This study presents a method that can be used to gain information relevant to determining the corrosion risk for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters during extended dry storage. Currently, it is known that stainless steel canisters are susceptible to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC). However, the rate of CISCC degradation and the likelihood that it could lead to a through-wall crack is unknown. This study uses well-developed computational fluid dynamics and particle-tracking tools and applies them to SNF storage to determine the rate of deposition on canisters. The deposition rate is determined for a vertical canister system and a horizontal canister system, at various decay heat rates with a uniform particle size distribution, ranging from 0.25 to 25 µm, used as an input. In all cases, most of the dust entering the overpack passed through without depositing. Most of what was retained in the overpack was deposited on overpack surfaces (e.g., inlet and outlet vents); only a small fraction was deposited on the canister itself. These results are provided for generalized canister systems with a generalized input; as such, this technical note is intended to demonstrate the technique. This study is a part of an ongoing effort funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Energy Office of Spent Fuel Waste Science and Technology, which is tasked with doing research relevant to developing a sound technical basis for ensuring the safe extended storage and subsequent transport of SNF. This work is being presented to demonstrate a potentially useful technique for SNF canister vendors, utilities, regulators, and stakeholders to utilize and further develop for their own designs and site-specific studies.
This initial gap analysis considers proposed accident tolerant fuel (ATF) options currently being irradiated in commercial reactors, since these are most likely for future batch implementation. Also, advanced fuel (AF) options that may be likely for use in advanced reactors are considered. The cladding technologies considered were chromium-coated zirconium-based alloys, FeCrAl, and both monolithic and matrix composite Silicide carbide (SiC). The fuel technologies considered were chromium-doped uranium dioxide fuel, uranium alloys, uranium nitride, and uranium silicide. Numerous national labs, industry, and countries are performing significant testing and modeling on these proposed technologies to establish performance, but at this time none of the prototypes being irradiated have achieved end-of-life (EOL) burnup. There are some testing results after one burnup cycle to verify in-reactor performance, but little data beyond that. As the ATF prototypes acquire more burnup, data will be produced that is relevant to storage and transportation. The DOE:NE Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SWFST) Storage and Transportation (ST) Control Account will evaluate the performance data as it becomes available for application to the identified gaps for ST.
The 30 cm drop is the remaining NRC normal conditions of transport (NCT) regulatory requirement (10 CFR 71.71) for which there are no data on the response of spent fuel. While obtaining data on the spent fuel is not a direct requirement, it allows for quantifying the risk of fuel breakage resulting from a cask drop from a height of 30 cm or less. Because a full-scale cask and impact limiters are very expensive, 3 consecutive drop tests were conducted to obtain strains on a full-scale surrogate 17x17 PWR assembly. The first step was a 30 cm drop of a 1/3 scale cask loaded with dummy assemblies. The second step was a 30 cm drop test of a full-scale dummy assembly. The third step was a 30 cm drop of a full-scale surrogate assembly. The results of this final test are presented in this paper. The test was conducted in May 2020. The acceleration pulses on the surrogate assembly were in good agreement with the expected pulses derived from steps 1 and 2. This confirmed that during the 30 cm drop the surrogate assembly experienced the same conditions as it would have if it had been dropped in a full-scale cask with impact limiters. The surrogate assembly was instrumented with 27 strain gauges. Pressure paper was inserted between the rods within the two long and two short spacer grid spans in order to register the pressure in case of rod-to-rod contact. The maximum observed peak strain on the surrogate assembly was 1,724 microstrain at the bottom end of the assembly. The pressure paper sheets from the two short spans were blank. The pressure paper sheets from the two long spans, except a few middle ones, showed marks indicating rod-to-rod contact. The maximum estimated contact pressure was 4,100 psi. The longitudinal bending stress corresponding to the maximum observed strain value (calculated from the stress-strain curve for low burnup cladding) was 22,230 psi. Both values are significantly below the yield strength of the cladding. The major conclusion is that the fuel rods will maintain their integrity following a 30 cm drop inside of a transportation cask.
The 30 cm drop is the remaining NRC normal conditions of transport (NCT) regulatory requirement (10 CFR 71.71) for which there are no data on the actual surrogate fuel. While obtaining data on the actual fuel is not a direct requirement, it provides definitive information which aids in quantifying the risk of fuel breakage resulting from a cask drop from a height of 30 cm or less. The 30 cm drop test with the full-scale surrogate assembly conducted in May 2020 was the last step needed for quantifying the strains on the surrogate assembly rods under NCT. The full-scale surrogate assembly used in the 2020 30 cm drop test was built using a new 17x17 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Westinghouse skeleton filled with the copper rods and 3 zircaloy rods from the full-scale surrogate assembly used in the Multi-Modal Transportation Test (MMTT). Felt pads were attached to the surrogate assembly bottom prior to the 30 cm drop to adequately represent the effects of the impact limiters and the cask. Note that felt "programming material" has been used extensively in past drop tests and is known to be a good material for programming a desired shock pulse. The felt pad configuration was determined during a previous series of tests reported in. The acceleration pulses observed on the surrogate assembly during the test were in good agreement with the expected pulses. This confirmed that during the 30 cm drop the surrogate assembly experienced the same conditions as it would if it was dropped in the cask with the impact limiters.
This report is a condensed version of previous reports identifying technical gaps that, if addressed, could be used to ensure the continued safe storage of SNF for extended periods and support licensing activities. This report includes updated gap priority assessments because the previous gap priorities were based on R&D performed through 2017. Much important work has been done since 2017 that requires a change in a few of the priority rankings to better focus the near-term R&D program. Background material, regulatory positions, operational and inventory status, and prioritization schemes are discussed in detail in Hanson et al. (2012) and Hanson and Alsaed (2019) and are not repeated in this report. One exception is an overview of the prioritization criteria for reference. This is meant to give the reader an appreciation of the framework for prioritization of the identified gaps. A complete discussion of the prioritization scheme is provided in Hanson and Alsaed (2019).
The data from the multi-modal transportation test conducted in 2017 demonstrated that the inputs from the shock events during all transport modes (truck, rail, and ship) were amplified from the cask to the spent commercial nuclear fuel surrogate assemblies. These data do not support common assumption that the cask content experiences the same accelerations as the cask itself. This was one of the motivations for conducting 30 cm drop tests. The goal of the 30 cm drop test is to measure accelerations and strains on the surrogate spent nuclear fuel assembly and to determine whether the fuel rods can maintain their integrity inside a transportation cask when dropped from a height of 30 cm. The 30 cm drop is the remaining NRC normal conditions of transportation regulatory requirement (10 CFR 71.71) for which there are no data on the actual surrogate fuel. Because the full-scale cask and impact limiters were not available (and their cost was prohibitive), it was proposed to achieve this goal by conducting three separate tests. This report describes the first two tests — the 30 cm drop test of the 1/3 scale cask (conducted in December 2018) and the 30 cm drop of the full-scale dummy assembly (conducted in June 2019). The dummy assembly represents the mass of a real spent nuclear fuel assembly. The third test (to be conducted in the spring of 2020) will be the 30 cm drop of the full-scale surrogate assembly. The surrogate assembly represents a real full-scale assembly in physical, material, and mechanical characteristics, as well as in mass.
The Department of Energy(DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program is performing research and development in the area of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) long term storage and transportation. This program is being conducted under the provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 and its amendments that require the DOE to take title to and manage SNF after storage at the utility reactor site. This report is a condensed version of previous gap reports (Hanson 2012 and Hanson 2019) with up-dated gap priority assessments. The gap priorities have been updated from Hanson 2019 because 2019 is based on R&D performed through 2017. Much important work has been done since 2017 that requires a change in a few of the priority rankings to better focus the near-term R&D program. Background material, regulatory positions, operational and inventory status, and prioritization schemes are discussed in detail in Hanson 2012/2019, and are not repeated in this report. One exception is an overview of the prioritization criteria for reference. This is meant to give the reader an appreciation of the framework for prioritization of the identified gaps. A complete discussion of the prioritization scheme is provided in Hanson 2019.