, a safeguards and security (S&S) team consisting of participants from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established. The S&S activity for this program is a cross-cutting task which addresses all of the FMD program options. It includes both domestic and international safeguards and includes areas such as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will discuss the activities of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) S&S team as well as some specific S&S issues associated with various FMDP options/facilities. Some of the items to be discussed include the threat, S&S requirements, S&S criteria for assessing risk, S&S issues concerning fissile material processing/facilities, and international and domestic safeguards.

Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory have been designated as the technical lead for Security, Safeguards and Computer/Information Security systems for all the DOE Complex 21/Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) facilities. The physical protection systems in these facilities will be required to meet the most current DOE orders and incorporate the latest physical protection technologies, proven state-of-the-art systems and strategies. The planned approach requires that security assistance and information be provided to the designers (e.g. the Complex 21 Architect & Engineer and the Weapons Complex Lead Laboratories) as early as possible and throughout all design phases. The outcome should avoid the costly retrofits to existing facilities that have occurred in the past and result in effective and comprehensive protection against current and projected threats with minimal impact on operations, safety and costs. This paper discusses the physical protection considerations being promoted for the integrated design effort for the Complex 21/Reconfiguration facilities, such as the tritium, uranium/lithium, plutonium processing and storage, high explosive and assembly and disassembly facilities.