Type B packages for the transportation of radioactive materials must remain 'essentially leak tight' under severe regulatory accident conditions, defined in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 10 CFR 71·73 and the International Atomic Energy Agency's TS-R-1. The 9-m free drop test requirement onto an unyielding surface is performed in an orientation 'for which maximum damage is expected'. Analytical techniques are used to evaluate various possible impact orientations before testing, and historically these maximal damage orientations have been side, slap-down, end, and centre-ofgravity over corner. Other orientations are rarely considered. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was asked by Equipos NuclearesSA (ENSA) todesign, analyse, and test animpact limiter system for a newly designed rail cask. During the conceptual design process, SNL performed due diligence and evaluated a wide spectrum of possible impact orientations, in order to assure that peak cask body acceleration design goals were not exceeded. However, design of the impact limiter, including not only crush strength of constituent materials (which can be orientation and temperature dependent), but also the shape of the impact limiter, greatly affects peak acceleration response during 9-m drops in various orientations. Although many impact limiter design shapes resemble truncated right circular cylinders attached to each end of the cask, some tend to round the outer corners or truncate those corners with conical sections. SNL's original conceptual design followed a similar theme, intending to use polyurethane foam or aluminium honeycomb within a bevelled corner shaped cylindrical shell. Detailed finite element analyses indicated excellent impact resistance at regulatory cold temperatures in the stereotypically tested side, slap-down, end, and CGOC impact orientations. Shortly before proceeding to engineering design, a rarely-considered impact orientation of 45° from horizontal indicated that cask body acceleration levels jumped unexpectedly, exceeding the design goal due to insufficient crushable material protecting the sharp corner of the cask. A complete re-design of the impact limiter was necessary, and the lessons learned from this experience could have implications for future impact limiter designs, and possibly existing designs that may not have considered this atypical impact orientation during the design process.
The Plutonium Air Transportable Package, Model PAT-1, is certified under Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per Certificate of Compliance (CoC) USA/0361B(U)F-96 (currently Revision 9). The purpose of this SAR Addendum is to incorporate plutonium (Pu) metal as a new payload for the PAT-1 package. The Pu metal is packed in an inner container (designated the T-Ampoule) that replaces the PC-1 inner container. The documentation and results from analysis contained in this addendum demonstrate that the replacement of the PC-1 and associated packaging material with the T-Ampoule and associated packaging with the addition of the plutonium metal content are not significant with respect to the design, operating characteristics, or safe performance of the containment system and prevention of criticality when the package is subjected to the tests specified in 10 CFR 71.71, 71.73 and 71.74.
The Plutonium Air Transportable Package, Model PAT-1, is certified under Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per Certificate of Compliance (CoC) USA/0361B(U)F-96 (currently Revision 9). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) submitted SAND Report SAND2009-5822 to NRC that documented the incorporation of plutonium (Pu) metal as a new payload for the PAT-1 package. NRC responded with a Request for Additional Information (RAI), identifying information needed in connection with its review of the application. The purpose of this SAND report is to provide the authors responses to each RAI. SAND Report SAND2010-6106 containing the proposed changes to the Addendum is provided separately.
Increasing computational speed has led to the development and use of sophisticated numerical methods in radioactive material (RAM) transportation container design. The design of a RAM container often involves a complex coupling of structural, thermal, and radioactive shielding analyses. Sandia National Laboratories has integrated automatic mesh generation, explicit structural finite element analysis, transient thermal finite element analysis, and numerical optimization techniques into a unified RAM container design tool to increase the efficiency of both the design process and the resultant design through coupled analyses. Although development of this technique has progressed significantly, inaccurate numerical gradients due to design space nonsmoothness and excessive computational time have hampered successful implementation of numerical optimization as a ``black box`` design tool. This paper presents the details of analysis tool integration, simplified model development, constraint boundary nonsmoothness difficulties, and numerical optimization results for a lightweight composite-overpack Type B RAM package subject to dynamic crush and fuel fire accident condition constraints.
H1224A weapons containers have been used for years by the Department of Energy and Department of Defense to transport and store W78 warhead midsections. Although designed to protect these midsections only in low-energy handling drop and impact accidents, a recent transportation risk assessment effort has identified a need to evaluate the container`s ability to protect weapons in higher-energy environments. Four impact tests were performed on H1224A containers with W78 Mod 6c mass mockup midsections inside, onto an essentially unyielding target. Dynamic acceleration and strain levels were recorded during the side-on and end-on impacts, each at 12.2 m/s (40 ft/s) and 38.1 m/s (125 ft/s). Measured peak accelerations experienced by the midsections during lower velocity impacts ranged from 250 to 600 Gs for the end-on impact and 350 to 600 Gs for the side-on impact. Measured peak accelerations of the midsections during the higher velocity impacts ranged from 3,000 to 10,000 Gs for the end-on impact and 8,000 to 10,000 Gs for the side-on impact. Deformations in the H1224A container ranged from minimal to severe buckling and weld tearing. At higher impact velocities, the H1224A container may not provide significant energy absorption for the re-entry vehicle midsection but can provide some confinement of potentially damaged components.
H1224A weapons containers have been used for years by the Departments of Energy and Defense to transport and store W78 warhead midsections. Although designed to protect the midsections only from low-energy impacts, a recent transportation risk assessment effort has identified a need to evaluate the container`s ability to protect weapons in more severe accident environments. Four radiant heat tests were performed: two each on an H1224A container (with a Mk12a Mod 6c mass mock-up midsection inside) and two on a low-cost simulated H1224A container (with a hollow Mk12 aeroshell midsections inside). For each unit tested, temperatures were recorded at numerous points throughout the container and midsection during a 4-hour 121{degrees}C (250{degrees}F) and 30-minute 1010{degrees}C (1850{degrees}F) radiant environment. Measured peak temperatures experienced by the inner walls of the midsections as a result of exposure to the high-temperature radiant environment ranged from 650{degrees} C to 980{degrees} C (1200{degrees} F to 1800{degrees}F) for the H1224A container and 770 {degrees} to 990 {degrees}C (1420{degrees} F to 1810{degrees}F) for the simulated container. The majority of both containers were completely destroyed during the high-temperature test. Temperature profiles will be used to benchmark analytical models and predict warhead midsection temperatures over a wide range of the thermal accident conditions.