Advancement of Dynamic Assessment Methodologies for Transportation Security
Abstract not provided.
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Jump to search filtersSYSTEMS THEORETIC PROCESS ANALYSIS TOOLS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS SAFEGUARDS EVALUATION
Abstract not provided.
Socio-Technical Interactions: A New Paradigm for Nuclear Security
Abstract not provided.
System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA): Overview of Sandia Uses to Address National Security Problems
Abstract not provided.
Security Safety and Safeguards (3S) Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors
Abstract not provided.
Addressing Cyber Hazards in Nuclear Power Plants with Systems Theoretic-Informed Fault Trees
Abstract not provided.
Partnering between the IAEA Collaboration Center for Human Resource and Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Development & Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII)
Abstract not provided.
Preliminary Results from a Comparative Analysis of Counterintelligence and Insider Threat Mitigation in Nuclear Facilities
Abstract not provided.
“Defense by other means”: future evolution(s) of cooperative threat reduction
Nonproliferation Review
This article discusses likely future contexts of, and options for, global threat-reduction activities to support nonproliferation goals over the next five to ten years. Threat-reduction activities span a continuum from unilateral actions that the United States might take with little cooperation and transparency at one end to cooperative actions associated with negotiated treaties and agreements at the other. This study focuses on cooperative approaches embodied in the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which has been the most visible program reducing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction for over two decades. Here, we argue that CTR’s evolution can be described in terms of the relationship between the desired US influence on outcomes, the ability to generate a common threat definition, and appetite for collaboration on threat reduction. To that end, this article provides an introduction and overview of CTR initiatives over its twenty-seven-year history and a review of relevant legislation and trends. After introducing and describing the CTR Possible Futures Framework, this article offers five possible options for—and discusses the implications of—CTR’s future evolution.
Advancement of Dynamic Assessment Methodologies for Transportation Security
Abstract not provided.
Integrated Safety and Security Dynamic Event Tree Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants
Abstract not provided.
Using Systems Theoretic Perspectives for Risk-Informed Cyber Hazard Analysis in Nuclear Power Plants
Abstract not provided.
Using Systems Theoretic Perspectives for Risk-Informed Cyber Hazard Analysis in Nuclear Power Plants
Abstract not provided.
EXPLORING INTEGRATED SAFETY/SECURITY DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENTS (DPRA) FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Abstract not provided.
System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume I)—Technical Evaluation of Safety Safeguards & Security
Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors—increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aim of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives.
System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume II). Conclusions & Implications
Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors-- increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aims of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives.
?Defense by Other Means?: Future Evolution(s) of Cooperative Threat Reduction (Slides)
Abstract not provided.
Final Results from a System-Theoretic Framework for Mitigating Complex Risks in International Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Abstract not provided.
An Engineering Systems Framework for Analyzing Nuclear Security (Slides)
Abstract not provided.
The Next Steps for the Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) (Slides)
Abstract not provided.
Summary of a Sandia National Laboratories Workshop on Extended Probabilistic Risk Assessment (ePRA)-Slides
Abstract not provided.
An Engineering Systems Framework for Analyzing Nuclear Security (Paper)
Abstract not provided.
Summary of a Sandia National Laboratories Workshop on Extended Probabilistic Risk Assessment (ePRA)
Abstract not provided.
Beyond Gates Guards and Guns: The Systems-Theoretic Framework for Security at Nuclear Facilities (Final Dissertation)
Abstract not provided.
Using Systems Theory to Address Complex Challenges to International Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation (Slides)
Abstract not provided.
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