Publications

Abstract not provided.

Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of spent fuel throughout its life cycle is a key objective of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This report describes a project in which two specific technologies, cameras with infrared (IR) imaging capabilities and imaging sonar, were tested to determine their effectiveness in augmenting optical surveillance cameras currently used for maintaining CoK for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) staged in spent fuel pools. Furthermore, the project identifies any modifications required to the technologies to facilitate deployment for international safeguards purposes. This report presents results for the imaging sonar tested at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in a mockup spent nuclear fuel pool and for the IR-capable cameras tested by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the Oregon State University Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) research reactor.

Future nuclear arms - control agreements may place numerical limits on the total number of warheads in the nuclear arsenals of states. Verifying these limits may require inspectors to account for individual warheads, both deployed and non-deployed. This task could be accomplished with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. To resolve this dilemma, we revisit the so - called Buddy Tag concept first proposed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s. The conceptual innovation in the Buddy Tag was to by separate the tag from the treaty limited item itself. Verification of the pairings between tags and limited items would take place during a short-notice inspection, where the host would be required to produce one buddy tag for each item. Sensors on the Buddy Tag would show that it had not been moved to the inspected site after the inspection was declared (e.g., within the last 24-48 hours). If the inspector counted more (or fewer) treaty limited items than Buddy Tags at the inspected site, a treaty violation could be asserted. Using a number of single-site inspections, an inspecting party can hold the host at risk for discovery of violating the treaty at an enterprise level by possessing more treaty limited items than the treaty allows. In this project, we developed a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper summarizes the performance requirements for an advanced Buddy Tag, the proposed conduct of operations, the design choices and functionalities of the different subsystems, and initial testing results. The report also summarizes peer review feedback obtained throughout the project.

Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.

Deep borehole disposal (DBD) has been suggested as an option for disposing spent nuclear fuel in a number of countries, including several countries that are subject to international safeguards. DBD presents some distinct challenges for safeguards compared to a conventional mined geological repository (MGR), including the ability to verify declared design information about the borehole. The ability to verify a borehole's design is crucial for assuring that spent fuel or other accountable nuclear materials are disposed as declared in a borehole of known and verifiable design. This study reviews existing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) borehole inspection tools currently used by the drilling industry, and evaluates the capabilities of those COTS inspection tools against how well they can meet potential needs and requirements of Design Information Verification (DIV) inspections for international safeguards. The study provides recommendations for several promising COTS borehole inspection tools that might be used for DIV safeguards inspections and recommends possible modifications and future testing

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Today’s international nuclear safeguards inspectors have access to an increasing volume of supplemental information about the facilities under their purview, including commercial satellite imagery, nuclear trade data, open source information, and results from previous safeguards activities. In addition to completing traditional in-field safeguards activities, inspectors are now responsible for being able to act upon this growing corpus of supplemental safeguards-relevant data and for maintaining situational awareness of unusual activities taking place in their environment. However, cognitive science research suggests that maintaining too much information can be detrimental to a user’s understanding, and externalizing information (for example, to a mobile device) to reduce cognitive burden can decrease cognitive function related to memory, navigation, and attention. Given this dichotomy, how can international nuclear safeguards inspectors better synthesize information to enhance situational awareness, decision making, and performance in the field? This paper examines literature from the fields of cognitive science and human factors in the areas of wayfinding, situational awareness, equipment and technical assistance, and knowledge transfer, and describes the implications for the provision of, and interaction with, safeguards-relevant information for international nuclear safeguards inspectors working in the field.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Containment/Surveillance (C/S) measures are critical to any verification regime in order to maintain Continuity of Knowledge (CoK). The Ceramic Seal project is research into the next generation technologies to advance C/S, in particular improving security and efficiency. The Ceramic Seal is a small form factor loop seal with improved tamper-indication including a frangible seal body, tamper planes, external coatings, and electronic monitoring of the seal body integrity. It improves efficiency through a self-securing wire and in-situ verification with a handheld reader. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), under sponsorship from the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D), have previously designed and have now fabricated and tested Ceramic Seals. Tests have occurred at both SNL and SRNL, with different types of tests occurring at each facility. This interim report will describe the Ceramic Seal prototype, the design and development of a handheld standalone reader and an interface to a data acquisition system, fabrication of the seals, and results of initial testing.

This purpose of this document is to provide an overview of Chain of Custody (CoC) technology options that could be made available for the LETTERPRESS exercise as part of the Quad Working Group. The Quad Working Group comprises five sub-working groups (Management, Protocol, Simulation, Technology, and Training) with members from the U.S., U.K., Norway, and Sweden having the goal of providing a repeatable, realistic arms control exercise (dubbed LETTERPRESS) to be executed in representative facilities and using non-proliferative but representative treaty items. The Technology Working Group is responsible for supporting the technology requirements of the LETTERPRESS exercise and as such the technologies presented here are possible options to meet those requirements.

International nuclear safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the correctness and completeness of declarations made by States about their nuclear activities. The systems used to verify such activities include electronic and digital hardware and software components capable of data collection, processing, analysis, storage and transmission. Despite increasing efforts to protect digital systems against unauthorized access or attack through cybersecurity measures, these systems are not immune to cyber exploitation that could compromise their integrity or reliability. Previous versions of these systems did not include capabilities that exist today, such as BluetoothTM and GPS. The inclusion of these new capabilities, as well as new data processing and storage mechanisms, adds new attack vectors and opportunities for adversaries to exploit the devices that did not previously exist. As mentioned in the above referenced Cybersecurity for Safeguards study, cyber-domain vulnerabilities present risks to the equipment used to perform the international nuclear safeguards mission. The IAEA has produced guidance on the protection of nuclear facilities and their computer systems against cyber threats, but these documents do not specifically address the risks to safeguards or safeguards equipment. In response, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Safeguards/Safeguards Technology Development (NA-241) sponsored Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia, SNL) and the Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho, INL) to conduct a one-year study to evaluate cyber related vulnerabilities in safeguards equipment and develop recommendations for the mitigation of any identified risks.

The ability to track nuclear material is a challenge for resiliency of complex systems, e.g., harsh environments. RF tags, frequently used in national security applications, cannot be used for technological, operational, or safety reasons. Magnetic Smart Tags (MaST) is a novel tag technology based on magnetoelastic sensing that circumvents these issues. This technology is enabled by a new, cost-effective, batch manufacturing electrochemical deposition (ECD) process. This new advancement in fabrication enables multi-frequency tags capable of providing millions of possible codes for tag identification unlike existing theft deterrent tags that can convey only a single bit of information. Magnetostrictive 70% Co: 30% Fe was developed as the base alloy comprising the magnetoelastic resonator transduction element. Saturation magnetostriction, λ_S, has been externally measured by the Naval Research Laboratory to be as high as 78 ppm. Description of a novel MEMS variable capacitive test structure is described for future measurements of this parameter.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Action Sheet 1 between the United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Forschungszentrum Julich (FZJ) for "Assessment of Lifecycle Challenges for the Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS)" explores the lifecycle challenges of the EOSS and identifies a strategy for the further management of the EOSS within the context of Germany's safeguards implementation. Specifically, the assessment explores lifecycle challenges for use of the seal during reactor operation, shutdown and removal of spent fuel, and the decommissioning process in Germany, identifying possible upgrades to the seal, and providing recommendations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) on what should be done to ensure the reliability and usability of the EOSS over the next decade.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.

Abstract not provided.