Two relatively under-reported facets of fuel storage fire safety are examined in this work for a 250, 000 gallon two-tank storage system. Ignition probability is linked to the radiative flux from a presumed fire. First, based on observed features of existing designs, fires are expected to be largely contained within a designed footprint that will hold the full spilled contents of the fuel. The influence of the walls and the shape of the tanks on the magnitude of the fire is not a well-described aspect of conventional fire safety assessment utilities. Various resources are herein used to explore the potential hazard for a contained fire of this nature. Second, an explosive attack on the fuel storage has not been widely considered in prior work. This work explores some options for assessing this hazard. The various methods for assessing the constrained conventional fires are found to be within a reasonable degree of agreement. This agreement contrasts with the hazard from an explosive dispersal. Best available assessment techniques are used, which highlight some inadequacies in the existing toolsets for making predictions of this nature. This analysis, using the best available tools, suggests the offset distance for the ignition hazard from a fireball will be on the same order as the offset distance for the blast damage. This suggests the buy-down of risk by considering the fireball is minimal when considering the blast hazards. Assessment tools for the fireball predictions are not particularly mature, and ways to improve them for a higher-fidelity estimate are noted.
Two relatively under-reported facets of fuel storage fire safety are examined in this work for a 250, 000 gallon two-tank storage system. Ignition probability is linked to the radiative flux from a presumed fire. First, based on observed features of existing designs, fires are expected to be largely contained within a designed footprint that will hold the full spilled contents of the fuel. The influence of the walls and the shape of the tanks on the magnitude of the fire is not a well-described aspect of conventional fire safety assessment utilities. Various resources are herein used to explore the potential hazard for a contained fire of this nature. Second, an explosive attack on the fuel storage has not been widely considered in prior work. This work explores some options for assessing this hazard. The various methods for assessing the constrained conventional fires are found to be within a reasonable degree of agreement. This agreement contrasts with the hazard from an explosive dispersal. Best available assessment techniques are used, which highlight some inadequacies in the existing toolsets for making predictions of this nature. This analysis, using the best available tools, suggests the offset distance for the ignition hazard from a fireball will be on the same order as the offset distance for the blast damage. This suggests the buy-down of risk by considering the fireball is minimal when considering the blast hazards. Assessment tools for the fireball predictions are not particularly mature, and ways to improve them for a higher-fidelity estimate are noted.
Sabotage of spent nuclear fuel casks remains a concern nearly forty years after attacks against shipment casks were first analyzed and has a renewed relevance in the post-9/11 environment. A limited number of full-scale tests and supporting efforts using surrogate materials, typically depleted uranium dioxide (DUO 2 ), have been conducted in the interim to more definitively determine the source term from these postulated events. However, the validity of these large- scale results remain in question due to the lack of a defensible spent fuel ratio (SFR), defined as the amount of respirable aerosol generated by an attack on a mass of spent fuel compared to that of an otherwise identical surrogate. Previous attempts to define the SFR in the 1980's have resulted in estimates ranging from 0.42 to 12 and include suboptimal experimental techniques and data comparisons. Because of the large uncertainty surrounding the SFR, estimates of releases from security-related events may be unnecessarily conservative. Credible arguments exist that the SFR does not exceed a value of unity. A defensible determination of the SFR in this lower range would greatly reduce the calculated risk associated with the transport and storage of spent nuclear fuel in dry cask systems. In the present work, the shock physics codes CTH and ALE3D were used to simulate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and DUO 2 targets impacted by a high-velocity jet at an ambient temperature condition. These preliminary results are used to illustrate an approach to estimate the respirable release fraction for each type of material and ultimately, an estimate of the SFR. This page intentionally blank
Sabotage of spent nuclear fuel casks remains a concern nearly forty years after attacks against shipment casks were first analyzed and has a renewed relevance in the post-9/11 environment. A limited number of full-scale tests and supporting efforts using surrogate materials, typically depleted uranium dioxide (DUO2), have been conducted in the interim to more definitively determine the source term from these postulated events. In all the previous studies, the postulated attack of greatest interest was by a conical shape charge (CSC) that focuses the explosive energy much more efficiently than bulk explosives. However, the validity of these large-scale results remain in question due to the lack of a defensible Spent Fuel Ratio (SFR), defined as the amount of respirable aerosol generated by an attack on a mass of spent fuel compared to that of an otherwise identical surrogate. Previous attempts to define the SFR in the 1980's have resulted in estimates ranging from 0.42 to 12 and include suboptimal experimental techniques and data comparisons. Because of the large uncertainty surrounding the SFR, estimates of releases from security-related events may be unnecessarily conservative. Credible arguments exist that the SFR does not exceed a value of unity. A defensible determination of the SFR in this lower range would greatly reduce the calculated risk associated with the transport and storage of spent nuclear fuel in dry cask systems. In the present work, the CTH shock physics code is used to simulate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and DUO2 targets impacted by a CSC jet at an ambient temperature condition. These preliminary results are used to illustrate an approach to estimate the respirable release fraction for each type of material and ultimately, an estimate of the SFR.
The 9/30/2008 ASC Level 2 Post-Processing V&V Milestone (Milestone 2843) contains functionality required by the user community for certain verification and validation tasks. These capabilities include fragment detection from CTH simulation data, fragment characterization and analysis, and fragment sorting and display operations. The capabilities were tested extensively both on sample and actual simulations. In addition, a number of stretch criteria were met including a comparison between simulated and test data, and the ability to output each fragment as an individual geometric file.